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APPENDIX
The Questions Submitted to Counterterrorism Officials
1- Do you think that security detention should be legalized in Turkey? Is it common in your
experience that individuals who are released due to lack of sufficient evidence later engage
in terrorism?
2- In what cases do you need preventive detention? Is intelligence information (such as
information obtained via preventive electronic surveillance) enough to prevent terrorist
attacks, or do you need any other preventive measures to terminate the activities of
dangerous people?
3- What do you think about material witness detention in the U.S.? Should it also be legalized
in Turkey? Would such an amendment contribute to your counterterrorism efforts?
4- Should dangerousness be enacted as another reason for pre-trial detention? Is there a need
to amend the Criminal Procedure Code in that respect?
5- What amendments do you think are necessary for Turkish Criminal Procedure Code and
the Counterterrorism Code? What are the deficiencies of current rules on arrest, pre-trial
detention, electronic surveillance, and search and seizure? Should the strong suspicion
requirement in electronic surveillance be lowered to the probable cause standard?
6- Do you think that rules regarding the use of force are sufficient? What are the relevant
issues arising in practice? Are there any statistics on the number of security officials who
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are; 1) accused or convicted of murder due to the excessive use of force, or 2) subjected to
any disciplinary punishment?
7- Should intelligence information be used as evidence at trial? What are the advantages and
disadvantages of such an amendment in the Turkish system?
8- What level of suspicion do you seek for preventive electronic surveillance? The Police
Code does not provide any standard of cause. Do you seek reasonable suspicion or probable
cause in practice?
9- Do security officials have any difficulty in conceptualizing different levels of suspicion?
Can you explain your understanding of reasonable suspicion, probable cause and clear and
convincing evidence standards? Do you think that Turkish law is clear enough? Do you
think that relevant rules in the Criminal Procedure Code is consistent with the Police Code?
10- What legal amendments should be made for better intelligence gathering, especially
through data surveillance?
11- What is your suggestion for strengthening oversight mechanisms to oversee the intelligence
unit of the police department?
12- What legal amendments are necessary in your opinion to more effectively prevent terrorist
attacks?
13- How is the immigration detention of terror suspects conducted in practice? Is the state able
to obtain information about future attacks through the interrogation of immigration
detainees? What is the average period of detention?
14- What amendments should be made regarding terror crimes? Do you think that Turkey
should expand the scope of terror crimes and criminalize more remote preparatory acts as
in France and Germany? Is there such a need in practice?
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15- What issues arise with regard to the right to counsel during interrogation?
16- Should lawyers be excluded from interrogations in terror crimes? What are the advantages
and disadvantages of a potential exclusion?
17- Was there any occasion in your past experience that procedural rights in the investigative
stage were not reminded or you thought should not have been reminded at all?
18- What factors do you use for risk assessments to prevent terrorist attacks? Should there be
different security regimes for different levels of terror risks?
19- What is the reasonable arrest-detention period in your opinion? How many days do you
need for a proper interrogation of a terrorist?
20- Which countries provide material and financial support to terrorist organizations in
Turkey?
21- How do preventive and investigative police departments coordinate with each other?
22- To what extent terrorist offenders become (more) radicalized in prison conditions? What
are the reasons for prison radicalization in your experience?
23- To what extent terrorist offenders continue to commit terror crimes after they are released
from prisons? Is there a statistical data on recidivism among terrorist offenders?
24- Do you think that special expertise is necessary for judicial officials in counterterrorism?
Do you support the idea that a special counterterrorism court system should be established
in Turkey for more effective counterterrorism? How the experience of a regular judge
would differ from that of an expert judge?
25- What other legal amendments do you think are necessary for more effective
counterterrorism? Which are the most problematic rules in your opinion?
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Imagine a 17-year-old boy who takes part in the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)’s
massacre of villagers in Southeastern Turkey, and who works in the immediate personal service
of a militant leader. He gets arrested in a police raid. Since the boy has served the group leader for
a substantial period of time, the police believe that interrogating him might reveal substantial
information regarding future attacks and connections in the leader cadre. The terrorist organization
sends a lawyer to the police station to compel the boy to refuse to disclose any information about
the organization and the village massacre event. The lawyer secretly threatens the boy with the
lives of his mom and siblings, and coerces him into rejecting any cooperation request from the
police. As a result, the boy refuses to disclose any information. The police try hard to persuade the
boy to collaborate with the state. They remind him that his cooperation may lead to a lesser
sentence, and that he is young enough to establish a new life after the serving of his sentence. The
boy nevertheless does not assist the police as he is worried about his family’s life.
If the police had the right to exclude defense counsel upon a showing of reasonable
suspicion of coercion, the boy might have cooperated with the police. The leader cadre might have
been revealed, and future attacks might have been prevented. The boy might have received a lower
sentence, which means a diminished time in jail and a higher likelihood of re-integration into
society after release.
These are the kinds of problems that counterterrorism specialists in Turkey encounter on a
daily basis. Similar issues arise due to inadequate preventive legal measures and the lack of judicial
expertise on counterterrorism. This dissertation examines whether Turkish law could be amended
in order to more fully address the concerns of counterterrorism officials without unnecessarily
infringing on relevant rights.
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This study differs from other research conducted on counterterrorism law in a number of
ways. First, it provides general information on the concept of terrorism and the history and
evolution of terrorism in Turkey. It further compares terrorism in Turkey with Europe and the
United States (U.S.). Second, it compares relevant counterterrorism laws of the United States, the
United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Turkey. Third, it shows the approaches of the European
and United States highest courts to shared counterterrorism law issues. Fourth, it incorporates
interviews with counterterrorism officials in Turkey in the course of its analysis in each chapter,
for more concrete legal assessment involving the needs of Turkish counterterrorism practice.
The dissertation is comprised of two sections. Section I explains terrorism, its evolution,
national and international definitions and common elements of terrorism. It also describes the
history and evolution of terrorism in Turkey, and compares Turkey’s terrorism with that of the
United States and Europe. It later shows the methodology followed by the author when
determining proposals for Turkish counterterrorism law: a) the comparison of European and
United States laws with Turkish law, and the determination of the gaps in Turkish law, b)
interviews with security officials, judges and prosecutors who have experience in counterterrorism,
c) the incorporation of the findings in interviews as supporting arguments for proposed legal
amendments in Turkey. Section II proposes three main amendments to Turkish law; compares
relevant European and United States laws with the Turkish law; analyzes the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR) and the United States Supreme Court decisions on these proposals; and
integrates interviews to support arguments for the proposals.
This study suggests three amendments to Turkish law. First, preventive detention on future
dangerousness grounds (in the pre-trial and post-sentence stages) should be enacted in Turkey.
Second, a public safety exception to the right to counsel and the right to be informed of procedural
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rights during police interrogation should be established. Further, defense counsel who are engaged
in representing others in the same terrorist organization or who aim to obstruct justice in certain
ways should be excluded from police interrogation via a magistrate court order. Third, a
specialized counterterrorism court system, which involves judges and prosecutors with
comprehensive knowledge and expertise on Turkey’s national security priorities and the
characteristics of terrorist organizations, should be established.

I.TERRORISM
This section includes five chapters. The first chapter explains the concept of terrorism, its
evolution over time, the national and international definitions of terrorism, and common elements
of terrorism. The second chapter explains the history of terrorism in Turkey, and compares
Turkey’s terrorism with that of the United States and Europe. The third chapter sheds light on the
roots of Turkish law and Turkey’s adoption of European legal standards, and generally compares
European and American legal standards. The fourth chapter provides information about interviews
with counterterrorism officials, and their way of use in this thesis. Finally, the fifth chapter informs
the reader about initial and final proposals of legal amendment asserted by the author.

A.INTRODUCTION
1. Terror and Terrorism
The term terror in English originates from the Latin word terrēre that means “frighten”.1
Terrorism is more of a political and legal term. The Encyclopedia Britannica defines it as “the

1

HAMIDE ZAFER, CEZA HUKUKUNDA TERRORIZM [TERRORISM IN CRIMINAL LAW] 9 (1999); HANS H. ØRBERG, LATINENGLISH VOCABULARY II 36 (1998).
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systematic use of violence to create a general climate of fear in a population and thereby to bring
about a particular political objective”.2 While terror refers to the subjective experience of extreme
fear, terrorism alludes to the systematic and planned utilization of violent or non-violent
terrorizing methods against individuals to coerce a government to fulfill terrorists’ political
demands.3 Terrorism, in this sense, is regarded as one of the oldest psychological warfare
techniques.4
The term terrorism was first used in France in the aftermath of the French Revolution to
indicate the Reign of Terror between 1793 and 1794.5 Yet, the systematic and planned use of
violence to fulfill political goals dates back to Ancient Times. The first known terrorist acts were
conducted in the first century by Jewish Zealots known as the Sicarii. The Sicarii formed an
uprising against the Roman Occupation in Palestine6 that brought about the destruction of the
second temple in 70 A.D. and the Diaspora.7 The Sicarii (Dagger men of Zealots) used a small but
lethal knife called sica to assassinate Roman officials and their Jewish collaborators by hit and run
techniques in crowds.8 The Sicarii also sabotaged public buildings, grain depots and aqueducts.9
Another important terrorist organization, which invented terrorist methods and the organizational
structure utilized by today’s terrorist groups, was the Ismaili Sect known as the Assassins.10 The

2

ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, BRITANNICA CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA 1890 (2006).
PAUL WILKINSON, TERRORISM AND THE LIBERAL STATE 47-49 (1977).
4
Id. at 49.
5
ANDREW MANGO, TURKEY AND THE WAR ON TERROR: FOR FORTY YEARS WE FOUGHT ALONE 2 (2005).
6
RANDALL D. LAW, TERRORISM: A HISTORY 26 (2009); ALEX P. SCHMID, THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF TERRORISM
RESEARCH 687 (2011).
7
GÉRARD CHALIAND & ARNAUD BLIN, THE HISTORY OF TERRORISM: FROM ANTIQUITY TO AL QAEDA 2, 3, 9, 55
(2007); ROBERT TAYLOR, THE HISTORY OF TERRORISM 13, 14 (2002).
8
SCHMID, supra note 6, at 687, 703; TÜRKIYE BAROLAR BIRLIĞI [THE TURKISH BAR ASSOCIATION], TÜRKIYE VE
TERÖRIZM [TURKEY AND TERRORISM] 28 (2006); TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 14.
9
[THE TURKISH BAR ASSOCIATION], supra note 8, at 28; Ihsan Bozkurt, Terör, PKK ve Dış Destek [Terror, PKK
and External Support] 28 (2013) (Unpublished M.A. thesis, Celal Bayar University).
10
Osama Bin Ladin and Al-Qaeda utilized the organizational scheme invented by Hassan-i- Sabbah. Suicide
techniques, the de-centralized structure of the organization, propaganda means, the recruitment and training of
terrorists are very much similar in Assasins and Al-Qaeda. CHALIAND & BLIN, supra note 7, at 69; TAYLOR, supra
note 7, at 21, 22.
3
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Assassins was a religious sectarian organization founded by Hassan-i- Sabbah to spread the
influence of the Ismaili sect of Shia Islam in the world.11 They conducted attacks against Muslim
dignitaries in Iran and Syria between 1090 and 1272.12 The organization used clandestine hit and
run techniques of guerilla warfare and invented assassination techniques to weaken the Seljuk Turk
Empire in the region.13
Terrorism took a new form at the end of the 18th century with the French Revolution14.
State terrorism, for the first time in history, was used to repress the opponents or presumed
opponents of the French Revolution. During the Reign of Terror, Jacobins under Maximilien
Robespierre arbitrarily arrested more than 300,000 people and guillotined 17,000.15 The term
ended with the execution of Robespierre himself on July 28th 1794 by his opponents in the
revolutionary legislature called as the Convention.16 Terrorism, only after then, had come to
receive a definition, and was explained in 1798 by the Académie Française Dictionary as a
“system, or regime of terror”.17
According to today’s understanding, terrorism is the systematic use or threat of violence to
intimidate or coerce a government, individuals or groups to alter their behavior or policies.18 It is
designed to generate power in situations where power was previously absent.19 It comes in many
forms, such as ethnic-separatist terrorism, religious-radical terrorism, far-right and far-left

11

TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 18; LAW, supra note 6, at 40.
CHALIAND & BLIN, supra note 7, at 3, 61.
13
Id. at 68; TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 18.
14
The French Revolution had begun in the summer of 1789 with the establishment of National Assembly against
French King Louis XVI, requesting a constitution curtailing the power of the King. The National Assembly was
founded as a legislative body. From 1789 to 1792, the National Assembly “abolished the class system; declared that
sovereignty resided in the nation, not the king; limited the power and influence of the Catholic Church; and eventually
created a constitutional monarchy.” LAW, supra note 6, at 60.
15
SCHMID, supra note 6, at 681; TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 24.
16
TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 26.
17
RANDALL D. LAW, THE ROUTLEDGE HISTORY OF TERRORISM 63 (2015).
18
STEPHEN DYCUS, WILLIAM C. BANKS, PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, COUNTERTERRORISM LAW 3 (2012).
19
JAMES M. LUTZ & BRENDA J. LUTZ, GLOBAL TERRORISM 10 (2004); TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 10.
12
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terrorism, anarchism, nihilism, individual terrorism, state terrorism, domestic and international
terrorism.20
Terrorism is different from ordinary violence in many ways: First, terrorist violence is
directed towards political ends instead of personal financial gain.21 Political ends may be any
changes with regard to a government policy, the governmental structure of a state, or territorial
extent of a state.22 Second, the target audience of terrorist attacks is the general public instead of
the immediate victims of violence.23 Victims are thus selected on a non-personal basis.24 Terrorist
attacks are designed to send messages to governments through the selection of symbolic targets
such as government officials, politicians, or civilians.25 Third, terrorism is a psychological warfare
and is designed to induce fear in a population. Its main goal is to generate a feeling in a society
that the government is no longer capable of protecting the lives of its citizens.26 Fourth, terrorism
is planned, systematic and continuous, and generally involves an organization which guarantees
the continuity and credibility of a particular political cause.27
By the same token, terrorists are different from ordinary criminals. They are highly
committed to their religious or ideological cause,28 group-focused, and well-trained for the
mission.29 They willingly risk their lives and often cause their own deaths. They are also not easily
deterred by the threat of future punishment.30 They are trained to resist ordinary interrogation

20

See generally ZAFER, supra note 1, at 60-73.
JAMES M. LUTZ & BRENDA J. LUTZ, TERRORISM: ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION 7 (2005).
22
Id. at 7.
23
Id. at 7, 8.
24
WILKINSON, supra note 3, at 52.
25
PAUL WILKINSON, TERRORISM VERSUS DEMOCRACY: THE LIBERAL STATE RESPONSE 1 (2006); LUTZ & LUTZ, supra
note 21, at 8; CIAN C. MURPHY, EU COUNTER-TERRORISM LAW 7 (2012).
26
LUTZ & LUTZ, supra note 21, at 8.
27
Id. at 8.
28
Alec Walen, A Unified Theory of Detention, with Application to Preventive Detention for Suspected Terrorists, 70
MD. L. REV. 871, 882 (2011).
29
MICHAEL R. RONCZKOWSKI, TERRORISM AND ORGANIZED HATE CRIME: INTELLIGENCE GATHERING, ANALYSIS,
AND INVESTIGATIONS 46 (2007).
30
Walen, supra note 28, at 871, 887, 888.
21
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techniques as well.31 Ordinary criminals, in contrast, are generally uncommitted to a cause, selfcentered, untrained and escape-oriented.32
Terrorism is different from guerilla warfare in two respects.33 For one thing, terrorists
attack innocents or unarmed members of a government to intimidate the public and to influence
the government conduct.34 Guerillas or freedom fighters, however, attack the supporters of an
oppressive state and armed members of government in order to overthrow the government or to
make a regime change.35 Second, terrorism is directed against legitimate governments that are
accepted by the people they govern.36 Guerilla warfare, however, targets illegitimate oppressive
governments that refuse to accord individuals their natural rights.37 In this sense, guerilla fighters
are named as “freedom fighters”. The justification of guerilla warfare or liberation movements is
either the right to resist against an oppressive government that lost its legitimacy due to its
indifference towards individual rights,38 or the right to self-determination of nations.39

31

Douglass Cassel, Pretrial and Preventive Detention of Suspected Terrorists: Options and Constraints Under
International Law, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 811, 824 (2008).
32
RONCZKOWSKI, supra note 29, at 44.
33
See generally LUTZ & LUTZ, supra note 19, at 8, 9; ROSEMARY H. T. O’KANE, TERRORISM 38 (2007).
34
LUTZ & LUTZ, supra note 19, at 8.
35
Id. at 8; CINDY C. COMBS & MARTIN SLANN, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TERRORISM 321, 322 (2007).
36
LUTZ & LUTZ, supra note 19, at 8.
37
Id.
38
The right to resist is not by itself an independent human right. Yet, it may be considered as a remedial right closely
connected to the ideal of human rights. CHRISTOPHER J. FINLAY, TERRORISM AND THE RIGHT TO RESIST: A THEORY
OF JUST REVOLUTIONARY WAR 19, 54 (2015).
39
Id. at 36.
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2. The Definitions and Elements of Terrorism

a) National

The international community unfortunately has not reached a consensus on the definition
of terrorism. This is partly because terrorism is not only a legal but also a political phenomenon.
The political nature of terrorism affects the way terrorism is defined by states. Each state defines
the term in accordance with its political ideals, history, constitutional structure, threat perceptions,
and social values.
Nevertheless, the general scope of terrorism in one state is more or less akin to another.
Terrorism definitions are largely built upon various offenses to be committed with a specific intent
by an individual or collective undertaking. The definition of terrorism in each state contains three
common elements:40 a specific purpose or intent (mens rea), particular terrorist acts (actus reus),
and an organization.41 Thus, in order to understand the similarities and differences between the
concepts of terrorism in the states analyzed in this study, these three elements must be scrutinized.

(1) Specific terrorist purposes (Mens rea)
The purposes of terrorism covered by the statutes are as follows:42

40

LUTZ & LUTZ, supra note 19, at 10-13.
Except the U.S.
42
According to the U.S. law, acts or threat of actions dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws
of the U.S. or of any state should be deemed as terrorist acts if: 1) they are committed to intimidate or coerce a civilian
population, 2) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or 3) to affect the conduct of a
government by mass destruction, assassination or kidnapping. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331-1-B, 5-B, 2332b-g-5-A. Different
from other states, the U.S. law distinguishes international terrorism from domestic terrorism. If terrorist acts “occur
primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means
by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their
perpetrators operate or seek asylum”, it is regarded as international terrorism. If terror acts occur primarily within the
jurisdiction of the United States, it is regarded as domestic terrorism. Id. § 2331-1, 5.
41
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a) to intimidate the public or to disrupt public order by intimidation or coercion (Fr.,
U.S., U.K., Ger., Turk.)
b) to influence the policy and conduct of a government or an international organization
by coercion and intimidation (U.S., U.K., Ger.)
c) to realize a particular political, religious, or ideological cause (U.K., Turk.)
d) to demolish the democratic social and constitutional structure of a state. (Ger.,
Turk.)

According to the United Kingdom law, terror crimes can be committed by a proscribed organization for the
purposes of influencing the government or an international governmental organization, or to intimidate the public, or
to advance a political, religious, racial or ideological cause. Terrorism Act 2000, §§ 1, 3.
The French Penal Code provides a list of crimes considered as acts of terrorism when committed intentionally
in connection with an individual or collective undertaking for the purpose of seriously disrupting public order through
intimidation or terror. CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN.] [PENAL CODE] art. 421-1.
The German Criminal Code encompasses three terrorist purposes: the disruption of public order, influencing
or affecting the policy or conduct of a government or an international organization, and demolishing the democratic
social and constitutional order. Section 129a-1 provides that terrorist acts are those intended to “seriously intimidate
the population, to unlawfully coerce a public authority or an international organization through the use of force or the
threat of the use of force, or to significantly impair or destroy the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or
social structures of a state or an international organization”. In order for terrorist acts to be punished, these acts must
objectively have the potential to seriously damage a state or an international organization given the nature or
consequences of such offenses. STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], § 129a-2-5, translation at
https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html. Intention by itself thus is not enough to punish
terrorist acts.
The Turkish Counterterrorism Code has a mixed structure. It encompasses a definition to protect not only
individual liberties and public order from intimidation and coercion but also the secular and unitary constitutional
structure of the Turkish state. It has the most nationalistic terror definition among other countries, probably because
of the variety of domestic and foreign threats directed against the existence of the state.
According to Article 1 of the Counterterrorism Code, the terror definition covers all criminal acts by members
of an organization that is conducted through coercion and violence, oppression, intimidation or threat, designed to: a)
change the characteristics of the republic; b) change the political, legal, social, laic, economic structure and order
demonstrated in the Constitution; c) destroy the unity of the nation and the country; d) endanger the existence of the
Turkish State and the republic; e) weaken, demolish, or seize the state authority; f) eradicate fundamental rights and
freedoms; g) disrupt the internal and external security of the State, public order or public health.
Communist bloc countries’ terror definitions were generally aimed to protect the socialist structure of the
state instead of the protection of people and their freedoms from intimidation. For example, the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, Czechoslovakia and Eastern Germany regarded terrorism as violent crimes against the socialist
structure of the state. In contrast, liberal bloc states’ statutes were designed to protect individual rights and public
order. Turkey, as a liberal state and the only NATO ally at the very eastern front of the Cold War, followed a mixed
approach. Under the mixed approach, the terror definition sought to protect; a) the fundamental rights of people, b)
the secular republican constitutional structure of the state, and c) the unity of the Turkish territory. ZAFER, supra note
1, at 45-47, 51.
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Terrorist purposes in each definition depend on the threats a state faces as well as its
historical and constitutional background. The U.S., U.K., and France --- countries that do not face
any substantial threat to their constitutional structures and which established economic colonies
around the world --- do not cite constitutional values in their terrorism definition. For instance, in
the U.S., a violent terror act is one that is intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, to
influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or to affect the conduct of a
government by mass-destruction, assassination and kidnapping.43 Similarly in the U.K., a terrorist
act could be designed to influence the government or an international governmental organization,
or to intimidate the public or to advance a political, religious, racial or ideological cause. In France,
the protection of social order is the foremost purpose as France faces Islamist terror attacks that
instill fear in its society. That is, since the U.S., U.K. and France do not encounter any substantial
inside threat against their parliamentary and secular regimes governed by the rule of law, their
terrorism definitions do not encompass domestic threats to its constitution.
Turkey and Germany, however, chose to protect their respective constitutional foundations
through their terrorism definitions. Germany experienced Hitler, who came to power through
democratic principles and then demolished the democratic structure of Germany, establishing a
dictatorship. Turkey, after the collapse of the theocratic and multi-national Ottoman Empire,
established a secular Turkish nation state based on the fundamentals of Western democratic values.
Unlike Europe, Turkey established a democratic and secular structure through Atatürk’s legal and
cultural revolution instead of a gradual evolution.44 This resulted in part of the society rebelling
against the democratic revolution in favor of an Islamist theocratic state. For this reason, one of

43
44

18 U.S.C. § 2331.
BERNARD LEWIS, THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN TURKEY 480-83 (1968).
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the biggest threats that Turkey faces is the changing of its constitution by direct or indirect coercion
or force. That is probably the reason why in Turkey ---like in Germany--- threats to the
constitutional and democratic structure of a state is listed among other terrorist purposes.45
While it may be unthinkable in the U.S., U.K. and France that people seize the government
authority and change the constitutional structure of the state, this is probably the biggest threat for
Turkey. Crimes of treason constitute serious but not terror-related crimes under U.S., U.K. and
French laws. But treason might be deemed a terror crime if it is committed through coercion or
violence within the scope of an organization for the purposes stated in Art. 1 of the Turkish
Counterterrorism Code.46 Under German law, the crime of treason may also be considered an act
of terrorism if it is committed by an organization formed to commit the crimes stated in German
Penal Code Section 129a in order to demolish the democratic social and constitutional order.47
This distinction might have consequences on the length of a sentence and the determination of an
applicable sentence execution regime. This is so, especially if a legal system entails different
sentencing and execution rules for terror crimes. For instance, Turkish law requires a 50% increase
of a sentence in terror offenses.48 Terror convicts are also required to be detained in high security
and closed penitentiary institutions.49 Turkish law also permits release on parole only after terror

45

TERÖRLE MÜCADELE KANUNU [ T.M.K.] [COUNTERTERRORISM CODE] art. 1 (Turk.).
For example, the U.S. law punishes treason and rebellion as different crimes from terrorism, in a different chapter
in its federal code. While treason and rebellion are in chapter 115, terrorism is in chapter 113 B. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2381,
2383; Id. §§ 2331-2339D.
The French Penal Code also distinguishes the crime of treason from terrorist crimes. The crime of treason is stated in
its Penal Code Article 411-1, and it is not among the terror crimes stated in Articles 421-1, 2.
Similarly, the crime of treason is not stated among one of the terror offenses in Terrorism Act 2000 and Terrorism Act
2006 under the U.K. law. Instead, the U.K. law has separate Treason Acts. For U.K. Treason Acts from 1351 to 1945,
see http://www.legislation.gov.uk/all?title=treason#top.
47
The German Penal Code contains separate sections of high treason. [StGB], §§ 81, 82.
48
[T.M.K.] art. 5.
49
[I.K.] art. 9-1. For regular criminals, however, the duration to be served in prison for parole eligibility is shorter.
The serving of 2/3 of a sentence is enough so long as other conditions are met. [T.M.K.] art. 17-1; [I.K.] art. 107-2.
46
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convicts have served at least ¾ of their sentence.50 And terrorists who received aggravated lifesentences are not eligible for release on parole.51
While U.S. and U.K. terrorism statutes include the purpose of influencing the policy or
conduct of a government, France does not incorporate such a reason in its penal code. Rather, it
only involves the disruption of public order as a terrorist purpose. The reason for this difference
raises curiosity, because these countries tackle the similar terrorist threat of religious extremism.
The dissimilarity between terrorist purposes might stem from differing threat perceptions between
Anglo-Saxon and Continental European law makers. The disruption of public order eventually
aims to change or influence government conduct. Therefore, this difference seems to be only a
matter of statutory expression and should not give rise to substantially contrasting outcomes in
counterterrorism prosecutions.

(2) Terrorist acts (Actus reus)
Each state criminalizes six main terrorist acts (if committed with a terrorism purpose):52

50

[I.K.] art. 107-4.
[T.M.K.] art. 17-4; [I.K.] art. 107-16
52
According to the U.S. Law, terrorist acts generally are the kills, kidnaps, maims, assaults involving serious bodily
injury, assaults with a dangerous weapon, substantial risk of serious bodily injury to any other person by destroying
or damaging any structure, conveyance, or other real and personal property within the U.S. 18 U.S.C. § 2332b-a-1. In
order for these acts to be considered as terror crimes, they should be committed for one of the three specific terrorist
purposes stated in the code. 18 U.S.C. § 2331-1, 5.
18 U.S.C. § 2332b-g-5 defines the term “Federal crime of terrorism” as follows: An offense that—
(A) is calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate
against government conduct; and
(B) is a violation of sections relating to: destruction of aircraft or aircraft facilities; violence at international
airports; arson within special maritime and territorial jurisdiction; biological weapons; variola virus; chemical
weapons; congressional, cabinet, and Supreme Court assassination and kidnaping; nuclear materials; participation in
nuclear and weapons of mass destruction threats to the United States; plastic explosives; arson and bombing of
Government property risking or causing death; arson and bombing of property used in interstate commerce; killing or
attempted killing during an attack on a Federal facility with a dangerous weapon; conspiracy to murder, kidnap, or
maim persons abroad; protection of computers; killing or attempted killing of officers and employees of the United
States; murder or manslaughter of foreign officials, official guests, or internationally protected persons; hostage
taking; government property or contracts; destruction of communication lines, stations, or systems; injury to buildings
or property within special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States; destruction of an energy facility;
Presidential and Presidential staff assassination and kidnaping; terrorist attacks and other acts of violence against
51
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railroad carriers and against mass transportation systems on land, on water, or through the air; destruction of national
defense materials, premises, or utilities; national defense material, premises, or utilities; violence against maritime
navigation; maritime safety; violence against maritime fixed platforms; certain homicides and other violence against
United States nationals occurring outside of the United States; use of weapons of mass destruction; acts of terrorism
transcending national boundaries; bombing of public places and facilities; missile systems designed to destroy aircraft;
radiological dispersal devices; acts of nuclear terrorism; harboring terrorists; providing material support to terrorists;
providing material support to terrorist organizations; financing of terrorism; military-type training from a foreign
terrorist organization; torture; prohibitions governing atomic weapons; sabotage of nuclear facilities or fuel; aircraft
piracy; assault on a flight crew with a dangerous weapon; explosive or incendiary devices, or endangerment of human
life by means of weapons, on aircraft; application of certain criminal laws to acts on aircraft; destruction of interstate
gas or hazardous liquid pipeline facility; and narco-terrorism. 18 U.S.C. § 2332b-g-5.
According to the U.K. Law, terrorist offenses involve acts or threat of actions that; a) involve serious violence
against a person or serious damage to property, b) endanger a person’s life, c) create a serious risk to the health or
safety of the public, d) are designed seriously to interfere with or to disrupt an electronic system. Terrorism Act 2000,
§ 1-2. See also KENT ROACH, COMPARATIVE COUNTER-TERRORISM LAW 168, 169 (2015). These acts must be
committed with the three specific terrorist purposes stated in Terrorism Act 2000.
The U.K. promulgated several terrorism statutes since 2000 to more effectively counter terrorism, two of
which are the Terrorism Act of 2000 and the Terrorism Act of 2006. Some of the terrorist offenses in these Acts are
as follows: membership in and support to a terrorist organization (Terrorism Act 2000, §§ 11, 12); weapons training:
(providing, receiving or inviting another to receive instruction or training in the making or use of firearms, explosives,
or chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, Id. §§ 54, 55); directing terrorist organization (Id. § 56); possession of
articles for terrorist purposes (Id. § 57); collection of information that could be useful to a person committing or
preparing an act of terrorism (Id. § 58); wearing clothes or carrying or displaying an article in such a way to arouse
reasonable suspicion that he is a member or supporter of a proscribed organization (wearing uniforms of the
organization in a public place, Id. § 13); fund raising for terrorism: providing, receiving or inviting to provide funds
for the purposes of terrorism (Id. § 15); use or possession of money for the purposes of terrorism (Id. § 16); money
laundering (Id. § 18); encouragement of terrorism (Terrorism Act 2006, c. 11, § 1); dissemination of terrorist
publications (Id. § 2); encouragement of terrorism or dissemination of terrorist publications through a service provided
electronically (Id. § 3); preparation of terrorist acts (Id. § 5); training for terrorism: to provide or receive terrorist
instruction or training knowing that the skills will be used in the commission or preparation of acts of terrorism (Id. §
6); attendance at a place used for terrorist training (Id. § 8); making and possession of radioactive devices and materials
(Id. § 9); misuse of devices or material and misuse and damage of facilities (Id. § 10); terrorist threats relating to
devices, materials or facilities (Id. § 11); trespassing on nuclear sites Id. § 12; eliciting, publishing or communicating
information about members of armed forces etc. (Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, c. 28, § 76).
Terror crimes listed in French Penal Code Articles 421-1 and 421-2 are as follows: willful attacks on life,
willful attacks on the physical integrity of persons, abduction and unlawful detention; hijacking of planes, vessels or
any other means of transport; theft, extortion, destruction, defacement and damage, and also computer offenses;
offenses committed by combat organizations and disbanded movements; the offenses set out under Articles 434-6,
441-2 to 441-5 (harboring terrorists, financing, and aiding terrorists; forgery on a document delivered by a public
body; unlawfully procuring for another person a document delivered by a public body); the production or keeping of
machines, dangerous or explosive devices; the production, sale, import or export of explosive substances; the purchase,
keeping, transport or unlawful carrying of explosive substances or of devices made with such explosive substances;
the detention, carrying, and transport of weapons and ammunition falling under the first and fourth categories; the
offenses forbidding the designing, production, keeping, stocking, purchase or sale of biological or toxin-based
weapons; the offenses on the prohibition of developing, producing, stocking and use of chemical weapons and on their
destruction; receiving the product of one of the offenses set out above; money laundering offenses; insider trading
offenses; the introduction into the atmosphere, on the ground, in the soil, in foodstuff or its ingredients, or in waters,
including territorial waters, of any substance liable to imperil human or animal health or the natural environment is an
act of terrorism where it is committed intentionally in connection with an individual or collective undertaking whose
aim is to seriously disturb public order through intimidation or terror; the participation in any group formed or
association established with a view to the preparation, marked by one or more material actions, of any of the acts of
terrorism provided for under the previous articles shall in addition be an act of terrorism. CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN.]
[PENAL CODE] art. 421-2-1 (same citation applicable for the above crimes as well); to finance a terrorist organization
by providing, collecting or managing funds, securities or property of any kind, or by giving advice for this purpose,
intending that such funds, security or property be used, or knowing that they are intended to be used, in whole or in
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part, for the commission of any of the acts of terrorism listed in the present chapter, irrespective of whether such an
act takes place (Id. art. 421-2-2); being unable to account for resources corresponding to one's lifestyle when habitually
in close contact with a person or persons who engage in one or more of terrorist activities (Id. art. 421-2-3).
The 2016 Amendments to the French Penal Code establish additional terror crimes that criminalize relatively
remote acts: a) the gathering of information regarding the place of a future terror act or persons who are potential
targets (reconnoitering) (Id. art. 421-2-6-II-2-a ); b) receiving or providing weapons training (Id. art. 421-2-6-II-2-b);
c) the learning of combat techniques, the learning of production or use of explosive, flammable, nuclear, radiological,
biological, chemical weapons (Id.); d) the learning of or endeavor to learn using planes or ships (Id.); d) the possession
of documents or habitual visiting of internet sites that encourage or praise terror acts, excludes bona fide online
searches such as scientific researches, searches for the exercise of a job related to informing the public, searches to
obtain evidence for justice (Id. arts. 421-2-6-II-2-c, 421-2-5-2); e) taking part with a terrorist organization abroad in
theater of operations (Id. art. 421-2-6-II-2-d); f) the conspiracy or formation of a group to commit preparatory offenses
(Id. art. 421-6); g) the offering or promising to offer food or drink or gifts to a person, or threatening or pressurizing
him in order to assure his participation in a terror act, regardless of its effects (Id. art. 421-2-4); h) the encouragement
of terror acts, or the praise of terror acts in public (Id. art. 421-2-5); i) intentional copying, forwarding, or extracting
the acts of praise for the particular purpose of diminishing the effectiveness of the particular procedure stated in Article
6 of the Trust in Numeric Economy Code, or that of the Article 706-23 of Criminal Procedure Code (Id. art. 421-2-51).
German Criminal Code Section 129a punishes the formation of and membership in terrorist organizations in
the commission of various terror crimes: murder under specific aggravating circumstances or murder, genocide
[different than other countries, as an historical effect of the Holocaust by the Hitler regime), a crime against humanity,
a war crime; crimes against personal liberty; acts causing serious physical or mental harm to another person; offenses
of computer sabotage, destruction of buildings, destruction of important equipment, or offenses endangering the
general public such as arson, arson causing death, causing a nuclear explosion, causing an explosion, misuse of
ionizing radiation, causing flooding, causing a common danger by poisoning, dangerous disruption of rail, ship and
air traffic, disruption of public services, attacks on air and maritime traffic, disruption of telecommunications facilities;
offenses against the environment; offenses regarding various sections of the Weapons of War (Control) Act. [StGB],
§ 129a-1, 2.
The German legislature passed the 2009 Law for the Prosecution of Preparation of Severe Seditious Acts of
Violence which established new criminal offenses that were inserted into German Criminal Code Sections 89a, 89b
and 91. (In German, the law is called as “Gesetz zur Verfolgung der Vorbereitung von schweren staatsgefährdenden
Gewalttaten”, which passed on 30 July 2009 and entered into force on 4 August 2009. ANNA OEHMICHEN, TERRORISM
AND ANTI-TERROR LEGISLATION: THE TERRORIZED LEGISLATOR?: A COMPARISON OF COUNTER-TERRORISM
LEGISLATION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, SPAIN,
GERMANY AND FRANCE 283 (2009).
First, section 89a criminalized the preparation of a serious violent offence endangering the state by
imprisonment of six months to ten years. A serious violent offence endangering the state refers to an offence against
life or personal freedom, which is “intended to impair and capable of impairing the existence or security of a state or
of an international organization, or to abolish, rob of legal effect or undermine constitutional principles of the Federal
Republic of Germany”. [StGB], § 89a-1; OEHMICHEN, supra, at 283.The law is applicable only when the person
engages in preparation by: 1) “instructing another person or receiving instruction in the production or the use of
firearms, explosives, explosive or incendiary devices, nuclear fission material or other radioactive substances,
substances that contain or can generate poison, other substances detrimental to health, special facilities necessary for
the commission of the offence or other skills that can be of use for the commission of an offence” against life or
personal freedom” (Participation in terrorist training camps is criminalized via this law. OEHMICHEN, supra, at 283);
2) “producing, obtaining for himself or another, storing or supplying to another weapons, substances or devices and
facilities mentioned under No. 1 above”; 3) “obtaining or storing objects or substances essential for the production of
weapons, substances or devices and facilities mentioned under No. (1) above”, or; 4) “collecting, accepting or
providing not unsubstantial assets for the purpose of its commission”. [StGB], § 89a-2.
Second, section 89b punishes the act of establishing or maintaining contacts with a terrorist organization,
with the intention to get training for committing a serious violent offense endangering the state. Punishment for this
offense is either a maximum three years of imprisonment or a fine. And lastly, Section 91 criminalizes the
encouragement of the commission of a serious violent offence endangering the state. Specific acts criminalized under
this section are as follows: 1) displaying or supplying to another written material capable of serving as an instruction
to the commission of a serious violent offence endangering the state, “if the circumstances of its dissemination are
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conducive to awakening or encouraging the preparedness of others to commit a serious violent offence endangering
the state” (Id. § 91-1-1.); 2) obtaining such instructive written material for committing a serious violent offence
endangering the state. Id. § 91-1-2.
Punishment for this offense is either maximum three years of imprisonment or a fine. [StGB], § 91-1; OEHMICHEN,
supra, at 284.
These acts are not unlawful if they serve the purpose of “citizenship education, the defense against anti-constitutional
movements, arts and sciences, research or teaching, reporting about current or historical events or similar purposes”
or “the fulfilment of lawful professional or official duties”. [StGB], § 91-2-1, 2.
Turkish Law sets forth three types of terror offenses: absolute terror offenses, relative terror offenses, and
offenses facilitating the commission of terror acts. Absolute terror crimes are themselves considered as terrorist acts,
with no additional specific purpose needed. Relative terror acts can be deemed as terrorist acts only if they are
committed for the terrorist purposes stated in Art. 1, within the scope of a terrorist organization. Facilitation offenses
ease the commission of absolute or relative terror offenses. ZAFER, supra note 1, at 124, 125, 131; [T.M.K.] art. 4.
Absolute terror offenses stated in the Turkish Counterterrorism Code are as follows: disrupting the unity and
integrity of the state (CEZA KANUNU [T.C.K.] [PENAL CODE] art. 302); destruction of military facilities and conspiracy
that benefits enemy military movements (Id. art. 307); attempts to demolish, change or hinder the enforcement of the
constitutional order via the use of force Id. art. 309; offenses against the legislative body (Id. art. 311); offenses against
the government (Id. art. 312); armed revolt against the government of Turkish Republic (Id. art. 313); armed
organization (Id. art. 314); supplying arms (Id. art. 315); enlistment of soldiers in foreign service (Id. art. 320);
assassination of the President (Id. art. 310-1).
Relative terror offenses in the Code are: migrant smuggling (Id. art. 79); human trafficking (Id. art. 80);
murder (Id. arts. 81, 82); suicide inducement (Id. art. 84); regular and aggravated physical injury (Id. arts. 86, 87);
torment (Id. art. 96); threatening (Id. art. 106); blackmailing (Id. art. 107); coercion (Id. art. 108); deprivation of liberty
(Id. art. 109); obstruction of education (Id. art. 112); obstruction of public services (Id. art. 113); obstruction of the
exercise of political rights (Id. art. 114); obstruction of the exercise of the freedom of belief, thought and opinion (Id.
art. 115); breach of the inviolability of home (Id. art. 116); breach of the freedom of labor and work (Id. art. 117);
obstruction of the exercise of union rights (Id. art. 118); aggravated theft (Id. art. 142); plunder, aggravated plunder
(Id. arts. 148,149); damage to property (Id. arts. 151, 152); purposeful endangering of public safety (Id. art. 170);
dissemination of radiation (Id. art. 172); causing atomic explosion (Id. art. 173); possession or exchange of hazardous
substances without permission (Id. art. 174); endangering life and health with toxic substances (Id. art. 185);
production and trade of narcotics and psychotropic substances (Id. art. 188); counterfeiting valuable stamps (Id. art.
199.); instruments for the production of money and valuable stamps (Id. art. 200); counterfeit of a public seal (Id. art.
202.); counterfeit of official documents (Id. art. 204); documents presumed to be official (Id. art. 210); threat with the
intention of causing fear and panic among the public (Id. art. 213); provocation to commit an offense (Id. art. 214.);
praise of a crime and a criminal (Id. art. 215); hijacking or seizure of transportation vehicles (Id. art. 223); occupation
of a stationary platform on territorial land or industrial zone (Id. art. 224); access to a data processing system (Id. art.
243); preventing the functioning of a system and deletion, alteration or corruption of data (Id. art. 244); obstruction of
public duty (Id. art. 265); assisting a detainee to escape (Id. art. 294); degrading the symbols of state sovereignty (Id.
art. 300); conspiracy to commit an offense (Id. art. 316); seizure of a military institution (Id. art. 317); alienation of
the public from military service (Id. art. 318); inducement of soldiers for disobedience (Id. art. 319); physical attack
against the president (Id. art. 310-2); offenses stated in the Weapons Act ([T.M.K.] art. 4-b); offenses regarding forest
fire under the Forests Act. (Id. art. 4-c); offenses requiring incarceration under the Anti-Smuggling Act. (Id. art. 4-ç);
offenses that led to the state of emergency under the Constitution art. 120 (Id. art. 4-d); illegal trafficking of cultural
and natural treasuries (Id. art. 4-e).
The Counterterrorism Code refers to a third type of terror offense which facilitates the commission of
absolute or relative terror crimes. ZAFER, supra note 1, at. 131. These crimes of facilitation are as follows:
1) To establish and direct a terrorist organization ([T.M.K.] art. 7-1);
2) Membership in a terrorist organization (Id. arts. 2, 7-1);
3) Terrorist propaganda: propaganda that praises, legitimizes and encourages the coercive, forcible and threatening
means of terror. If this crime is committed by means of press, it constitutes aggravated propaganda. Other acts regarded
as terrorist propaganda are: Regardless of whether these occurred during public assemble and demonstrations:
i. carrying or hanging the emblem or insignia, pictures and symbols of a terrorist organization
ii. shouting slogans
iii. broadcasting through sound equipment
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§

The violent acts or threat of actions dangerous to human life,

§

The violent acts or threat of actions physical integrity

§

The violent acts or threat of actions against personal freedom

§

The destruction of property

§

The formation of or membership in or material support to a terrorist organization

§

Hijacking

In 2016, France ---as a response to the growing ISIS threat in 2015--- enacted new laws to
criminalize remote preparatory acts of terrorism that are suggestive of future terrorist acts. These
offenses, which are absent in other systems, mainly are as follows: a) the habitual visiting of
internet sites that encourage or praise terror acts; b) the learning of or endeavor to learn using
planes or ships; c) the gathering of information regarding the place of a future terror act or persons
who are potential targets.

iv. wearing of uniforms on which there is the insignia, picture or symbols of a terrorist organization. Id. art.
7-2.
4) During illegal public assembly and demonstrations in which terrorist propaganda is made, people who totally or
partly cover their faces to disguise themselves or conceal their identity will be punished between 3 to 5 years of
incarceration. Id. art. 7-3. If such people utilize coercion or force, or use or possess any type of weapons, Molotov
cocktail, or similar types of explosive, oxidizer and flammable substances, the punishment will be no less than 4 years.
If this crime is committed in buildings, clubhouses, bureaus, educational institutions, student dormitories (or their
attachments) of unions, foundations, political parties, worker and professional organizations, or their sub-institutions,
the punishment will be twice the basic punishment. Id. art. 7-4.
5) The commission of crimes on behalf of the terrorist organization without being a member of the organization (lone
wolf cases) is punished as if he is the member of the terrorist organization. Id. art. 7-5, with some exceptions.
6) Printing and publishing the manifesto, bulletin or statements that praises, legitimizes and encourages the use of
coercive, forcible and threatening means of terror is punished between 1 to 3 years. Id. art. 6-2.
7) Revealing or publishing any information regarding the identity of counterterrorism officials or informants. With or
without explicit disclose of name &ID, but in a way making it easier to understand the identity. [T.M.K.] art. 6-1, 3.
8) Revealing the fact that a terror act will be directed against somebody and the identity thereof. With or without
explicit disclose of name &ID, but in a way making it easier to understand the identity. Id.
9) Terrorist financing. Id. art. 8.
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(3) Organization
Turkey, Germany and U.K. require the direct or indirect involvement of an organization to
regard an offense as an act of terrorism. French law, in contrast, incorporates both individual and
collective undertakings.53 U.S. law does not contain a specific organization requirement like the
former three countries do, which leads us to conclude that both individual and organizational
activities are implied in the U.S. terrorism definition.54 Thus, under U.S. and French laws, every
violent deed can be deemed to be a terrorist act, regardless of whether an organization is behind
it, so long as it is committed with a terrorist purpose.
Any difference observed during the examination of these three elements (terrorist purposes,
terrorist acts, and an organization) most likely stem from each state’s historical background,
differing Anglo-Saxon or Continental European legal traditions, constitutional priorities, and the
structure and scope of relevant codes.55 For this reason, there is no best statutory enactment to be
preferred over another. Each state is unique in itself, and has its own reasons for certain
enactments. Yet there is plenty of room for borrowing --- every state has an interest in considering
other state’s laws as examples to see if a foreign rule would meet its own needs in
counterterrorism.56

53

[ T.M.K.] art. 1; [StGB], § 129a-1, 2; Terrorism Act 2000, § 1, 3; [C. PÉN.] art. 421-1; ZAFER, supra note 1, at 51.
18 U.S.C. § 2331; ZAFER, supra note 1, at 51.
55
For instance, Germany and Turkey chose the way to protect the state from insider threats against their
constitutional order, and preferred a statutory language more protective of their constitution compared to other
states. The U.S., the U.K., and Germany, whose governments have substantial influence on international politics,
regarded violent acts aimed to influence a government conduct as terrorism. It might be surprising that France,
which entails similar characteristics with the former states, only focused on the disruption of public order. This
should be a matter of articulation of the concept of terrorism by the French legislator.
56
For example, Turkey may consider following the French example of criminalizing preparatory acts of terrorism if
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b) International

In order to ensure the legality and certainty of terrorism definitions as well as the
ideologically neutral assessment of terrorism, states in the international arena have attempted to
set a clear definition of terrorism.57 The first proposal was drafted by the League of Nations (the
predecessor of today’s United Nations) under the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment
of Terrorism in Genova on November 16, 1937.58 The draft Convention, for the first time, defined
the acts of terrorism as “criminal acts directed against a state and intended or calculated to create
a state of terror in the minds of particular persons, or a group of persons or the general public.”59
The draft convention did not receive sufficient support due to the upcoming World War II.60 Since
the 1970s, ad hoc United Nations Committees have also attempted to generate several proposals,
which also did not receive sufficient support.61 For instance, the U.N. Ad Hoc Committee in 1996
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drafted a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism.62 The Committee, though, could
not agree on a description of the purpose and motive of terrorism, the perpetrator of terrorism,
whether the definition of terrorism should entail state-sponsored terrorism, the difference between
terrorism and legitimate fight against oppression, the characteristics of terrorist acts, and on what
bases a terrorist chooses his target of the public or property.63
Many attempts to define terrorism have failed because terrorism is partly a political
phenomenon, and ideological differences play a big role in international law. “One person’s
terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter”64 is a widely known expression implying that
different ideologies and conflicts of interests shape international legal principles. With no
international consensus on the definition, member states to the United Nations and to the Council
of Europe, instead, took the path of generating conventions that prohibit particular acts tied to
terrorism, namely the hijacking of aircraft, kidnapping, detonating bombs, and financing such
activities.
The United Nations has produced nineteen international legal instruments designed to
prevent terrorism. These agreements are with regard to civil aviation, the protection of
international staff, the taking of hostages, nuclear material, maritime navigation, explosive
materials, terrorist bombings, the financing of terrorism, and nuclear terrorism. The U.N. legal
instruments that direct states to enact certain offenses are as follows:65
§

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (1970)66
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G.A. Res. 51/210, (Dec. 17, 1996), available at http://legal.un.org/docs/?symbol=A/57/37(Supp); U.N. Draft
Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, U.N. Doc. A/59/894, (Feb.11, 2002). SAUL, supra note 59, at
163-172.
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ELAGAAB & ELAGAAB, supra note 57, at XX5.
64
Id.
65
International documents are available at https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/resources/international-legal-instruments/; Id.
at III, IV, 302. See also SAUL, supra note 59.
66
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 10, 1970, 860 U.N.T.S. 106, available at
https://treaties.un.org/doc/db/Terrorism/Conv2-english.pdf.
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§

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation
(1971)67

§

Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving
International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (1988)68

§

Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation
(2010)69

§

Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of
Aircraft (2010)70

§

Protocol to Amend the Convention on Offenses and Certain Acts Committed on Board
Aircraft (2014)71

§

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected
Persons, including Diplomatic Agents (1973)72

§

International Convention against the Taking of Hostages (1979)73

§

Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (1980)74
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§

International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1997)75

§

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation (1988)76

§

Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation (2005)77

§

International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1997)78

§

International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999)79

§

International Convention for the Suppression of the Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (2005)80

Although none of the U.N. treaties explicitly define “terrorism”, they require signature
states to criminalize particular acts that are tied to terrorism. These offenses mainly are as follows:
hijackings 81; murder, kidnapping, or other attack upon the person or liberty of an internationally
protected person82; seizure or detainment and threatening to kill, to injure or to continue to detain
another person in order to compel a third party83; the receipt, possession, use, transfer, or alteration
of nuclear material that is likely to cause death or serious injury to any person or substantial
damage to property84; seizure or control over a ship by force or threat of force, or any other form
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of intimidation;85 delivery, placement, discharge, or detonation of an explosive or other lethal
device in or against a place of public use;86 providing or collecting funds directly or indirectly in
the knowledge that they are to be used to carry out a terror act;87 possession of radioactive material,
or making or possession of a device, with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or
substantial damage to property or to the environment.88
The Council of Europe member states also generated treaties for cooperation against
terrorism. The Council generated many treaties determining extraditable (terror) and nonextraditable (political) offenses. The relevant European treaties are as follows:89
§

European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (1977)90

§

Protocol Amending the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (2003)91

§

Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (2005)92

§

Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism
(2015)93
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According to the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (1977) and The
Protocol amending the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (2003) list serious
offenses that require extradition.94 These offenses basically are any attacks against the life,
physical integrity or liberty of internationally protected persons,95 kidnapping,96 the use of a bomb,
grenade, rocket, or automatic firearm if this use endangers persons.97
The Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (2005) requires the
contracting states to criminalize certain preparatory acts designed to commit terror crimes. These
acts are “public provocation to commit a terrorist offense”,98 “recruitment for terrorism”,99
“training for terrorism”.100 The Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the
Prevention of Terrorism (2015) requires contracting states to criminalize “receiving training for
terrorism”,101 “travelling abroad for the purpose of terrorism”,102 “funding travelling abroad for
the purpose of terrorism”,103 “organizing or otherwise facilitating traveling abroad for the purpose
of terrorism”.104
In conclusion, the United Nations and the Council of Europe have not established a clear
definition of terrorism. Yet, they provide the international community with a series of rules
obliging the contracting parties to take precautionary measures to prevent the commission of
certain acts of terrorism and to criminalize their perpetration.
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B.TERRORISM IN TURKEY
This Chapter involves two sub-chapters: the history of terrorism in Turkey, and the
comparison of terrorism in Turkey with terrorism in the United States and Europe. The first subchapter classifies the history of terrorism in Turkey in two stages: the ethnic separatist terrorism
inherited from the Ottoman Empire, and the terrorism against the democratic constitutional order
of modern Turkey. The second sub-chapter provides a list of terrorist organizations in Turkey,
Europe, and the United States, and compares Turkey’s terrorism with that of other countries.

1. The History of Terrorism in Turkey
Turkey’s terrorism has three dimensions: ethnic separatist terrorism dating back to the
Ottoman Empire, Islamist terrorism against the democratic constitutional order of Modern Turkey,
and the Marxists-Leftist terrorism against the liberal structure of the state. This sub-chapter will
provide substantial information on the types of terrorism, the historical roots of terrorism in
Turkey, and particular terrorist organizations.

a) The Ethnic Separatist Terrorism Inherited from the Ottoman Empire

(1)The Fall of the Ottoman Empire
The Ottoman Empire was a multiethnic, multi-cultural and multi-religious105 military
empire that ruled territories on the three continents of Europe, Asia, and North Africa. The Empire
was founded in 1299 by the Turks, whose origin lay in central Asia.106 Having today’s Turkey as
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the mainland, the Empire was expanded to the gates of Vienna107 in the West encircling the Balkan
states from Adriatic Sea to the Black Sea, the Northern borders of the Black Sea including Crimea
and southern part of the Ukraine, the whole Arabian Peninsula in the South East, and the Northern
African countries from Morocco to Egypt on the Mediterranean Sea.108 The empire consisted of
Greeks, Bulgarians, Serbians, Jews, Arabs, Slavs, Armenians, Bosnians, Albanians, Circassians,
Pomaks, Kurds, Tatars and Turks.109 Today’s Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, Albania, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, Moldova,
Southern Ukraine including Crimea, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Southwest Iran, Iraq, Syria,
Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain,
Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, and eventually Turkey (as the heir of the founder
Ottoman Turks) are the states once included in the maps of the multi-continental Empire.110
The Ottomans ruled these territories with great tolerance and flexibility for different
cultures, religions, and ethnicities.111 Each protected non-Muslim community was granted great
autonomy in internal affairs.112 These communities were represented by their religious leaders in
matters of state.113
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In theory, the Ottoman Empire was a theocratic state governed by Islamic law. Yet, in
practice, by the eighteenth century, Islamic rules were confined to matters of family law and of
ownership.114 Public law issues such as land tenure, taxation and criminal law were mostly based
on the secular decrees of sultan (örf or kanun).115
The Ottoman Empire began to collapse in the seventeenth century for four main reasons.116
First, the discovery of new trade routes by Europe in the sixteenth century diminished Europe’s
dependency on the Ottoman Empire to obtain goods from Asia and led to a financial crisis in the
Empire.117 Second, industrial revolutions increased the economic, technological and military
power118 of Western Europe. The Ottoman Empire, however, fell behind Europe in economy and
technology.119 The Empire continued to use primitive techniques of production and
transportation,120 and remained “a medieval state with a medieval mentality and a medieval
economy”. 121
Third, the developments in European military science and training to which the Turks were
indifferent eventually resulted in the halting of the Ottoman advance into Europe. The failure of
the second siege of Vienna in 1683, followed by other defeats by Austrians at the second battle of
Mohacs in 1687 and at Zenta in 1697, confirmed the downfall of the Turks.122 The Carlowitz
Treaty signed in 1699 was the beginning of a new era of decline.123
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Fourth, the ideals of liberty, equality, fraternity and nationalism that emerged as a result of
the French Revolution influenced the Christian Ottoman subjects and led to their uprisings against
the State.124 The first nationalist insurrection was conducted by the Serbs and Greeks,125 followed
by Bulgarians, Bosnians, Romanians, Macedonians, and Albanians.126
The Turco-Russian War in 1877-78 resulted in the great defeat of the Ottoman Empire in
the Balkans, Southern Caucasus, and Eastern Anatolia. In the West, the Russian Army was assisted
by the Bulgarian and Romanian fighters.127 The Treaty of Berlin signed at the end of the war
imposed harsh conditions on the Empire. According to the Treaty, either full or limited autonomy
was granted to certain parts of Bulgaria. Serbia, Montenegro and Romania were recognized as
independent states. Bosna-Herzegovina was placed under the protection of Austria-Hungary.128 In
Eastern Anatolia, the Russians were given Kars, Ardahan, Batumi, and Southern Bessarabia. 129
The Ottoman Empire later was defeated in the Turco-Italian War in 1911-12 and lost its
North African territory in Libya to Italy.130 While the War in Libya continued, the Balkan states
of Serbia, Bulgaria, Montenegro, and Greece formed an alliance and waged war against the
Ottomans.131 The Balkan States were victorious in the war. They not only strengthened their
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independence, but also gained more territory from the Ottoman Empire. Balkan defeat brought
about the expulsion of the Balkan Turks from Europe.132
The last strike against the Empire was World War I in 1914-18. The Ottoman Empire
entered into the war along with the Central Powers of Germany and Austria-Hungary against the
Allied Powers of France, Britain, and Russia.133 The Empire additionally sought to suppress the
Arabic and Armenian separatist nationalist movements that rose up during the War.134 The
Ottoman Empire had to fight on several fronts. The Allied Powers defeated the Central Powers,
and the Ottoman participation in the war ended with the Mudros Armistice signed by the Ottoman
government in 30 October 1918.135 The Treaty ordered the discharge of the Ottoman military and
government.136 The Allied Powers retained the right to occupy six Armenian territories in case of
a disorder and any strategic points in cases of a threat to allied security.137 The Treaty was followed
by the occupation of Istanbul (then the Capital of the Ottoman Empire) in 1918 and the partition
of the Empire by the Allied Powers.
The final agreement to abolish the Ottoman Empire was the Treaty of Sévres, which was
signed between the Allied Powers and the Istanbul government in August 10, 1920. The Treaty
partitioned the Ottoman’s homeland territory of Anatolia, where the majority was Muslim,138 to
the Allied Powers.139 According to the Treaty, Anatolia was divided among victorious powers and
only one fifth of Anatolian territory was left to the Turks.140 The Treaty ordered Turkey to
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recognize an Armenian state in the East,141 a Kurdish state in the Southeast, and a Greek state in
Western Anatolia.142 The Treaty left Egypt, Sudan and Cyprus to British protectorate;143 Syria,
Mesopotamia and Palestine to the protectorate of the commission comprised of the representatives
of France, Britain, Italy and Turkey;144 Libya and many Aegean Islands to Italy;145 Western
Anatolia and some Aegean islands to Greece; Eastern Anatolia to Armenia; and Southeastern
Anatolia to Kurdistan.146
The Turks, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal (later Atatürk), began an armed
resistance as a response. The Turkish General National Assembly, which had been established in
April 1920 in Ankara as a reaction to the Ottoman government and which had directed the National
Independence War between 1920 and 1922, repudiated the Treaty of Sevres.147 The Turkish
National Assembly was victorious in its independence war against the Allied Powers. Eventually,
the Treaty of Sevres was replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne in July 24, 1923.148 The Treaty of
Lausanne149 was signed between the Allied Powers and the Ankara Government.150 The Peace
Treaty of Lausanne officially ended the 700-year old Ottoman Empire, set aside the conditions of
the Treaty of Sevres, and recognized Turkey as an independent, free and equal country with
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territories in Anatolia and Europe.151 The Western powers withdrew their forces from Turkey as
commanded by the Treaty.152
Turkey proclaimed itself a Republic on 29 October 1923,153 and established a secular
democratic state under the 1921 and 1924 Constitutions154 (with constitutional amendments in
1928 that secularized the state).155 The Caliphate was abolished by the Turkish Grand National
Assembly in November 1924. The Declaration of Republic was followed by many legal and
cultural reforms up until 1934. These reforms were designed to modernize and secularize the
country. The wearing of headscarves was banned in official premises, the wearing of turbans and
robes was restricted to Islamic officials, the veiling of women was officially discouraged, dervish
lodges were closed, modern dress was imposed, women were given equal rights with men, Western
civil and criminal codes were translated into Turkish and adopted into the legal system,
international numerals replaced Arabic numerals, the Latin alphabet replaced Arabic scripts, and
women were given the right to vote and to be elected in elections.156

(2) Armenian and Kurdish Separatist Terrors since the Ottoman Era
In its 100 years of history, Modern Turkey witnessed two types of separatist terrorism in
Eastern Turkey, namely the Armenian and Kurdish separatist movements. Both of these
movements date back to the Ottoman Era.
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Armenian157 riots against the Ottoman Empire were conducted between 1878 and 1915.158
The most destructive insurrections occurred in the 1890s,159 including the 1894-95 revolts in
Sasun160 and Zeytun, and 1896 revolts in Van,161 with the alliance162 of Russia163 at places where
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[A]rmenian history reaches back more than two thousand years. In AD 301 the Armenians were the first people
to adopt Christianity as their official religion; the Holy Apostolic and Orthodox Church of Armenia (also known
as the Gregorian Church) has played an important role in the survival of a people who for much of their history
have lived under the rule of foreigners. The last independent Armenian state, the Kingdom of Cilicia, fell in
1375, and by the early part of the sixteenth century most Armenians had come under the control of the Ottoman
Empire. Under the millet system instituted by Sultan Mohammed II (1451-81) the Armenians enjoyed religious,
cultural, and social autonomy. Their ready acceptance of subservient political status under Ottoman rule lasted
well into the nineteenth century and earned the Armenians the title "the loyal community." Over time large
numbers of Armenians settled in Constantinople and in other towns, where they prospered as merchants, bankers,
artisans, and interpreters for the government. The majority, however, continued to live as peasants in the empire's
eastern provinces (vilayets), known as Great Armenia, as well as in several western districts near the
Mediterranean called Cilicia or Little Armenia. We have no accurate statistics for the population of the Ottoman
Empire during this period, but there is general agreement that by the latter part of the nineteenth century the
Armenians constituted a minority even in the six provinces usually referred to as the heartland of Armenia
(Erzurum, Bitlis, Van, Harput, Diarbekir, and Sivas). Emigration and conversions in the wake of massacres, the
redrawing of boundaries, and an influx of Muslims expelled or fleeing from the Balkans and the Caucasus
(especially Laz and Circassians) had helped decrease the number of Armenians in their historic home. Their
minority status fatally undermined their claim for an independent or at least autonomous Armenia within the
empire-aims that had begun to gather support as a result of the influx of new liberal ideas from the West and the
increased burdens weighing upon the Christian peasants of Anatolia. GUENTER LEWY, THE ARMENIAN
MASSACRES IN OTTOMAN TURKEY: A DISPUTED GENOCIDE 10-11 (2005).
158
Dikran Kevorkyan, Uluslararası Terörizm Bünyesinde Ermeni Terörizmi [Armenian Terrorism within the Structure
of International Terrorism], in ANKARA ÜNİVERSITESİ [ANKARA UNIVERSITY], ULUSLARARASI TERRORİZM VE
UYUŞTURUCU MADDE KAÇAKÇILIĞI [INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND DRUGS TRAFFICKING] 91, 94 (1984).
159
Armenians provided help to the invading forces of Russia even before the 1890s, such as in 1828, 1854 and 1877
Russian-Turkish Wars. This was the reason why the Ottoman government did not trust Armenians. Justin McCarthy,
Zehir ve Panzehir Olarak Tarih [History as a Poison and Antidote], in ANKARA ÜNİVERSITESİ [ANKARA UNIVERSITY],
ULUSLARARASI TERRORİZM VE UYUŞTURUCU MADDE KAÇAKÇILIĞI [INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND DRUGS
TRAFFICKING] 81, 85 (1984).
160
“Armenians often used the name ‘Şatak’ to encompass the entire northern area, but the European usage of ‘Sasun’
is applied here. The Ottoman Sasun Region is divided among a number of modern Turkish provinces- Muş, Bingöl,
Bitlis, Siirt, Batman, and Diyarbakır today.” JUSTIN MCCARTHY &ÖMER TURAN& CEMALETTIN TAŞKIRAN, SASUN:
THE HISTORY OF AN 1890S ARMENIAN REVOLT 3 (2014).
161
JUSTIN MCCARTHY& ESAT ARSLAN & CEMALETTIN TAŞKIRAN & ÖMER TURAN, THE ARMENIAN REBELLION AT
VAN 60-62 (2006).
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Before the beginning of 1728-1829 Russia-Ottoman War, Russians promised autonomy and some privileges to the
Armenians in return of the Armenians’ support in Russian invasion. This promise still has not yet been realized.
McCarthy, supra note 159, at 81, 86.
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It was the Russians, not the Armenian revolutionaries, who gave the first impetus to Armenian separatism. The
change in Armenian sympathies began when Russian power was felt in the East. In their wars against Iran and
the Ottoman Empire in 1827–29, the Russians defeated first the Persians then the Ottomans. The Russians
killed or expelled 26,000 Turks from their newly won territories, including the province of Erivan (now the
Armenian Republic), where Turks had been a majority. Armenian elements had supported the Russians in their
conquests. The Russians, in turn, offered to Armenians the lands and farms from which the Turks had been
evicted, as well as relaxation of normal taxes. More than a hundred thousand Armenians came from Iran and
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Armenians are a minority.164 Their strategy was the same as the Bulgarians:165 gangs attack the
Muslims, let them respond, and seek Russia’s help through invasion. 166 In 1896, the Armenians
also stormed the Ottoman Bank in Istanbul and killed four employees. In 1905, Sultan Abdulhamit
II was the target of an assassination attempt from which he barely survived when the bombs planted
by Armenian terrorists did not explode.167 During World War I in 1915, Armenians again
compromised with the Russians at the back of the Caucasus Front,168 revolted against the Ottoman
Empire, and annihilated groups loyal to the Ottomans, mainly the majority Muslim Turks and
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the Ottoman Empire. The process was repeated in the 1877–78 Russo-Turkish War, when Armenians in the
Ottoman northeast supported Russian invaders, even acting as Russian police in occupied cities. When the
Russians left at war’s end, they were accompanied by perhaps twenty-five thousand Armenians. In turn, the
Russians expelled more than a hundred thousand Muslims from their newly conquered territories. MCCARTHY
ET AL., supra note 161, at 46.
European pressure did the most damage to the Ottoman ability to wage war on rebels. As in subsequent
generations, fighting guerrillas effectively involved punishing those who supported the rebels as well as
fighting the rebels themselves. These were the tactics used by the British, French, and Russians against rebels
in their own colonies. One need only compare Ottoman actions in Van Province with British actions against
rebels in India, French actions in North Africa, or Russian actions in the Caucasus to see the double standard
that was at work. The situations were indeed different, because the Europeans were imposing colonial rule on
majorities, whereas the Ottomans were attempting to protect a majority, the Muslims, against a distinct
minority, the Armenian rebels. The Europeans, however, would not allow the Ottomans the tools that they
themselves used to put down revolt. Comparing the Ottomans and Russians reveals the inequity. The Russians
in effect expelled millions of Jews from their northwest provinces. By 1878 they had murdered or expelled 1.2
million Caucasian Muslims and four hundred thousand Turks and Tatars from their Asiatic conquests and the
Crimea. Yet there was no European outcry against them. The Ottomans, in contrast, were not to be allowed
even to stop a rebellious minority. MCCARTHY ET AL., supra note 161, at 48.

“Even before 1915 event, between 1911 and 1912, it was clear that the Armenians were only the minority. The truth
was that after the centuries long Turkish sovereignty, not only majority but the vast majority of Asia Minor had been
Islamized.” McCarthy, supra note 159, at 81, 85.
165
“The Bulgarians had an advantage that the Armenians of Eastern Anatolia did not share: they were a much larger
proportion of the population.” MCCARTHY ET AL., supra note 161, at 73.
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The intent of the revolutionaries was not to defeat the Muslims but rather to cause retaliatory atrocities against
Armenians. These, they were sure, would draw European support. England and France would intervene
diplomatically. Russia might go to war. The Armenians would be granted their state. This was not a far-fetched
plan. It was exactly what had happened in Bulgaria. Bulgarian revolutionaries had attacked Bulgarian Muslims
in 1876, killing perhaps 1,000. The Muslim response killed 3,000–12,000 Bulgarian Christians. The Russians
then invaded. Ultimately 260,000 Bulgarian Muslims died and 575,000 were driven from Bulgaria. A
Bulgarian principality was created. The Armenian revolutionaries hoped to emulate the Bulgarian success.
MCCARTHY ET AL., supra note 161, at 60.
167
MANGO, supra note 5, at 3.
168
Kevorkyan, supra note 158, at 91, 94.
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Kurds as well as loyal Armenians.169 The Armenian population in the eastern region, which
involves six cities of Bitlis, Van, Mamuretulaziz, Diyarbakir, Sivas and Erzurum, in 1912 was
870.000. In these six cities, the population of Muslim Turks was six times as many as the
Armenians. The rest of the Armenians were dispersed throughout the Empire, and they were equal
to the East in terms of number, which was 870,000.170 This shows that the total number of
Armenian subjects in the Empire was not more than 1,800,000.171
In response to the rebellious Armenians who were attacking the villages (of the Turks,
Kurds and loyal Armenians), the Ottoman government decided to deport the rioting Armenians to
the Eastern provinces which were not invaded by the Russians, mainly Syria (which was then an
Ottoman state) and the very East. While Armenians that were deported to Syria arrived safely due
to stronger Ottoman authority in that area, the ones who were exiled to the East suffered from
disease, hunger, and the attacks of Kurdish tribesmen and bandits, and ill-treatment of some
irregular Ottoman soldiers.172 Armenian deaths in Anatolia were around 600.000 in total.173
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By March 1915 the Eastern Anatolian countryside was completely at war. Armenian rebels and deserters
increased their incursions into the neighborhood of the city of Van. Without distinction of age or sex, Muslims
who met with the rebels were simply killed… The Armenians have prepared a general revolt that will aid the
upcoming Russian attack from Abaak and Saray and the enemy occupation of Van. MCCARTHY ET AL., supra
note 161, at 196.
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McCarthy, supra note 159, at 81, 83, 84.
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The official documents and statistics of the Ottoman Empire on population shows that the Armenian population in
the Ottoman Empire was 1.293.000. Accepting a 15% odd of mistake in the statistics, the number would not exceed
1.500.000, according to the author. Kevorkyan, supra note 158, at 91, 94.
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Who were later punished (1367 people) and executed (62 people) for this ill-treatment which was explicitly
prohibited by the military orders sent from Istanbul, according to Ottoman records. McCarthy, supra note 159, at 81,
85; Kevorkyan, supra note 158, at 91, 94.
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On the other side, the Russian invasion174 of the Caucasus (including Crimea and today’s
Armenia)175 and the Armenian collaboration with Russia in 1800s resulted in 1.2 million Turks
being deported from the Caucasus by the Russians to the Eastern Anatolia,176 and 2.5 million
Turkish deaths in the whole of Anatolia.177
Seeking revenge for the 1915 events, Armenian revolutionists sought world public
attention through terrorism in order to pressurize and influence the Turkish government and its
relationship with its NATO allies.178 Armenian terrorism, which was thought to be supported by
then Soviet Union to cause instability in Turkey,179 was active in 1975-85. It targeted Turkish
diplomats and other soft targets in foreign countries.180 The organizations were ASALA (Armenian
Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia) and JCAG (Justice Commandos of the Armenian
Genocide). Nine months after the establishment of ASALA,181 the Turkish ambassador in Paris
was murdered together with his bodyguard. Many Turkish diplomats were assassinated in the
following years in Austria, Greece, Holland, Spain, Switzerland, and Australia.182 The wife of a
Turkish ambassador was assassinated in Madrid in 1978, and the son of a Turkish ambassador was
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Worse than any cause of state poverty, though, was the effect of Russian military action against the Ottomans.
The Russians invaded the Ottoman Empire in 1806, 1828, 1853, and 1877–78. They left behind destruction, a
much weakened tax base, and the loss of territories such as Bulgaria, in which the Ottomans had spent much
of their limited capital for development. Then the Russians demanded, and received, reparations from those
they had attacked. MCCARTHY ET AL., supra note 161, at 263.
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For example, 80% of the city of Erivan was Turkish, before the Russian invasion and the replacement of deported
Muslim villages with Armenians brought from Eastern Anatolia. McCarthy, supra note 159, at 81, 86.
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KAÇAKÇILIĞI [INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND DRUGS TRAFFICKING] 130 (1984).
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murdered in Holland in 1979. Deadly attacks were conducted on Turkish Airlines and tourist
offices in many countries. Bomb attacks were conducted in the Istanbul airport and its railway
station in May 1977, Ankara Airport in August 1982, Orly Airport in Paris, the Turkish embassy
in Lisbon in June 1983, and the Turkish embassy in Ottowa in March 1984.183 In total, 42 Turkish
diplomats were assassinated in 110 incidents in 21 countries.184
Kurdish rebellions emerged as feudal tribal riots against the central government authority
in Ottoman Eastern Anatolia, rather than ethnic uprisings.185 Major rebellions were erupted in
1806–8, 1828–29, 1834–37, 1840–47, 1855, and 1878–82.186 The rebellions continued during the
years of the Independence War (1920-1923) and even after the proclamation of the Republic in
1923.187 The most serious insurrection was Sheikh Said’s rebellion which posed a serious threat
on the republican state.188 The riot involved both ethnic and religious ideology and demanded the
reinstatement of the Caliphate (which was abolished by the Modern Turkish Republic in 1924).
After the riot of Dersim in 1937, the Kurdish movement slowed down until 1976, when
today’s PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) was established in a meeting organized by its leader
Abdullah OCALAN in Dikmen, Ankara.189 The principles, ideology, logistics and structure of the
organization was formed in that meeting, and terrorist attacks against the state began with the
August 15, 1984 Eruh and Semdinli simultaneous attacks in Southeastern Turkey.190 Until the
2000s, PKK utilized Marxist-Communist ideology to establish a separate Kurdistan, including
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Southeastern Turkey, Northern Iraq and Syria, and Northern Iran. For realizing this purpose, the
organization established four stages:191
1) to ensure cultural and social development within Kurdish elements in four countries
2) to obtain autonomous and self-governing administrations in each state
3) to establish an independent Kurdish state in each state
4) to assemble each independent state and to establish the “Great Kurdistan”
PKK has been listed as a terrorist organization by the United States and the European Union
(E.U.).192 PKK terror has led to the death of approximately 35,000 people since 1984.193 The
organization receives enormous material and financial support from several foreign states,194 and
earns large amounts of money from illegal drug trafficking and from legal Kurdish institutions
established in Europe that fund the terrorist organization.195
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b) Terrorism against the Democratic Constitutional Order of the Turkish Republic

(1)Islamist Terrorism against the Democratic Constitutional Order of Modern Turkey
The abuse of Islam for political purposes had long been a security issue that has affected
the Turkish states. Radical Islam was a threat directed against the territorial integrity of the
Ottoman Empire, and is now challenging the constitutional structure and existence of Modern
Turkey. The Ottomans had tried hard to restrain religious fanaticism, which was a security threat
targeted at the unity of the state itself. When Ottomans were in control of the Arabian Peninsula,
they fought against Wahhabis in today’s Saudi Arabia and the Zeydis in Yemen, which were
violent political movements advocating the return to primitive Islam by establishing a new state
independent from the Ottoman rule.196 Modern Turkey also has been intensely fighting against
religious fanaticism, knowing that it threatens the spread of modern knowledge,197 hampers social
development, and harms secular and democratic198 constitutional order. Islamist terrorism in
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The Wahhabis who arose among the Bedouins of central Arabia in the middle of the eighteenth century, at a
time of Ottoman weakness, were considered particularly pernicious because they branded as infidels all
Muslims who did not follow their puritanical teaching. They were ejected from Mecca in 1812–13 by
Muhhamad Ali, the Ottoman governor of Egypt. When the Ottoman reforming statesman Midhat Pasha was
governor of Baghdad in 1870, he described the Wahhabis as ‘evil men’ and pushed them out of the Arabian
coast of the Persian Gulf. It is instructive to remember that before Napoleon invaded Ottoman Egypt at the
beginning of the nineteenth century, one of his generals tried to open relations with the Wahhabis. Similarly,
the Italians sustained the Zeydi Imam Yahya in his revolt against the Ottomans in Yemen in order to facilitate
their invasion of Libya in 1911. During World War I, when the British financed the revolt of Husayn, the
Hashimite ruler of Mecca, they also negotiated both with the Wahhabi chieftain Ibn Saud in central Arabia and
with Imam Yahya in Yemen. The rise to power of the Wahhabi dynasty of Ibn Saud in Arabia was the direct
result of the destruction of the Ottoman Empire, as the British protégé, the Hashimite Emir (later King) Husayn,
proved unable to retain control of the Muslim Holy Places. As the Saudi dynasty gradually moved away from
Wahhabi extremists, the latter joined forces with another group of fanatics known as Salafis. Their doctrine of
return to primitive Islam was developed in Egypt in the middle of the nineteenth century and then spread to
North Africa and Syria. Today Islamist terrorists justify their recourse to violence in terms of Wahhabi-Salafi
teaching, which arose as an expression of opposition to the Ottoman order. These extremist doctrines have
always been alien to Turkish Islam. MANGO, supra note 5, at 58, 59.
See also EMIN DEMIREL, AFGANISTAN: TALIBAN, EL KAIDE- LADIN VE PAYLAŞILAMAYAN ÜLKE AFGANISTAN
[AFGHANISTAN: TALIBAN, AL QAEDA-LADIN AND THE UNSHARED STATE AFGHANISTAN 119 (2002).
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Contrary to what is generally thought, the democracy attempts of the Turks did not begin with the establishment
of Modern Turkey. Ottomans had long tried to instill democratic institutions to the structure of the Empire, and to
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Turkey has been supported by the adversaries of Western democratic values and the proponents of
an Islamist regime.199
The Islamist terrorist organizations posing substantial threat to Turkey are Al Qaeda,
Hezbollah, ISIS and FETO. The aim of Al Qaeda was to demolish the Western supremacy over
Islamic countries, to establish the caliphate again, and to found an Islamic empire in the world.200
The most damaging attack of Al Qaeda in Turkey was the Istanbul bombings of 2003, conducted
in two synagogues, the HSBC Bank, and the British Consulate.201
Hezbollah aims to demolish the secular structure of Turkey and to establish a theocratic
state governed by Islamic Sharia principles.202 Hezbollah mainly operates in Eastern Turkey,
receives material support from Iran203 and would like to export the Iranian type of a theocratic
regime to Turkey.204 The organization has so far perpetrated crimes in four ways: internecine

limit the authority of the Sultan. The 1839 Imperial Edict of Gulhane (Tanzimat Fermani) and 1856 Reform Edict
(Islahat Fermani) limited the authority of Sultan, emphasized the equality of all Ottoman subjects before the law,
guaranteed the life, honor, and property of all Ottoman subjects regardless of their religion, and had made substantial
administrative, legal, military, and tax reforms.
The First Constitution called as Kanuni-Esasi was promulgated in 1876, and remained in force until the promulgation
of the 1924 Constitution by the Turkish National Assembly.
The Parliament had been suspended by the Sultan Abdulhamid II in 1878, reinstated by the Young Turk Revolutionists
in 1908, and dissolved again by Sultan Vahdettin in 1918. These reforms principally aimed to prevent the secession
of different religious and ethnic groups from the Empire and to generate parliamentary representation. Yet, they were
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fighting, the conflict with Marxist PKK, contract killings, and the assassination of secularists in
universities and media.205
ISIS was also established as a reaction to Western democracies and principles, and aimed
to establish an Islamic Empire in a territory including the Middle East and Turkey. ISIS has been
conducting attacks in Turkish territory since 2014, causing at least 360 deaths in 16 attacks.206
The latest

organization in Turkey accused of terrorism is the Fethullah Terrorist

Organization (FETO), which conducted the military coup on July 15th, 2016.207 From outside,
FETO is only a religious organization with schools, charities and businesses around the world.208
Yet, many have argued that it is an organization raising radical Islamist students who are later to
be appointed in higher state bureaucracy, in order to take part in the misappropriation of state
authority.209
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The real nature of FETO is disputed between the U.S. and Turkey. While the U.S. regards
it as a dissident group that rebelled against the oppressive government in 2016, Turkey has
considered it to be an Islamist terrorist organization since 2017.210

(2)Marxist-Leftist Terrorism against the Liberal Structure of the State
Turkey, which was founded as a liberal state, was a Western bloc state in the Cold War and
is a NATO ally since 1952.211 The terrorist organization advocating Marxist-leftist ideology and
the communist system of governance in Turkey has been DHKP/C (The Revolutionary People’s
Liberation Party/ Front). DHKP-C aims to establish a communist state and to remove the U.S. and
NATO presence in Turkey.212 DHKP/C began its terror attacks in 1972, and intensified the attacks
against foreign targets, governmental and judicial officials, the police, and banks since the
1990s.213 The U.S. and E.U. also regard DHKP/C as a terrorist organization.214

2. Turkey’s Terrorism Compared to the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and
Germany
The United States, The United Kingdom, France and Germany have also had their own
domestic and international terrorism problems, like Turkey.

210

For the first Turkish High Court judgment deeming FETO a terrorist organization, see C.G.K. 26.9.2017 E.
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In terms of domestic terrorism, the United States experienced left-wing terrorism in the
1960s and 1970s, and right wing terrorism in 1980s and 1990s.215 Left-wing terrorism was opposed
to the American military involvement in Indochina and capitalism in general.216 The Weather
Underground was the most important group that carried out some lethal attacks.217 Right wing
extremist violence included neo-Nazi groups, racist (like Ku Klux Klan), anti-gay, anti-abortionist,
and anti-Semitist groups, the militia movement, extreme tax protest organizations, and Christian
Identity violent extremist groups.218 The U.S. has not experienced ethnic separatist terrorism. In
terms of international terrorism, U.S. targets at home and abroad have been under attack by AlQaeda various times since early 1990s.219 The 9/11 attacks had the most devastating effect,220
killing almost 3000 people.221 There have also been attacks inspired or conducted by ISIS in the
U.S. since 2014.222
The United Kingdom has long suffered from separatist terror in Northern Ireland conducted
by the Irish Republican Army.223 The purpose of the Irish Republican Army was to separate
Northern Ireland (2/3 of which is Protestant) from Protestant U.K, and unite it with the Catholic
Republic of Ireland. The Good Friday Agreement (also known as the Northern Ireland Act 1998
or Belfast Agreement) between the U.K. and Ireland was a turning point to end Irish separatist
terrorism and to ensure peace in Northern Ireland.224 The Northern Ireland Assembly was
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established,225 and a new government that shared power between the Unionist Protestants (who
were loyal to the Crown and the U.K.) and Nationalist Catholics (who wanted to secede from the
U.K. and to join the Northern Ireland) was formed.226 The IRA was disarmed in 2005,227 and the
British Army officially terminated its operations in Northern Ireland in 2007.228 As international
terrorism, ISIS has conducted many attacks on British soil.229
France, as domestic terrorism, had the left wing Action Directe between 1972-1987 and
Corsican separatist terrorism until the early 2000s.230 As international terrorism, it tackled the
Algerian terrorism, Armenian ASALA terrorism, and the Islamic jihad group of Hezbollah.231 ISIS
has also conducted many attacks in France since 2015.232
Germany had the left-wing terrorism of the Red Army Faction from the late 1960s to
1998,233 and right-wing and racist violence from 1979 to the early 1990s.234 Germany did not
experience separatist terrorism. International terrorism in Germany mainly was directed toward
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targets related to a conflict in a terrorist organization’s country of origin.235 For instance, in the
1990s, the Kurdistan Worker’s Party attacked Turkish shops, community centers, and embassies
in Germany.236 Lebanese Hezbollah, the Palestinian Hamas, and the Algerian GIA had branches
in Germany, and participated in mostly non-violent fundraising, recruitment and political
propaganda activities.237 Al Qaeda (and later ISIS) became an international terrorism problem for
the West including Germany since the 9/11 attacks.238

TERRORIST
ORGANIZATIONS

AL QAEDA239

TYPE

GENERAL INFORMATION

• Islamic jihad
• Since 1988
• Listed in U.S.
designated
foreign terrorist
organizations
since 1999240

• Afghanistan, United States,
France, India, Turkey
• 9/11 attacks that killed
nearly 3000 Americans
• 2003 bombings that killed
62 and injured 718.241

TERRORIST
PROFILE

• Training
camps
are
located
in
numerous
countries
around
the
globe
• Physical
training
as
well
as
indoctrination
through study,
videos,
prayer, and a
generally
regimented
lifestyle

ORGANIZATIONAL
STRUCTURE

FUNDING

• Has
become
decentralized, with
affiliates
acting
semi-autonomously
as extensions of alQaeda’s
core
mission.

• Iran, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia
• Private donors, charities and
foundations
• Drug
trafficking,
bank
robbery, hostages
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DHKP/C242

• Leftist (Marxist)
• Anti-U.S. and
Anti-NATO
• Since 1978
• Listed in U.S.
designated
foreign terrorist
organizations
since 1997243

• Turkey, primarily Istanbul
• Attacks against current and
retired Turkish security
officials.
• U.S. officials in Turkey
• Suicide
bombings,
assassinations, the use of
explosive devices

• Recruited
supporters
from
high
schools and
universities244
• Urban poor245

•

• Western Europe
• Armed robberies
• Extortion

HEZBOLLAH246

• Islamic jihad
• Since 1982
• Listed in U.S.
designated
foreign terrorist
organizations
since 1997247

• Lebanon, Syria, Germany,
Mexico, Brazil, Turkey
• Against U.S., Israel and the
Jews, Turkey248
• Since 2012, Hezbollah has
been fighting on behalf of
Syria’s President Bashar
Assad against al-Qaeda, the
Nusra Front, and other
rebels.

• Networks
of
schools, camps, and
religious
programming
throughout
Lebanon.
• Runs
summer
camps, field trips,
and
religious
holiday programing.

• Extensive
military
and
financial support from Iran
through Syria
• First and foremost an
instrument of the Iranian
regime.
• Transnational
criminal
activities
• Extortion, robbery, taxing
their own members and
supporters, revenue from
foreign sources mainly Iran249

IRISH REPUBLICAN
ARMY (IRA)250

• Separatist
• Political
pressure group
dedicated
to
removing British
forces
from
Northern Ireland
and
unifying
Ireland
• Since early 1998
• Between 1969
and 1998, IRA
brought about

• Northern Ireland, Irish
Republic and Great Britain
• Seeks separation from
protestant U.K. 1/3 of the
Northern
Ireland’s
population is Catholic,
while 2/3 of it is Protestant.
The Protestant majority
remains loyal to the U.K.
and refuses to secede from
it.252 Southern Ireland’s
majority was Catholic and
gained independence from

• Between 200
and
250
fighters
• Searching for
15,000 new
recruits by the
fall of 2013.
• Shiite
Hezbollah has
expanded its
recruitment to
include
Sunnis
and
non-Muslims
• 100 to 200
activists
• Good Friday
Agreement
between U.K.
and Ireland in
1998.254
• Declared
initiation of
disarmament
in 2001; total

• Cell structure
• Highly secretive
• Military structure

• Annual revenue: 6-15 million
dollars between 1978 and
1998256
• Oil and cigarette trafficking,
extortion,
robbery,
counterfeiting257
• Prohibited its members from
engaging
in
drugs
trafficking258
• Provides guns from US gun
dealers
• Receives
funds
from
sympathizers
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3700 deaths and
30.000 injuries.
• Real
IRA
(RIRA) had been
listed in U.S.
designated
foreign terrorist
organizations
since 2001251

U.K. in 1920s. IRA also
would like to separate itself
from U.K. and get united
with today’s Ireland.253

THE RED ARMY
FACTION (RAF) 261

• Left-wing
(communist)
organization
• Also known as
Baader-Mainhof
Gang

KURDISTAN

•
•
•
•

• Germany
• Founded in 1970 by
Andreas Baader, Gudrun
Ensslin, and others
• Emerged as a violent fallout of the 1968 student
revolt
• Operated from the late
1960s to 1998
• Responsible for more than
40 deaths, and 100 injuries
in the 30 years of activity
• Hostage taking, bombing,
hijacking, assassination
• Main targets were economic
and political leaders
• RAF
core
members
committed suicide in prison
in 1977
• In April 1998, the RAF
declared its disbandment
• Turkey, Europe, and the
Middle East
• The goal is to establish an
independent Kurdish State
in Southeastern Turkey
• Targets are Turkish security
as well as civilians
• Conducted
attacks
on
Turkish diplomatic and
commercial facilities in
dozens
of
Western
European cities in 1990s.

WORKERS

PARTY

(PKK) 262

Separatist
Marxist
Since 1974
PKK left at least
14.739, if not
35.000, dead263,
and 5337 people
wounded.264
• Listed in U.S.
designated
foreign terrorist

• Sophisticated weapons from
Balkans
• Funding from Libya until 1987
and the United States until the
end of the 1980s.259
• Trade organizations, donations
and financial aid from
NORAID and Ireland diaspora
in the US260

disarmament
in 2005.255

• Student revolt
groups
converted to
militant gangs

• Urban
group

• Militant
groups

• Three layers of
structure: “Party”,
Army and “Front”.
Party
is
the
determiner of the
political purpose and
ideology. “Front”
organizes
the
students, workers,
youth and officers.
Arranges
propaganda

militant

• Annual revenue: 550-750
million dollars
• Aid from neighbors,267 mainly
Syria, Iran, Iraq, Greece
• Support from Western Europe:
a refuge, a school for its
supporters, a source of funds, a
base for wide ranging
propaganda campaign inciting
violence in Turkey and
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organizations
since 1997265

• Bombed tourist sites, hotels,
and kidnapped foreign
tourists in 1990s.

activities
and
logistics to the army
as well as revenue to
the
organization.
“Army” conducts
violent terrorist acts.
“Army” and ‘Front”
implements
the
decisions of the
“Party”.266

•

•

•
•

ISIS272

• Islamic jihad
• Since 2004 as
Al- Qaeda in
Iraq
• Since 2013 as
ISIS
• ISIS was used to
be known as Al
Qaeda in Iraq
until 2013273

• Attacks worldwide; mainly
Turkey, France, United
States, Belgium, Nigeria,
Lebanon,
Malaysia,
Bangladesh,
Indonesia,
Tunisia, Kuwait
• Holds territory in Syria,
Iraq, Libya, Egypt, Algeria,
Yemen, Saudi Arabia,
Nigeria,
Afghanistan,

• Ideological
and physical
training275
• High
level
military
techniques276

• Comprised of many
ministry-like
councils: leadership
council,
financial
council,
military
council,
security
council, intelligence
council,
media
council,
fighters’

•

•

seeking Western support for
it.268
Indirect support from US:
Material support to PYD269,
and the consequences of Iraq
War on Turkey and the capture
of Saddam’s ammunition by
the PKK
Drugs trafficking, migrant
trafficking,
weapons
trafficking, cigarette, alcohol,
and
oil
trafficking,
counterfeiting, racket
Trade
organizations,
donations270
2 newspapers, 4 TV channels,
13 radio channels, 19
magazines, 3 printing houses,
and many websites in
Europe.271
The
richest
terrorist
organization in the world: $23 billion of annual revenue via
taxes, oil trade, bank looting
and kidnapping ransoms282
Daily income of $3 million283
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• Listed in U.S.
foreign terrorist
organizations
list as Al Qaeda
in Iraq in
2004.274

Pakistan, and the North
Caucasus.

•

•
•

•

• Radical Islamist

FETHULLAH
TERRORIST
ORGANIZATION
(FETO)284

• Turkey’s
democratic
constitutional structure
• July 2016 coup attempt led
to 240 deaths and 2200
injuries.

• Raise of poor
students with
religious
ideology,
infiltration of
them into the
bureaucracy
of military,
judiciary, and
the executive
departments.

•
•
•

assistance council,
legal council277
Lone wolf attacks278
which account for
70 percent of all
deaths in the West
from
2006
to
2014.279
50.000 fighters half
of
which
are
foreigners
Since 2011, between
25.00-30.000
fighters from 100
countries
have
arrived in Iraq and
Syria.280
Europe comprises of
21 percent of all
foreign
fighters,
while 50 percent is
from neighboring
Middle East and
North
African
countries.281
Highly secretive
Strict organizational
structure
High devotedness

• Schools,
charities
businesses worldwide

Table 1 - The Characteristics of Terrorist Organizations285

The above table suggests that terrorism in Turkey has been more grave than Western
terrorism in three respects: the lengthy life span of terrorist organizations, their strength and
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and

capacity, and the variety of organizations operating simultaneously. Firstly, terrorist organizations
in Turkey has a lengthier history than those in Europe and the U.S. Secondly, the strength and
capacity of terrorist organizations targeting Turkey is greater than that of Europe and the United
States. This is particularly because of two reasons: the close geographic position of Turkey to the
Middle East and the substantial foreign support behind terrorist organizations in Turkey. For one
thing, terrorist organizations emerge in the conditions of instability where democracy under the
rule of law is weak. Instability and the authority gap in the Middle East thus generate favorable
conditions for the emergence of terrorist organizations in the region. For another thing, states that
have economic and political interests in the Middle East seek to undermine Turkey by providing
material and financial support to terrorist organizations.286 And lastly, Turkey has been under
threat from different types of terrorist organizations at the same time: communist DHKP-C,
separatist PKK, Islamist Hezbollah, Al Qaeda, ISIS. Given these unique factors, Turkey may need
to take special measures at counterterrorism. These possibilities are discussed in the next section.

C. THE COMPARISON OF TURKISH LAW WITH EUROPEAN AND UNITED STATES
LAWS
1. The Roots of Turkish Law, Its Relationship with the European Convention on Human
Rights, and the Binding Force of the European Court of Human Rights Decisions
With the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the modern Republic of
Turkey in 1923, the Turks turned their face to the West instead of the East. The founders of the
Turkish Republic established a Westernized legal system. They took Western Constitutions as

286
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models,287 abolished the application of Islamic Sharia rules, and adopted Western Criminal and
Civil Codes. In order to eliminate the authoritarian social structure and to promote individualism
in society, Western Codes were integrated into the Turkish legal system in the 1920s. The first
criminal code was adopted from Italy, and the civil code was adopted from Switzerland in 1926.288
The commercial code and the criminal procedure code were adopted from Germany in 1929.289
Necessary amendments to these codes were later made in consideration of legal developments in
the West as well as issues arising in Turkish legal practice.
Turkey expressed its commitment to human rights values in various international arenas
such as the United Nations (U.N.) and the Council of Europe. Turkey is a founding member state
of the United Nations.290 The United Nations General Assembly proclaimed the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948.291 Turkey is a party to 15 of 18 of the U.N. Human Rights
Conventions.292
Turkey had been one of the founding members of the Council of Europe that was
established in 1948 after World War II.293 It ratified many human rights conventions and protocols
signed under the Council of Europe, one of which is the European Convention on Human Rights.
The European Convention on Human Rights was signed in Rome in 1950, and entered into force

287

For more information, see generally Earle, supra note 154, at 100.
MANGO, supra note 154, at 1124-26; ZURCHER, supra note 113, at 173; HUGHES, supra note 150, at 19.
289
MANGO, supra note 154, at 1194-95; DOĞAN SOYASLAN, CEZA MUHAKEMELERİ USULÜ HUKUKU [CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE LAW] 171 (2016).
290
United Nations, Founding Member States, http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/unms/founders.shtml (last visited Aug. 25,
2018); United Nations, Turkey, http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/unms/turkey.shtml (last visited Aug. 25, 2018).
291
United Nations, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-humanrights/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2018); G.A. Res. 217A (Dec. 10, 1948), available at
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/217(III).
292
Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/İnsan-hakları.en.mfa (last
visited Aug. 25, 2018).
293
Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Council of Europe, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/council-ofeurope.en.mfa (last visited Aug. 25, 2018); Council of Europe, Complete list of the Council of Europe's treaties,
https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list (last visited Aug. 25, 2018).
288

57

in 1953.294 Turkey signed the European Convention on Human Rights in 1950, and the Convention
was ratified by the Turkish Parliament and entered into force in 1954.295 The Council established
the European Court of Human Rights to ensure the proper application of the European Convention
and its additional protocols.296 Turkey recognized the right of individual petition to the European
Court of Human Rights in 1987, and accepted the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction in 1990.297
The European Court of Human Rights decisions are binding for Turkish courts under
Article 46 of the Convention298 and the Turkish Constitution Article 90.299 First, Article 46 states
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that ECtHR decisions have a binding force over member states, one of which is Turkey.300 Second,
Article 90 of the Turkish Constitution states that international agreements on human rights norms
would prevail over statutes if any contradiction exists. Article 90 also asserts that the
unconstitutionality of the international agreements (such as the European Convention) cannot be
claimed before the Turkish Constitutional Court. This latter provision implies that international
agreements are superior to the Turkish Constitution. For these reasons, the ECtHR decisions, by
which the norms of the European Convention on Human Rights are interpreted, would prevail over
statutory (and even constitutional) rules, and should primarily be taken into consideration by
Turkish judges.301
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The European countries examined in this paper are members of the Council of Europe, and
they ratified the European Convention on Human Rights.302 Yet, the judgments of the ECtHR are
not directly enforceable in the way like that domestic court judgments would be.303 All of the
member states are obliged by the Convention to abide by the judgments of the ECtHR.304 The
means for conforming to these judgments is left to the discretion of states, whether it be through a
legislative change or the alteration of an administrative policy that violates the Convention.305 The
Committee of Ministers, which is comprised of Ministers for Foreign Affairs306 of member states,
oversees the execution of the Court’s judgments.307 The Committee examines a) whether any just
satisfaction awarded by the Court has been paid, b) whether individual measures have been
undertaken to cease the violation and whether the individual party has been put to the same
condition prior to the violation, and c) whether general measures were adopted to prevent similar
future violations or to terminate continuing violations.308 If the Committee concludes that a state
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has refused to abide by the Court’s final decision to which it is a party, it can refer the matter to
the Court for determination of whether the state has failed to fulfill its obligation under Article
46/1.309 This is called an “infringement proceeding”, and such proceedings may be initiated only
in exceptional circumstances.310 The Committee is required to give formal notice to the infringing
state prior to the initiation of infringement proceedings. If the Court finds a violation, it refers the
case to the Committee of Ministers for consideration of the measures to be taken.311 The
Convention and the Statute of the Council of Europe are both silent about what those potential
measures (or sanctions) are.

2. The General Comparison of European and American Legal Principles
From a general perspective, European and American basic legal standards are similar. First,
the proportionality standard (in Europe) and the balancing test (in the U.S.) are the primary
principles that various aspects of law are grounded upon. These two standards function
similarly.312 Second, state intrusions on liberty are subject to the requirements of judicial warrant
and a reasonable standard of cause in each system.313 The more serious a human rights intrusion,
the more level of cause is required for state intrusions as a result of the balancing analysis used in
both systems. For instance, while arrest requires probable cause or reasonable grounds,314 pre-trial
detention necessitates a more demanding standard than probable cause both in Europe and the
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U.S.315 This standard is named as “clear and convincing evidence” or “strong suspicion”,
depending on the system.316
Third, reasons for pre-trial detention are similar: the destruction of evidence, witness
tampering, flight risk, the renewal or consummation of a crime, the protection of the suspect or
defendant.317 Fourth, procedural rights such as the privilege against self-incrimination, the right
to counsel, the right to silence, and the right to be informed of procedural rights are fundamental
in the investigative stage.318 As the basic standards are the same, this study concentrated on the
comparison of specific rules used in counterterrorism in each jurisdiction.
Because Turkey is legally bound by international human rights principles, any proposals
for Turkey must comply with these universal standards. For this reason, European and American
legal principles hold considerable importance in determining the utmost limit of human rights
intrusions that could be suggested for Turkish counterterrorism law. In this thesis, European and
U.S. Laws are first compared, and then are used to determine the gaps in Turkish law and to
propose suitable statutory amendments that meet Turkish security needs.

D. INTERVIEWS AS SUPPORTING ARGUMENTS
This study incorporates interviews with counterterrorism officials into its analysis to
support possible legal amendments to the Turkish system. These interviews were conducted with
Turkish security officials, and judges and prosecutors with experience in counterterrorism.
Interviews were conducted within a three-month period from February 2017 to April 2017. Each
interview took approximately two hours.
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Interviewed security officials consisted of: a) the general heads of counterterrorism,
intelligence, and organized crime departments of the police and gendarmerie; b) the heads of
specific units of these departments; c) some retired senior security officials.319 The number of
these interviewees are as follows: twelve officials from the counterterrorism department, five
officials from the intelligence department, and two officials from the organized crime department.
All of the security officials had 10-20 years of experience in counterterrorism. With regard to the
judiciary, six judges and three public prosecutors with experience in counterterrorism were
interviewed.
Each interview was based on previously prepared questionnaires with 20-25 questions.
Different questions were prepared for different departments. Judicial officials were also asked
similar questions. The content of the questions was exhaustive. It included questions that were
prepared for the initial scope of my thesis. The previous scope of this study contained the following
topics: preventive (security) detention, the limitation of the procedural rights of counsel and the
right to be informed of the right to silence, the expansion of terror crimes, counterterrorism courts,
the extension of the duration of arrest, the use of deadly force against fleeing terrorists posing a
non-imminent but continuous threat, and intelligence gathering laws specifically on electronic
surveillance and data surveillance. Questions were prepared considering any potentially
problematic parts of existing laws in each topic, and then were discussed with counterterrorism
officials. They are attached as an appendix.
The experience and positions of the interviewed officials suggest their credibility. Yet, with
regard to security personnel, it was observed that they had biases as a result of the police subculture and subjective experiences. Interviews with security personnel were limited to the
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functioning of the existing law and the system. They talked about the problems they experience in
the application of the rules more than provided suggestions for change. Interviews with judicial
officials were, however, mostly about legal issues in the application of the rules and potential
changes in current rules.
Interviews were initially thought to be used as the sole reason for relevant statutory
changes. Yet, after conducting the interviews, I realized that it was not plausible to depict
interviews as the sole grounding of proposals. They could only be used as supportive arguments
for already determined gaps of Turkish law identified through comparative law assessment. This
is mainly because the opinions of interviewed officials stem from their subjective experiences and
cannot be generalized to the whole counterterrorism system of Turkey. In order to make more
generalized statements and to reach accurate conclusions, a comprehensive statistical data analysis
on the effects of each counterterrorism rule should be conducted. This type of a work requires the
substantial use of state sources and a deep-down analysis of secret government information
available only to high-ranked state officials.

E.INITIAL AND CURRENT PROPOSALS
The initial proposals made in this thesis included the enactment of; a) preventive detention,
b) the limitation of procedural rights of counsel and the right to be informed of the right to silence,
c) preparatory terror crimes, d) counterterrorism courts, e) an extended duration of arrest, f) the
use of deadly force against fleeing terrorists posing non-imminent but continuous security threat,
and g) improved intelligence gathering laws on electronic surveillance and data surveillance.
Considering the exhaustiveness of this scope and suggestions of my dissertation committee
members, I decided to limit this thesis to three proposals:
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a) Preventive detention based on general dangerousness in pre-trial and post-sentence
stages.
b) The limitation of procedural rights in the investigative stage: a public safety (or
compelling needs) exception to the right to counsel and to the right to be informed of procedural
rights, and the exclusion of defense counsel who are aiming to obstruct justice in certain ways.
c) The establishment of a counterterrorism court system that consists of judges and
prosecutors with special knowledge on Turkey’s national security priorities and terrorist
organizations.

II. TURKISH LAW REFORM PROPOSALS AND RELEVANT EUROPEAN AND
UNITED STATES LAWS
Based on the comparative law research and interviews conducted, this section makes three
main proposals for the Turkish system related to counterterrorism. The proposals are as follows:
a) preventive detention based on general dangerousness both in pre- trial and post-sentence stages,
b) a public safety exception to the right to counsel and the right to be informed of procedural rights,
and the exclusion of defense counsel affiliated with a terrorist organization, c) the establishment
of a specialized court system that consists of judges and prosecutors with special knowledge,
training, and expertise on counterterrorism.

A. PREVENTIVE DETENTION ON GENERAL DANGEROUSNESS GROUNDS
This section discusses the difficult balance between security and liberty. It then discusses
why preventive detention is critical in counterterrorism. And it reviews the types of preventive
detention applied in the United States and countries in Europe. It proposes two preventive legal
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measures that are lacking in Turkish law: 1. Pre-trial detention on a showing of terrorism-related
dangerousness; 2. Post-sentence detention of former terrorists who retain their dangerousness even
after serving of their sentences. A proportionality analysis is conducted and arguments against
post-sentence detention are discussed. Dangerousness factors and a precise level of cause are also
suggested to prevent arbitrary detention by the state. The dangerousness factors are prison
radicalization, mental disorder, prison intelligence, and personal and criminal background. The
level of cause suggested is the preponderance of evidence for a temporary detention, and clear and
convincing evidence if the detention period extends.

1. The Security and Liberty Relationship
The Oxford Dictionary defines security as “the state of being free from danger or threat”.320
The state of security refers to two distinct conditions: objective and subjective states.321 First, the
objective state of security means “being protected from threats”, through their “neutralization”,
“avoidance”, or “non-exposure to risk”.322 Second, the subjective state of security derives from the
Latin word securitas and indicates individual sense of safety, the feeling of being secure, or
freedom from anxiety.323
The Oxford Dictionary defines liberty as “the state of being free within society from
oppressive restrictions imposed by authority on one's way of life, behavior, or political views”.324
Liberty has roots in the Latin word libertas.325 It refers to a broad concept including not merely
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freedom from bodily restraint but also any limitation that impedes the pursuit of happiness in
life.326 The right to life, to marry, to contract, to acquire knowledge, to engage in or refrain from
any type of religious observance as one’s conscience directs, and other rights are all within the
scope of the concept of liberty.327
Security and liberty have a nourishing relationship. Security is the principal precondition328
of exercising individual liberties that pave the way for individual and social development; and the
uninterrupted exercise of individual liberties contributes to the preservation of security. On one
hand, the feeling of insecurity would deter individuals from taking necessary actions in pursuit of
happiness, hindering the proper exercise of liberties.329 On the other hand, the exercise of liberties
generates peace in a society as individuals are given the opportunity of self-realization.
The liberty and security balance should be proportionately set. Otherwise, each would have
an undermining effect on the other. Too much security may harm individual liberties, while the
lack of security may render liberties unusable. It is important to establish a fair balance between a
need for security and a need to execute a particular individual right.330

2. Preventive Detention in Counterterrorism
According to the classical liberal political theory, the state and citizen relationship is built
upon obligations. The state is under the obligation of providing security to persons and their
property, while citizens are obliged to obey the law and respect others’ rights.331 Thomas Hobbes,
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in his groundbreaking work of Leviathan, suggested that the sovereign power (be it a monarch or
an assembly ) was obliged by the law of nature to ensure the safety of the people.332 The state’s
duty to provide security generates two core state functions: First is the protection of citizens’ lives
and property, and the prevention of any potential harm towards individuals. States are for this
reason under the duty to enact laws and follow policies to ensure security for its citizens.333 Second
is the exclusive authority to use coercion to carry out these laws and to ensure the safety of its
people. In return for the state’s efforts to provide security, citizens are under the obligation to abide
by the law, to respect others’ rights, and to accept state coercion as the price of peace and order.334
A state’s core duty of prevention increases in cases of terrorism, because catastrophic terror
attacks can affect thousands of victims in one instance, and leave long-term psychological effects
on a society. Some countries have developed preventive legal measures under the notion of
“prevention is better than cure”.335 The enactment of unconsummated offenses, preventive
electronic surveillance, the use of deadly force to protect the lives and bodily integrity of
individuals, and the preventive detention of the dangerous are among these measures.
This chapter examines the preventive detention of dangerous persons in immigration
proceedings as well as in pre-trial and post-sentence stages. It first explains the conditions on which
Europe and the United States detain dangerous persons preventatively in these stages, and then
gives information about interviews conducted with counterterrorism officials, and finally makes
relevant suggestions to the Turkish law.
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3. The Types of Preventive Detention

a) Immigration Detention

(1)The United States
Immigration detention is the preventive detention of foreigners accused of immigration
violations pending removal from the U.S. It is a discretionary measure utilized by the Attorney
General.336 The Attorney General may either detain an individual or release him on bond or
conditional parole.337
Immigration detention is a useful tool to detain foreigners who have possible ties to
terrorism and to prevent future terror attacks.338 Under the U.S. law, those foreigners who are
suspected to be engaged in terrorist activities are inadmissible and subject to detention until they
are deported from the U.S.339 According to the relevant U.S. Code, any alien who
a) has engaged in or is likely to engage in a terrorist activity,
b) is a representative or member of a terrorist organization, or
c) endorses terrorist activity or is engaged in such groups
is inadmissible in the U.S. and will be subjected to immigration detention pending deportation.340
Aliens can be detained for a 90-day removal period.341 This duration can be extended if an
alien poses a risk to the community or is unlikely to comply with the removal order.342 In the event
of connection with terrorism, the detention period can be even longer. Although the Code does not
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provide a certain limit for detention, the U.S. Supreme Court in Zadvydas v. Davis343 did. First,
the Court set a six-month limit, the passing of which would generate a presumption that there was
“good reason to believe that there was no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future.”344 The alien must provide “good reason to believe that there is no significant
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.”345 The government then bears the
responsibility to rebut this presumption. Second, the Court ruled that the six-month presumption
did not mean that every alien not removed within six months should have been released. An alien
could be held in confinement “until it has been determined that there is no significant likelihood
of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.”346 The longer the duration of the pre-removal
confinement, the less likely it is that an alien will be removed in the reasonably foreseeable
future.347

(2)The United Kingdom
Immigration detention in the U.K. is a means for the government to detain foreign nationals
whom the government cannot prosecute criminally, or cannot deport for legal or practical
reasons.348 The Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act authorizes the Secretary of State to issue a
detention certificate if there are reasonable grounds to believe that a foreigner’s presence in the
U.K. poses a threat to national security, and there is suspicion that the person is a terrorist.349 The
Act does not provide any limit regarding the duration of detention.350
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A detention certificate is subject to strict judicial supervision by the Special Immigration
Appeals Commission. The judicial body is required to hold periodic reviews of the detention
certificate, regardless of whether the detainee challenges the decision.351 If there is no reasonable
basis to issue a detention certificate, the commission has to nullify it.352 In case of no-nullification,
it could be appealed to the Court of Appeals and thereafter to the House of Lords.353

(3) Germany
The Residence Act sets forth the grounds for expulsion and pre-deportation detention of
foreigners. The expulsion decision is made after “weighing the interests in the foreigner’s
departure against the foreigner’s individual interests in remaining in the federal territory” under
the totality of circumstances.354 The foreigner may be expelled if there is an overriding public
interest in him leaving. The Act provides a list of occasions where there is a particularly serious
public interest in expelling him. One of these cases is terrorism involvement. A foreigner must be
subjected to pre-deportation detention, if he:
a) threatens the free democratic basic order or the security of the Federal Republic of
Germany,355
b) is a leader of a banned organization,356
c) is involved in violent activities in the pursuit of political or religious objectives or
calls publicly for the use of violence or threatens the use of violence,357 or
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d) incites others to hatred against segments of the population.358

The deportation order can be issued by the supreme Land authority (the highest federal
authority) without a need for a prior expulsion order, in cases when there is a special danger to the
security of the Federal Republic of Germany or a terrorist threat.359 In other cases, the notice of
intention to deport must be issued to the foreigner. He must be given a reasonable period between
7-30 days for voluntary departure.360 This period can be shortened or waived altogether if the
foreigner poses a serious danger to public safety or order.361
The Residence Act allows custody awaiting deportation to prepare and to secure
deportation. Principally, pre-deportation detentions are issued by judicial order.362 The Act
suggests two types of pre-deportation orders: “custody to prepare deportation” and “custody to
secure deportation”. The former is issued to prepare deportation in cases when a deportation order
cannot be issued immediately and if deportation would be much more difficult or impossible
without such detention.363 The latter is issued in cases when there are reasonable grounds that the
foreigner will evade deportation.364
The duration of “custody to prepare deportation” cannot exceed six weeks. If a deportation
order has been issued for a foreigner with terrorist involvement and the order is not immediately
enforceable, a judicial order for “custody to secure deportation” can be issued.365 Custody to secure
deportation can be ordered for up to 6 months, and may be extended by a maximum of twelve
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months in cases where the foreigner hinders his deportation (for example by destroying travel
documents like a passport). 366 It may additionally be extended for twelve more months in security
or terrorism cases, and where the transmission of relevant documents was delayed.367
In exceptional cases, the authority preparing detention applications can automatically
detain foreigners without the need of a judicial order. The administrative authority can order
custody to secure deportation in cases where; 1) there is a strong suspicion that the deportation
order that has been issued to avert a special danger to the security or a terrorist threat is not
immediately enforceable, and 2) it is not possible to obtain the judicial order beforehand; and 3)
“there is a well-founded suspicion that the foreigner intends to evade the order for custody to
secure deportation”.368

(4) Turkey
Immigration detention369 is utilized in cases of visa violations as well as engagement in
terrorism. In cases of terrorism, the orders of deportation can be issued against; a) leaders or
members of a terrorist organization, b) aliens posing a threat against public safety, security, and
health, and c) aliens who are deemed by international organizations to be associated with terrorist
organizations.370 These deportable aliens may be kept in administrative detention at most for six
months, if they;
a) are negligent in timely deporting
b) pose a risk of flight or missing
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c) violated the entrance and exit rules
d) used counterfeit documents, or
e) pose a threat against public safety, security and health.371
The order of administrative detention is given by the office of the governor, and can be
extended for at most six more months.372 The immigration detention order can be appealed to a
magistrate’s court by the alien, his legal representative, or his counsel.373

(5) The European Court of Human Rights
The European Convention on Human Rights Article 5---The Right to Liberty and Security
--- provides the cases and conditions in which a person can be deprived of his liberty. Article 5-1f permits immigration detention in cases of “the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent
his effecting an unauthorized entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being
taken with a view to deportation or extradition.”374 According to the ECtHR’s interpretation of
these words, the Article does not demand that the detention be reasonably considered as necessary,
for instance to prevent the commission of new offenses or fleeing.375 Whether the underlying
reason for expulsion can be justified under national or Convention law is thus insignificant.376 So
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long as the detention is made with a view to deportation or extradition and the deportation
proceedings are conducted with due diligence, any immigration detention will be justified.377
Thus, according to the ECtHR, what matters is whether a reason of expulsion is stated in
the statutes of a state. If terrorist involvement is one of those reasons, which mostly likely would
be so in any democratic state, it may lawfully lead to the expulsion and pre-deportation detention
of foreigners. For instance, in Chahal v. the United Kingdom,378 a foreigner was detained “in view
of the national security threat represented by him”379. The foreigner, Mr. Chahal, denied that he
posed a national security threat and demonstrated his reasons for his argument. The Court deferred
to the determination of national authorities, especially considering that a judicial panel reviewed
the evidence relating to the national security threat posed by him and reached the same conclusion
as the Home Secretary. The Court reiterated that this procedure provided “an adequate guarantee
that there was at least prima facie grounds” to believe that national security would be in jeopardy
if Mr. Chahal was at liberty, and that administrative authorities had not acted arbitrarily when
ordering detention.380
The Court imposes some additional requirements for an extended immigration detention to
continue to be permissible. The detention should be lawful under “substantive and procedural rules
of national law”,381 the authorities must act with “due diligence” in conducting extradition
proceedings,382 and there should be sufficient guarantees against arbitrariness.383
In terms of lawfulness, the Court interprets the words “in accordance with a procedure
prescribed by law” in the Article, and has declared that the ground and proceedings regarding
377
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detention should conform to the substantive and procedural rules of national law.384 In this
analysis, the Court scrutinizes the quality of that law, the state’s compliance with the rule of law,
and whether the law is sufficiently accessible, foreseeable and precise to avoid any risk of
arbitrariness.385
When evaluating whether the authorities acted with due diligence, the Court examines
whether there are “unjustified delays on the part of the domestic authorities”,386 and the length of
the detention and extradition proceedings.387 The Court does not impose any definite time limits
for detention pending deportation, and assesses each case within its particular circumstances.388 In
its case law, the Court has found it excessive to detain individuals pending extradition for periods
from about two to three years.389 But in the national security case of Chahal v. the United Kingdom,
the Court allowed the six years of lengthy detention considering the exceptional circumstances of
the case, and the facts that authorities acted with due diligence and that there were sufficient
guarantees against arbitrariness.390
In order for a detention not to be arbitrary, the immigration detention “must be carried out
in good faith”, “it must be closely connected to the ground of detention relied on by the
Government”, “the place and conditions of detention should be appropriate”, and “the length of
the detention should not exceed that reasonably required for the purpose pursued”.391 The existence
of an effective remedy (like a judicial review procedure) to contest the lawfulness and the length
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of detention is considered an important safeguard against arbitrariness.392 Such a remedy should
be “available during a person’s detention to allow that person to obtain speedy review”, it must be
of a “judicial character”, must provide appropriate guarantees, must be capable of leading to
release, and must be sufficiently certain in theory and practice.393

b) Pre-Trial Detention

(1)The United States
The Bail Reform Act of 1984394 allows the detention of an arrestee pending trial, if “no
condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as
required and the safety of any other person and the community”.395 The Act also lists some offenses
that raise a rebuttable presumption on flight risk and endangerment of community safety in cases
when there is probable cause about their commission.396
In a detention hearing under the Bail Reform Act, courts are required to assess whether any
release conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person and the safety of any other
person or the community in two groups of cases.397 The first group involves; a) crimes of violence,
b) offenses for which the maximum sentence is life imprisonment or death, c) offenses for which
the maximum sentence is ten years or more in the Controlled Substances Act, d) any felony if the
person has been convicted of two or more offenses, e) any felony that is not a crime of violence
but involves a minor victim or that involves the possession or use of a firearm or destructive device,
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or any other dangerous weapon, or a failure to register.398 The second group includes cases that
involve a serious risk that the arrestee will flee, or a serious risk that the person will obstruct or
attempt to obstruct justice, or threaten, injure, or intimidate, or attempt to threaten, injure, or
intimidate a prospective witness or juror.399 This provision shows that courts are required to
consider alternative measures to pre-trial detention, even in cases when it is more likely to order
detention pending trial. These are cases involving serious crimes and cases where there is a serious
risk of flight, the obstruction of justice, or tampering with witnesses or jurors.400
In determining whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure the
appearance of the person and the safety of any other person and the community, courts are required
to take into account various factors: the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, the
weight of the evidence against the person, the history and characteristics of the person, the nature
and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the person’s
release.401
When assessing the nature and circumstances of the charged offense, courts should
consider whether the offense is a crime of violence, a federal crime of terrorism, or involves a
minor victim, or a controlled substance, firearm, explosive, or destructive device.402 In evaluating
the history and characteristics of the person, courts should take into account the person’s character,
physical and mental condition, family ties, employment, financial resources, length of residence
in the community, community ties, past conduct, history relating to drug or alcohol abuse, criminal
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history, and record concerning appearance at court proceedings.403 If the person has committed a
crime while on release for another offense, courts should also consider the release status of the
accused at the time of the current offense or arrest. Judges should determine whether he was on
probation, parole, or other release pending trial, sentencing, appeal, or completion of sentence for
an offense under Federal, State, or local law.404
In United States v. Salerno405 case, the U.S. Supreme Court assessed the Bail Reform Act’s
requirement of flight risk and the safety of community under the “clear and convincing evidence”
standard.406 That is, in order for a judge to order pre-trial detention, there must be clear and
convincing evidence of flight risk and endangerment of community safety if released. In a “clear
and convincing evidence” assessment, courts will consider the above mentioned factors such as
the nature and seriousness of the offense, the weight of the evidence, the history and characteristics
of the person, and the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that
would be posed by the person’s release.407
The Court in Salerno basically ruled that if there was clear and convincing evidence that
release conditions would not eliminate the flight risk and endangerment of the safety of the
community, the detention of an arrestee pending trial would comply with the substantive due
process principle under the Fifth Amendment.408 The Court weighed the legitimate and compelling
government interest in preventing crime against an individual’s interest in liberty, and reiterated
that the right to liberty may in some cases be subordinated to the greater needs of society when the
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government’s interest was sufficiently weighty, as in this case.409 Since the legislature precisely
described the circumstances of pre-trial detention including dangerousness factors, and the Court
required the standard of “clear and convincing evidence” of identifiable and articulable threat, the
Court concluded that pre-trial detention upon a showing of future dangerousness complied with
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.410
In terrorism cases, the U.S. law requires “probable cause” instead of “clear and convincing
evidence” to raise a rebuttable presumption in favor of pre-trial detention.411 If probable cause
exists regarding the commission of a terror crime, there emerges a rebuttable assumption that no
release conditions will reasonably assure the safety of the community and the appearance of the
person at trial. Turkey also has a similar rule for terrorism. Yet, the level of suspicion required is
strong suspicion, which is equivalent to the clear and convincing evidence standard.412
The Bail Reform Act is under-inclusive, for it only incorporates flight risk and safety as
reasons for pre-trial detention. Witness tampering and the destruction of evidence are not among
these reasons. They are instead regarded only as pre-requirements for conducting a pre-trial
detention hearing to assess whether any release conditions would reasonably assure the appearance
of the accused and the safety of the community.413 U.S. legislators may have been looking from a
different angle than their counterparts in Europe. But the rule could have been more
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comprehensive, if witness tampering and destruction of evidence had been integrated into the
provision as independent reasons.

(2) The United Kingdom
The Bail Act 1976 provides the occasions in which the bail need not be granted to a
defendant. According to Section IV, a defendant may not be granted bail if there are substantial
grounds for believing that if released on bail, he would; a) “fail to surrender to custody”, b)
“commit an offence while on bail”, or c) “interfere with witnesses or otherwise obstruct the course
of justice, whether in relation to himself or any other person”.414 Like other states, flight risk, the
prevention of the commission of a new offense, witness tampering, and the destruction of evidence
(the obstruction of justice) are the main reasons for pre-trial detention. In addition to these primary
reasons, the U.K. Act suggests that defendants can be detained for their own protection, or, if he
is a child or young person, for his own welfare.415
When making pre-trial detention decision, courts should take into consideration the
following factors:
(a) the nature and seriousness of the offence or default (and the probable method of
dealing with the defendant for it),
(b) the character, antecedents, associations and community ties of the defendant,
(c) the defendant's record as respects the fulfilment of his obligations under previous
grants of bail in criminal proceedings,
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(d) except in the case of a defendant whose case is adjourned for inquiries or a report,
the strength of the evidence of his having committed the offence or having defaulted,
as well as to any others which appear to be relevant.416
Since the U.K. law also allows pre-trial detention to prevent the commission of a new
offense, we may conclude for the purposes of this sub-chapter that pre-trial detention for future
dangerousness is lawful under the U.K. law.
U.K. law’s structure is similar to that of U.S. law probably as a result of Anglo-Saxon legal
traditions. For one thing, they both perceive pre-trial detention as an alternative to bail. Bail is the
rule; pre-trial detention is the exception. Pre-trial detention is ordered only if bail conditions are
not met. Yet, one important difference is that while bail is a right under U.K. law with some
exceptions,417 there is no right to bail in U.S. law.418
For another thing, both U.S. and U.K. laws set forth many factors that guide judges to
decide on bail or pre-trial detention. These factors would help judges make more individualized
determinations for each defendant and incentivize them to touch upon relevant factors in their
judicial reasoning. As a result, judges may refrain from acting as rubber stamps and be tempted to
provide fully grounded decisions.

(3) France
The French Code of Criminal Procedure Article 144 states that:
Pre-trial detention may only be ordered or extended if it is the only way:
1º to preserve material evidence or clues or to prevent either witnesses or victims or their
families being pressurized or fraudulent conspiracy between persons under judicial
examination and their accomplices;
416
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2º to protect the person under judicial examination, to guarantee that he remains at the
disposal of the law, to put an end to the offence or to prevent its renewal;
3º to put an end to an exceptional and persistent disruption of public order caused by the
seriousness of the offence, the circumstances in which it was committed, or the gravity of
the harm that it has caused.
The French law thereby allows pre-trial detention for wide range of reasons:
a) Protection of evidence: to prevent destruction of material evidence, tampering of
witnesses or victims or their families, or fraudulent conspiracy between suspects
and their accomplices,
b) Protection of the suspect or defendant,
c) Eliminate the flight risk: to ensure that the suspect is subject to the law,
d) Prevention of further crimes: To put an end to the commission of the offence or to
prevent its renewal,
e) To put an end to the persistent disruption of public order caused by the seriousness
of the offence, the circumstances in which it was committed and the harm it caused.

French law involves the most comprehensive reasons, as compared to other states, for pretrial detention. It provides many more reasons than flight risk, the destruction of evidence, and
witness tampering. It allows pre-trial detention to protect the defendant, to prevent future offences,
and to end the continuous disruption of public order as well. Since pre-trial detention to prevent
future offenses is allowed in the French system, we may conclude for the purposes of this subchapter that pre-trial detention for future dangerousness is lawful under French law.
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(4) Germany
The German Code of Criminal Procedure Section 112 states that the remand detention may
be ordered if grounds for arrest are satisfied, and there is strong suspicion that the suspect
committed the offence. The term “arrest” mentioned in the official translation should be
understood as “detainment” or “seizure”. The article is as follows:
(1) Remand detention may be ordered against the accused if he is strongly suspected of the
offence and if there is a ground for arrest. It may not be ordered if it is disproportionate to
the significance of the case or to the penalty or measure of reform and prevention likely to
be imposed.
(2) A ground for arrest shall exist if, on the basis of certain facts,
1. it is established that the accused has fled or is hiding;
2. considering the circumstances of the individual case, there is a risk that the accused
will evade the criminal proceedings (risk of flight); or
3. the accused’s conduct gives rise to the strong suspicion that he will
a) destroy, alter, remove, suppress, or falsify evidence,
b) improperly influence the co-accused, witnesses, or experts, or
c) cause others to do so,
and if, therefore, the danger exists that establishment of the truth will be made more difficult
(risk of tampering with evidence).
…

The Code allows detention on remand if there is strong suspicion that an offense is
committed and there are grounds for arrest. Grounds for arrest are flight risk, destruction of
evidence, and tampering with evidence. In cases of the crime of forming terrorist organizations,
detention may be ordered pursuant to Section 112-3 even if one of these grounds for arrest does
not exist.
Section 112a additionally sets forth another ground for arrest (detention), which is future
dangerousness. If “certain facts substantiate the risk that prior to final conviction a person will
commit further serious criminal offences of the same nature or will continue the criminal offence”,
and “if detention is required to avert the imminent danger”, this must also be considered as a reason
84

for arrest under the Section. Future dangerousness can be a reason for arrest only in enumerated
serious offenses, one of which is the repeated commission of violent crimes that endanger the state
and undermine the legal order.
Pre-trial detention upon future dangerousness, therefore, is permissible under German law
for certain crimes and when there are supporting facts establishing that the individual will either
commit further crimes or consummate the prior offense.419 The purpose of the detention is to avert
imminent danger.

(5) Turkey
Turkish Criminal Procedure Code Article 100 sets forth three reasons for pre-trial detention
upon the determination of strong suspicion regarding the commission of a crime. These reasons
are as follows: 1) flight or hiding, or the risk of flight, 2) destruction or alteration of evidence upon
strong suspicion thereon, 3) witness tampering.420 The government must provide a strong factual
showing that one of these grounds are met, and if so, a defendant can be detained pending trial.
The statute requires “concrete facts” for flight risk, and “strong suspicion” for the destruction of
evidence and witness tampering. We may conclude that the levels of cause that the Code requires
are “the preponderance of evidence” for flight risk, and “clear and convincing evidence” for
witness tampering and the destruction of evidence.
Besides these three general reasons, the article also provides a list of offenses which
presumptively satisfy the standards for detention. These crimes are as follows: genocide, crimes
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against humanity, murder, aggravated assault, torture, sexual assault, child molestation, theft,
robbery, the production and trafficking of drugs, the establishment of illegal organization to
commit crimes, crimes against state security, crimes against constitutional order, weapons
trafficking, embezzlement, crimes of smuggling, intentional forest fire, crimes regarding illegal
demonstrations, and terror crimes.421 If there is “strong suspicion” about the commission of one of
these crimes, a judge may presume that there is a risk of flight, the destruction of evidence or the
tampering of witnesses.
What is lacking in the Turkish system is “future dangerousness” as a reason for pre-trial
detention.422 That is, besides the existing reasons, the Turkish legislature should have considered
the possibility that the suspect will commit further serious offences in the future, and should have
enacted it as a fourth reason for detention. Although the violent crimes that raise the presumption
imply dangerousness, the legislature should have made it clear that suspects or criminals can be
detained pending trial if they have the propensity to commit more crimes or to pose a threat to
others. This is mainly because the existing presumption is rebuttable by the defendant. If the
defendant shows that he does not pose any risk of flight, destruction of evidence or witness
tampering, the Court has to release the person. The person who has the propensity to commit
another terror crime may therefore be set free. The release of a dangerous person would put the
society in danger and generate one more obstacle to the already demanding counterterrorism
efforts. The police would need to continuously follow the released in order to prevent his
engagement in terrorism. Adding future dangerousness, however, will at least take the already
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accused criminals off the ground, diminish the number of dangerous people that security officials
need to oversee outside of the prison, and prevent any further attacks.
The level of cause for the reason of dangerousness should be either “the preponderance of
evidence” or “clear and convincing evidence”, depending on how common it is to commit more
crimes or harm others pending trial in the country. If the propensity to commit more crimes or
harm third persons is common and can be expected from everybody, like in “flight risk” situations,
the level of cause should be determined as “the preponderance of evidence”. Yet, if it is not so
common or may not be expected from every criminal, like in “the destruction of evidence” or
“witness tampering”, the level of cause should be set as “clear and convincing evidence”.

(6) The European Court of Human Rights
The European Convention on Human Rights Article 5 regulates the right to liberty and
security of a person, and the specific conditions under which the right can be limited. Its sub-article
1-c describes the circumstances in which the deprivation of liberty through pre-trial detention is
lawful. The article allows the detention in cases of “the lawful arrest or detention of a person
effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable
suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent
his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so”.423 The Convention establishes three
justifications for pre-trial detention: 1) bringing the defendant before the competent legal authority,
2) prevention of the commission of an offence, and 3) flight risk.
The European Court of Human Rights interpreted member states’ grounds for pre-trial
detention in various cases. Generally, the justifications that were regarded as permissible, provided
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that the duration of detention was reasonable, are as follows: 1) the risk of pressure on witnesses,
2) the danger of absconding, 3) the preservation of public order or prevention of public disorder.
In Letellier v. France424, a case of detention of the accessory of a pre-meditated and
organized murder, the Court considered France’s grounds for pre-trial detention. First, in terms of
tampering with witnesses, the Court ruled that such risk must have endured during the whole
detention period in order to justify its lengthiness. In the Court’s words: “a genuine risk of pressure
being brought to bear on the witnesses may have existed initially, but (The Court) takes the view
that it diminished and indeed disappeared with the passing of time.” 425 Second, with regard to the
danger of absconding, the Court determined that such danger could not have been assessed merely
on the basis of the severity of a sentence. There must be some other relevant factors either
confirming the existence of such danger to justify pre-trial detention.426
Third, in terms of the preservation of public order, the Court discussed whether the
commission of a crime by itself would be sufficient to establish a risk of disturbance of public
order upon pre-trial release.427 The Court accepted the fact that particular grave offenses and their
effect on the public may justify pre-trial detention, yet only for a short period of time.428 The Court
ruled that pre-trial detention on public order grounds could be “regarded as relevant and sufficient
only provided that it is based on facts capable of showing that the accused’s release would actually
disturb public order. In addition detention will continue to be legitimate only if public order
remains actually threatened; its continuation cannot be used to anticipate a custodial sentence.”429
The Court, in Geisterfer v. the Netherlands430 case, reiterated the requirement that the government
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must show a threat to public order that would be caused by the release,431 and ruled that courts
could not presume that the gravity of an offense would justify detention pending trial at all times
regardless of the existence of suitable release conditions.432 Detention determinations from such
“a purely abstract point of view” were thus prohibited.433
It is well-established in the Court’s case law that there must be “specific indications of a

general public interest, which, notwithstanding the presumption of innocence, outweighs the rule
of respect for individual liberty”.434 Further, overriding reasons for pre-trial detention must persist
during the entire detention period in order to keep a person in remand for an extended period of
time.435

c) Post-Sentence Detention

(1) The United States
The U.S. Supreme Court, in two opinions, has approved the post-sentence preventive
detention of dangerous offenders who have difficulty in controlling their behaviors due to a mental
abnormality or a personality disorder. In Kansas v. Hendricks,436 the Supreme Court evaluated the
constitutionality of the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act,437 which established procedures for
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the civil commitment of persons who were likely to engage in “predatory acts of sexual violence”
as a result of a “mental abnormality” or a “personality disorder”. The state applied the statute to
an inmate who was convicted of multiple counts of sexually molesting children and who was going
to be released from prison soon after the statute became law. The inmate, Hendricks, challenged
the statute on the grounds of substantive due process, double jeopardy, and the prohibition on ex
post facto application of penal rules. After the Kansas Supreme Court invalidated the Act, the
Court ruled that the statute was constitutional, and complied with the Due Process and Double
Jeopardy Clauses of the Fifth Amendment as well as with the prohibition on ex post facto
application of punitive rules under U.S. Constitution Article 1.
The Supreme Court ruled that the statute complied with the substantive due process
requirements prohibiting arbitrariness, as the statute required more than a mere “predisposition to
violence”.438 For civil commitment proceedings to be initiated, there must have been a show of
prior conviction or charge of a sexually violent crime as well as a mental abnormality or personality
disorder making the person likely to engage in the predatory acts of sexual violence upon release.
Because the statute did not allow civil commitment solely on the grounds of general
dangerousness, but in addition required “previous instances of violent behavior” and “mental
illness” or “mental abnormality”, it satisfied the substantive due process clause forbidding arbitrary
governmental action. The Court emphasized that the liberty interest (upon fully serving a
sentence) was not absolute and may be limited even in the civil context.439
In terms of the double jeopardy argument, the Court rejected Hendrick’s claim that the
continued detention was based upon the prior conduct for which he had already been convicted
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Id. at 356-58.

90

and served the prison sentence.440 The Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits multiple “punishment”,
and the Court held that the civil commitment was not a “punishment” because it did not serve the
punitive purposes of retribution and deterrence.441 Rather, it fulfilled the purposes of incapacitation
and treatment of sexually violent offenders.442 Thus, the main goal of the civil commitment statute
was not to punish an offender twice but instead to segregate sexually violent offenders from the
public. Therefore, it did not offend the Double Jeopardy Clause.
In Kansas v. Crane,443 the Court re-explained and crystallized its ruling in Kansas v.
Hendricks. It made it clear that the state was not required to prove “lack of control” in order to
establish proper grounds for civil commitment.444 Rather, some proof of serious “difficulty”445 in
controlling behavior, coupled with a finding of dangerousness would suffice to authorize civil
commitment. The court stated that it was not possible to measure inability in controlling behaviors
with mathematical precision, and that scientific determinations did “not control ultimate legal
determinations.”446
In Kansas v. Crane, the Court did not draw a distinction between volitional, emotional, and
cognitive impairments for constitutional purposes. It further recognized that “there may be
‘considerable overlap between a . . . defective understanding or appreciation and . . . [an] ability
to control . . . behavior.’”447 This finding is significant in the sense that emotion or volition-related
mental abnormalities that show themselves as radicalism and conditioned thinking in terrorism
cases may justify the civil commitment of terrorists in future decisions.
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The dissenting opinion written by Justice Scalia in Kansas v. Crane would have gone even
further, as he would have permitted detention without any showing that the detainee could not
control his behavior. Justice Scalia asserted that one could exercise volition but could still be
extremely indifferent to others’ rights, which would make him too dangerous to set free. In his
own words: “The man who has a will of steel, but who delusionally believes that every woman he
meets is inviting crude sexual advances, is surely a dangerous sexual predator.” Justice Scalia’s
dissenting opinion interpreting Hendricks is important, as he was one of the Justices in the
Hendricks majority.448 It seems that there is not yet a clear consensus on the scope of Hendricks
and the post-sentence detention of dangerous offenders. Justice Scalia’s view might pave the way
for preventive detention of convicted terrorists who have served their sentences, solely on
dangerousness grounds in the future.

(2) Germany
German law permits post-sentence detention of dangerous offenders for the purpose of
incapacitation. German Criminal Code Section 66 (detention for the purpose of incapacitation) and
Section 66b allow for the post-sentence detention of particular types of dangerous offenders due
to their propensity to commit serious offenses.449

448

Justice Thomas, who took part in the majority opinion in Hendricks, dissented and joined the dissent opinion of
Scalia in Crane.
449
Section 66 Detention for the purpose of incapacitation
(1) The court shall make an incapacitation order in addition to the term of imprisonment
if
1. a person has been sentenced for an intentional offence to a term of imprisonment of not less
than two years, and
a) the offence was directed against life or limb, personal freedom or sexual selfdetermination,
b) the offence falls under Chapters One, Seven, Twenty or Twenty-Eight of the Special Part,
or under the Code of International Criminal Law or the Drugs Act, and the maximum sentence
threatened is no less than ten years’ imprisonment, or
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German trial courts are authorized to determine post-sentence detainment for
incapacitation purposes at the time of the sentencing hearing, and a determination may also be
made at a later point. An incapacitation order at the sentencing hearing can be issued for:
1) an offender who had been sentenced for an intentional offense to at least two years; and
his offense targeted the life and limb, personal freedom or sexual self-determination of a person,
or his offense falls under particular chapters of the Criminal Code, or the Code of International
Criminal Law or the Drugs Act and requires no less than ten years of imprisonment.450
2) recidivists451

c) violates section 145a insofar as the supervision order was made on the basis of an offence
under a) or b) above, or if it violates § 323a insofar as the offence committed in the drunken state was
one of those mentioned under a) or b) above.
2. the offender had been convicted for offences under No. 1 above, committed before the
present offence, at least twice to a term of imprisonment of no less than one year each,
3. the offender had for at least one of these offences before the present offence served at least
two years in prison or under a custodial measure of rehabilitation and incapacitation, and
4. a comprehensive evaluation at the time of the present conviction of the convicted
person and his offences reveals that, due to his propensity to commit serious offences, particularly
of a kind resulting in serious emotional trauma or physical injury to the victim, he poses a danger
to the general public.
Section 66b Subsequent incapacitation order
If pursuant to section 67d (6) a mental hospital order has been declared moot because the
condition causing insanity or diminished responsibility on which the order was based did not exist at
the time of that declaration, the court may subsequently make an incapacitation order
1. if the mental hospital order pursuant to section 63 was made based upon more than one of
the offences set forth in section 66 (3) 1st sentence or if the person had either previously been sentenced
to a term of imprisonment of no less than three years or had a mental hospital order made against him
because of one or more such offences having been committed by him prior to the offence leading to the
mental hospital order pursuant to section 63, and
2. if a comprehensive evaluation of the person, his offences and his development until the date
of the decision indicate a high likelihood of his committing serious offences resulting in serious
emotional trauma or physical injury to the victims.
This shall apply mutatis mutandis if after serving an order under section 63 a term of
imprisonment imposed at the same time is to be enforced in its entirety or in part.
450
STRAFGESETZBUCH [StGB] [PENAL CODE], § 66-1-1-a, b (Ger.).
451
Id. § 66-1-2,3.
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3) offenders who poses a danger to the general public “due to his propensity to commit
serious offenses, particularly of a kind resulting in serious emotional trauma or physical injury to
the victim”.452
A subsequent incapacitation order can be issued if there is a high likelihood that the
offender will commit offences resulting in serious emotional trauma or physical injury to the
victims. After the serving of ten years of an incapacitation order, the court must terminate the
measure if there is no more “danger that the person under placement will commit serious offenses
resulting in serious emotional trauma or physical injury to the victims.”453
German law provides that detention for incapacitation must be carried out in institutions
which offer some level of care and comprehensive treatment through an implementation plan.
Psychiatric, psycho-socio-therapeutical treatment that is suitable to the needs of the detainee must
also be provided. Such detention must be implemented in special buildings or sections that are
separate from the prison regime.454

(3) The European Court of Human Rights
The European Convention on Human Rights sets forth the permissible circumstances for
preventive detention in its Article 5. Preventive detention is permissible;455 1) when it is reasonably
considered necessary to prevent committing an offense,456 2) for the prevention of the spreading
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of infectious diseases,457 3) the prevention of the unsound mind,458 alcoholics,459 drug addicts or
vagrants, and 4) to prevent an unauthorized entry into the country.460 For the purposes of this
section, only cases regarding post-sentence detainment will be scrutinized. 461
The European Court of Human Rights evaluated Germany’s above-mentioned postsentence detention regime which was carried out for the incapacitation of dangerous offenders in
M. v. Germany.462 The Court ruled that the German law did not comply with the right to liberty
under the Convention. The case involved the post-sentence detention of a recidivist who had
committed many assaults.463 The Court found that any potential further offenses were not concrete
and specific enough to satisfy the requirement conditioning detention on the prevention of “an
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offense” under of the Convention.464 The Court additionally required that the offense and its place,
time and victims must be specific and concrete in order to justify post-sentence detention.465 The
Court eventually concluded that detention on general dangerousness grounds was impermissible,
and that an individual or a category of individuals with a general propensity to commit a crime
(without specific and concrete information regarding the upcoming offense) could not be an
adequate justification for preventive detention.466

(4) Turkey
Turkish law does not include any provision allowing the preventive detention of dangerous
offenders after they have served their sentences. It only provides for probation measures for
recidivists after the serving of their sentences. The duration of such probation is at least one year,
which could be extended by a judge up to five years.467 Probation terms for post-sentence probation
are the same with the terms applied for parole release: voluntary public work, supervision and
surveillance at a house or a particular place, prohibition on traveling to particular places,
participation in particular rehabilitation programs.468 Detention in rehabilitation centers is not
among the possible probation measures. Turkish law thus does not offer any post-sentence
detention even specifically for terrorists, who are known to become even more radicalized and
professionalized in harsh prison conditions.
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4. Interviews: The Need to Focus on Prevention Instead of Prosecution
“The Turkish system seems to be designed to detect terrorists after a terror attack than to
prevent it”, said a public prosecutor, who was responsible for prosecuting terror crimes, in a
meeting in Ankara. He added:
We have more tools to investigate and prosecute than to prevent a deadly terror attack. The two
occasions that we can detain an attacker before he consummates his offense are: a) in cases of
attempt, and b) when we have precise information regarding the identity of a future attacker and
when the place, time, and the way of an attack is clear. We cannot jump in, seize and prosecute a
future attacker without concrete information on a particular attack. This is because we can detain
people only for investigation and prosecution purposes, respectively through arrest and pre-trial
detention. The Turkish system is not open to preventive detention at all, if the offense is not
crystalized enough. That is, without a certain crime reasonably attributable to a person, we just wait
for terrorists’ new action or follow them through intelligence. We know that an attack is underway
but we have to wait for a terrorist organization to more clearly determine its attacker and the place
of attack. If we determine the attacker, we seize him for membership in a terrorist organization in
order to prevent the attack. Yet, the organization in most cases has substitutes for an attacker. So,
they conduct it anyways, which forces us to follow the attacker more closely and to identify other
details of the attack to prosecute for attempt before another militant consummates the offense. In
some cases, responsible heads of the organization make last minute changes of their target or mislead
intelligence services by leaking incorrect information regarding the place, time and conductor of a
future attack. Then, the attack occurs somewhere else. These are the risks we unfortunately take.

Hearing these comments, I wondered what more could be done to prevent dangerous
persons from conducting further terror attacks in Turkey. Researching on European and American
preventive legal measures, I concluded that pre-trial detention to prevent the commission of new
crimes, and the post-sentence detention of terrorists on dangerousness grounds, could be potential
preventive means to incapacitate terrorists and to prevent them from harming more people. As a
country that is in the middle of instability and violence, we should have the right to detain people
upon the multifaceted determination of future dangerousness, without waiting for them to initiate
the substantial steps of a new offense.
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For these reasons, pre-trial and post-sentence detention on dangerousness may be useful
tools to protect the public from terrorists who are waiting for the right time or an order from their
leader to conduct an attack. The opportunity should be in the hands of the innocent and thereby of
the state, instead of dangerous terrorists. Thus, we should detain terrorists pending trial to prevent
more offenses they may commit. Additionally, we must continue to detain terrorists who remain
to be dangerous to a society even after their serving of sentences. We must keep them in
rehabilitation centers, where they will be more isolated from their counterparts than in prisons.
They will also benefit from psychological and mental treatment opportunities in these centers.
Even if there is the slightest chance of re-integration into society, we should give reformed
terrorists a chance regardless of the proposed measure’s potential economic burdens on the society.
We could be able to save the lives of innocents by converting a terrorist into a society-friendly
human being. Therefore, this section proposes pre-trial and post-sentence detention of terrorists on
dangerousness grounds.

5. Proposals for Turkey: The Pre-Trial and Post-Sentence Detention of Terrorists on
Dangerousness Grounds

a) Pre-Trial Detention on Dangerousness Grounds

A review of European and United States laws on the subject indicates that there is a gap in
Turkish criminal procedure law regarding the authorization of pre-trial detention to prevent the
commission of further offences or to protect public safety from danger. Turkish law authorizes
pre-trial detention only in cases of flight risk, the risk of destruction of evidence, and the risk of
tampering with witnesses, victims or others. The risk of furthering the charged offense, the
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commission of other crimes, or danger to public safety are not enacted as reasons for detention
pending trial.
This deficit results in the misinterpretation of existing rules to fulfill the needs of public
safety and especially of counterterrorism. Firstly, some magistrate judges are inclined to
automatically authorize pre-trial detention in cases of the serious offenses enumerated in the
Turkish Criminal Procedure Code Article 100/3, even though there is no risk of flight, destruction
of evidence, or tampering with witnesses or victims.469 They are reluctant to refute the rebuttable
presumption that if the enumerated crimes exist, judges may assume that there is a risk of flight,
the destruction of evidence, or the tampering of witnesses or victims. These judges thereby prefer
not to disprove the assumption and apply the rules without any consideration of the actual
tendencies of the accused, namely whether he has the real capacity to abscond, destroy or disguise
the evidence, or pressurize witnesses or victims. If dangerousness or inclination to commit further
crimes had been recognized as a reason, judges may not have had the tendency to use their
discretion in such a way leading to misinterpretation and misapplication of law.
Secondly, in order to disguise the underlying reason of preventing dangerousness or
preserving public safety, some judges tend to use as pretexts any of the existing bases in the law,
without providing sufficient concrete supporting facts.470 Such pre-textual results violate the
ECtHR decisions that require a genuine public interest to deprive a person of his liberty pending
trial and that prohibit the determination of detention upon purely abstract grounds.471 Such
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mechanical and incorrect application of existing rules damages the integrity of the Turkish criminal
justice system and diminishes the public’s trust in it, notwithstanding the fact that the courts are
trying to address a terror threat. This proposal, therefore, is designed to preserve the honesty and
reliability of Turkish courts in the public eye, more than to further counterterrorism.

b) The Post-Sentence Detention of Terrorists on Future Dangerousness Grounds

The detention of convicted terrorists who served their sentence but still pose substantial
threat to society is another means of preventing future terror attacks through preventive detention.
Since the post-sentence detention restricts various rights of imprisoned terrorists, we must make
sure that such a limitation is justifiable under human rights law. This section of the paper will
touch upon various issues in three chapters. The first chapter will compare the proportionality
standard of European law with the U.S.’s balancing standard that stems from the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments under its Constitution. It will later determine
whether the proposed post-sentence detention of terrorists would pass the European proportionality
analysis.
The second chapter will discuss the arguments against post-sentence detention, namely
whether the double jeopardy principle is violated, and whether post-sentence detention contradicts
the basic notion of human dignity. And finally, the third chapter will set forth safeguards against
arbitrariness through proposing dangerousness factors, a certain level of cause, and a particular
detention period.
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(1) The Justification of Post-Sentence Detention of Terrorists
i.

The Proportionality Standard of Europe versus the Balancing Analysis of
the United States

European proportionality and American balancing analysis have different historical origins
but relatively insignificant substantive differences. The proportionality principle was created by
Germany in 1958 for administrative law issues.472 It was generated as a result of an effort to protect
individual rights against unwarranted governmental intrusion.473 Its emergence was influenced by
the concepts of the liberal state and natural rights.474 It migrated to other European countries either
in the late 1990s or early 2000s.475 The proportionality was adopted by the ECtHR in 1976 in
Handyside v. United Kingdom,476 where the Court ruled that “every "formality", "condition",
"restriction" or "penalty" imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate aim
pursued.”477.

The U.S. balancing test emerged in private law and then extended to public law.478 It was
generated by the United States Supreme Court to prevent the overzealous protection of individual
rights stemming from excessively strict reading of the Constitution.479 The balancing test has been
used by the Court in the constitutionality analysis of relevant Bill of Rights provisions. It was
utilized as a criterion under the Fourth Amendment reasonableness test, the Due Process Clauses
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of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and strict scrutiny analysis under the Equal Protection
Clause.
The European proportionality analysis has four elements: proper purpose (legitimate aim),
rational connection (suitability), necessity, and proportionality stricto sensu (balancing, or
proportionality in the narrow sense).480 First, the proper purpose requirement demands the
existence of some overriding interest to justify any human rights intrusion. Proper purposes could
be either the protection of others’ rights or any public interest (such as national security, public
order that includes public health and the protection of minors’ interests).481 Second, rational
connection or suitability demands that there is a fit between means chosen and the proper
purpose.482 That is to say, the means chosen to realize a government interest must be appropriate
to further the goal.483 Third, necessity involves the consummation of equally applicable but least
restrictive alternatives in order to make sure that an individual’s rights are restricted as little as
possible.484 Thus, if there are two means that are equally suitable to realize the desired purpose,
the less intrusive one should be selected.485 And fourth, the proportionality stricto sensu (the
balancing test) makes a value-based comparison between the social importance of the restricted
individual right and that of the purpose furthered by the intrusion on the individual right.486
Different than the first three components that are grounded upon a means and ends analysis, the
balancing focuses on individual rights and their values in a specific context.
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The United States Supreme Court applies only the balancing test with least restrictive
means analysis487 when needed in a particular case.488 For the purposes of this chapter, I will focus
on the balancing test that the Court applies under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. The Due Process is divided into two concepts of procedural and
substantive due process, both of which are based on the balancing of competing interests of
individual liberty or autonomy and government power489. While the procedural due process
requires fairness in proceedings by which a government restricts the rights of an individual, the
substantive due process demands that the rights of an individual are sufficiently protected from
unnecessary government intrusions. That is, the substantive due process protects the essence of
substantive rights, while the procedural due process examines whether substantive rights are
limited in a fair manner.490
In Matthews v. Eldridge,491 which was a procedural due process case, the Court reiterated
that the Due Process Clause required the “analysis of the governmental and private interests that
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were affected”.492 In Youngberg v. Romeo,493 a substantive due process case, the Court concluded
that in order to decide whether a substantive right protected by the Due Process Clause was
violated, it was necessary to balance “the liberty of the individual” against “the demands of an
organized society.”494 The balancing of liberty interest against a relevant state or public interest,
thereby, is the way to conduct a due process analysis designed to protect individual rights against
excessive government intrusions.
From the information given above, we may conclude that the balancing test is being applied
by both Europe and the U.S., and the primary difference between the two jurisdictions is that
Europe has additional and explicit requirements of necessity and rational connection. Europe’s
proportionality standard thus seems to be more comprehensive and protective than the U.S.
balancing test at the first sight. Nevertheless, this conclusion is misleading and their differences
are insubstantial. This is because the U.S. Supreme Court conducts its constitutionality analysis
under the totality of circumstances of each case, which inherently requires the consideration of
whether means and ends are rationally connected and whether there are least restrictive alternatives
(necessity) to the current measure.495 The least restrictive alternatives test functions very similarly
to the necessity test.496 Thus, the differences between the two systems are more interpretive than
outcome-determinative.
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ii.

The Proportionality Analysis of the Post-Sentence Detention of Terrorists

Turkey incorporated the European proportionality analysis into its legal system through an
amendment to its Constitution Article 13. The Article is as follows:
Restriction of fundamental rights and freedoms
ARTICLE 13- (As amended on October 3, 2001; Act No. 4709)
Fundamental rights and freedoms may be restricted only by law and in conformity with the
reasons mentioned in the relevant articles of the Constitution without infringing upon their
essence. These restrictions shall not be contrary to the letter and spirit of the Constitution
and the requirements of the democratic order of the society and the secular republic and the
principle of proportionality.497
The proportionality analysis encompasses four main elements: proper purpose, rational
connection, necessity, and proportionality stricto sensu (the balancing test).498 The issue before us
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is whether the post-sentence detention of terrorists posing an unspecific but genuine threat to
public safety would meet the proportionality standard, paving the way for its enactment into
Turkish law. Post-sentence detention is absent in Turkish law and is needed by Turkish
counterterrorism practitioners.499 Therefore, this sub-chapter will analyze each element of the
proportionality principle, and determine whether the post-sentence detention of terrorists is
sufficiently proportionate to be legislated in the future.

Proper purpose
The first element is the purpose of the proposed liberty restriction. Public safety, public
order and national security are my main arguments to support the post-sentence detention of
terrorists that continue to be dangerous to a society. To elaborate on these public interest
considerations, a brief explanation of their scopes will be provided.
Public interest in the post-sentence detainment of dangerous terrorists are as follows: 1)
public safety, 2) public order, and 3) national security.500 First, public safety is concerned with the

a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of
a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation
prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before
the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably
considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;
(d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention
for
the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority;
(e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of
unsound
mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants;
(f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his
effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view
to deportation or extradition.
These restrictions are comprehensive and cannot be expanded. Yet, this does not mean that the proportionality
principle should not be used when interpreting the Article 5-The Right to Liberty and Security. On the contrary, the
right to liberty and security is a relative right, and it must be interpreted in compliance with the proportionality
principle like other non-absolute rights.
499
See supra Sec. II-A-4.
500
National security can be distinguished from safety as it is the pre-requisite of safety. PETER CANE & JOANNE
CONAGHAN, THE NEW OXFORD COMPANION TO LAW 193 (2009). Safety refers to freedom from danger, while national
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protection of citizens’ physical integrity and sense of security.501 Terrorist attacks not only directly
affect the life and bodily integrity of targeted individuals but also indirectly harm the mental
wellbeing of the whole society by imposing fear. Attacks damage the subjective sense of security
of individuals and thereby erode state authority.
Second, public order refers to the smooth running of an orderly society.502 It is a similar
concept to public safety but with more emphasis on stability in a country. In a society where public
order exists, citizens would believe that current living and security conditions will be sustained for
a foreseeable period of time, and that there are plausible grounds for further life expectations.
Public order is thus the basis for hope for the future and for the development of a society as a
civilized nation. Third, national security indicates the “protection of the very existence of the state
from any internal or external threats or dangers and the measures taken to protect it.”503 For these
reasons, a state has an interest in protecting against the risks posed by terrorists who have served
their sentence but remain a danger to society.

Rational connection
The rational connection element demands that there be a fit between the means and ends
of a limitation. The ends of a limitation in the counterterrorism context are to ensure public safety,

security is a more comprehensive term. It refers to the protection of the existence of a state from internal or external
threats, let alone protection of its people from a concrete danger. As national security raises issues of the protection
of existence, it “encompasses more than protecting the state's territorial integrity and extends to military and strategic
secrets, and protection from terrorism and protection of essential infrastructure from sabotage.” Id. at 151 (2009).
501
Id. at 193. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1351 (9th ed. 2009).
502
This understanding is concluded from the definition of offenses against public order in the Oxford Dictionary of
Law. The dictionary defines “offenses against public order” as “crimes that affect the smooth running of orderly
society” such as “riot, violent disorder, affray, threatening behavior, stirring up racial hatred, public nuisance, and
obstruction of highways”. OXFORD DICTIONARY OF LAW 340 (5th ed. 2003). See also CANE & CONAGHAN, supra note
500, at 179.
503
H. VICTOR CONDÉ, AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES V.1 164 (2011).
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public order, and national security. The issue before us is whether continued detention of terrorists
in rehabilitation centers (the means) has a common-sense logical connection to fulfill these ends.
The continued detention of dangerous persons in rehabilitation centers is designed to fulfill
incapacitation and rehabilitation purposes. These purposes are aimed to be realized during the
initial detention period as well. Yet, in some cases, rehabilitation and incapacitation services
provided by prisons may not work. This might be so because of a prisoner’s personal and family
circumstances, his psychological condition, his tendency towards violence, his interaction with
other prisoners, his connection with the terrorists outside, crowded prison conditions, or
corrections officers’ attitude toward prisoners. This might even be the case because a prisoner
needs further individualized care for rehabilitation and a forced isolation from past environment
for incapacitation. In these type of cases, continued detention in rehabilitation centers might be a
suitable measure to retry achieving these goals.
The incapacitation and rehabilitation of the dangerous is necessary to ensure public safety
and order, and national security. Detention in rehabilitation centers serves the incapacitation
purpose since it isolates a person from his natural environment and deprives him of the tools and
connections necessary to conduct a terrorist attack. It also to some extent rehabilitates a terrorist
through providing psychological treatment and a certain level of education. For these reasons, this
measure entails the necessary logical connection with the purposes of public safety, order, and
national security.
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Necessity
The necessity test examines whether there are less restrictive alternatives that would
equally advance a proper purpose.504 Post-sentence detention is a highly intrusive measure that
deprives an individual of his personal liberty that is essential to the exercise of other rights. If we
are to restrict liberty, detention should be the last resort. If any alternative less restrictive means
equally fulfills these proper purposes, then detention is not necessary.
Potential alternatives to detention are as follows: supervision by a designated person,
treatment, employment, participation in an educational program, restrictions on personal
associations and on traveling to certain places, regular reports to a law enforcement agency,
prohibition of the possession of weapons or destructive devices, undergoing a particular treatment,
or in-home detention.505 The question before us is where these alternatives are sufficient to achieve
the proposed law’s purpose of protecting society from further terror attacks to be perpetrated by
professional terrorists just released from prison.
The supervision, employment, treatment and education would rehabilitate a released
prisoner and ease his reintegration into society. Yet, these measures won’t be enough to isolate
him from his previous environment after he is released from prison. Social environment is one of
the primary reasons for engagement in terrorism.506 It is very hard for a terrorist to disengage
himself from an organizational hierarchy. This difficulty increases if a convicted terrorist returns
to his previous environment after discharge from prison. For these reasons, these alternate
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measures applied outside of a detention facility would not sufficiently detach a terrorist from his
previous contacts, which would most likely be the members of the same terrorist organization.
A ban on particular personal associations and on travel to certain places, in-home detention,
and regular reports to a law enforcement agency would be effective to an extent to monitor the
behaviors and relationships of a released. A ban on the possession of weapons would limit
dangerous conduct. Yet, these measures would not be as effective as detention, because
supervision and oversight would be difficult to impossible. First, prohibition on communication
with particular persons would only prevent a terrorist from communicating with the people who
are known by the government to have terrorist connections. It has no preventive effect on
communications with people who are not known as terrorists but yet still have terrorist
engagement. Second, travel limitations would also be under-inclusive as it is impossible to fully
know through which channels and with whom terrorists communicate secretly. A simple travel
ban might prevent a convicted terrorist from physically going to places the government knows as
terrorist grounds. Yet, a person does not need to travel to terrorist territories in order to engage in
terrorism. He can provide material support to an organization without going anywhere. Third, inhome detention might be effective in some respects but still does not suffice to prevent a former
terrorist from building bombs at home. Indeed, the latest trend of lone wolf attackers is to produce
destructive weapons at home by using materials accessible to the general public, such as pressure
cookers. Since in-home detention does not allow monitoring inside of a home, it does not fully
regulate the behavior of a former terrorist who still has violent tendencies and keeps terrorist
connections. Fourth, regular reports to a law enforcement agency is an alternative designed to
prevent flight. It won’t prevent an individual from engaging in terrorist acts or providing support
to an organization in his daily life.

110

The least restrictive means that might be used instead of post-sentence detention in prisons
is detention in rehabilitation centers. It would sufficiently isolate terrorists from the outside world
and would at the same time provide treatment and education. On the other hand, it would provide
the government with the opportunity of fully monitoring and observing terrorist behavior. The
closer supervision opportunity would ensure that terrorists are released when they no longer pose
a threat to society and that they benefit from better rehabilitation facilities than regular prisoners.
This means would serve the ultimate purposes (of protecting public safety, public order, and
national security), without unnecessarily infringing on individual’s liberty interest, providing him
with more dignified conditions of custody.

Proportionality stricto sensu (The Balancing Test)
Proportionality stricto sensu (the balancing test) requires a just balance between relevant
individual rights and public interests. The post-sentence detention of terrorists, in this sense,
demands the weighing of the fundamental right of individual liberty against the interests of public
safety, public order, and national security.507
To put it in other words, the social importance of the right to liberty should be measured
against the social importance of the public interest in preventing catastrophic terror attacks through
post-sentence detainment. The social importance and value of a public interest and a particular
individual right can differ depending on the state. The social value of a public interest as well as
an individual right are affected by “different political and economic ideologies”, “the unique
history of each country”, “the structure of the political system”, and “different social values”.508
For example, the protection of human dignity and the prohibition of torture are the most
507
508
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fundamental principles in German law because of the Nazi background.509 By the same token, the
balancing analysis in this paper will be conducted considering Turkey’s own historical
background, constitutional and foundational priorities as well as its social values.
The right to liberty is the primary condition of the complete and fulfilling enjoyment of
every other right. The right to privacy, the freedom of movement, the freedom of expression, the
freedom of association, the right to property and even the right to life would be less meaningful
without an actual physical liberty. All these rights are diminished in prison conditions. Even the
right to property loses its meaning in a prison as the prisoner lacks the proper means and
opportunities to exercise his sovereign power upon his property.
The right to liberty has a paramount importance in Turkey. This is because modern Turkey
was determined to make human rights improvements. The founders of the Turkish Republic were
aware of the fact that the underlying reason for the Ottoman Empire’s collapse was the lack of the
basic concept of freedom (“freedom of the mind from constraint and indoctrination, to question
and inquire and speak”)510 in the society. The founders were determined to instill the Western
values of individualism and freedom into Turkish society, through secular legal enactments. For
this purpose, the Turkish Republic adopted Western statutes in the 1920’s, ratified the ECHR in
1954, and accepted ECtHR’s compulsory jurisdiction in 1990.511 All these efforts indicate
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Turkey’s commitment to international human rights standards, and demand more vigilance in
regulating infringements of liberty.512
Public interest in the post-sentence detention of dangerous terrorists are public safety,
public order, and national security.513 First, public safety is related to the aim of protecting the
public from further terror attacks that are directed to its people’s physical integrity and the sense
of security.514 This interest is higher in the Turkish system due to the variety of terrorist
organizations operating in the Middle Eastern region. The higher the possibility of an attack, the
more public safety interest it generates. Thus, the high possibility of terror attacks in Turkey and
the variety of terrorist organizations engender a weighty public safety interest.
Second, public order515 is a similar concept but with more emphasis on stability in a
country. The continuous terror problem in Turkey and the ongoing wars in the Middle East region
undermines the stability of the country, erodes the sense of security in the society, and diminishes
future life expectations. Thus, the potential of having terror attacks at home and the violence in
neighbors disrupting the smooth running of orderly society, create a substantial interest in public
order.
Third, the national security interest is particularly high in Turkey. The Turkish Republic
was founded on the premise of not making the same mistakes the Ottomans had made.516 The
Turkish Republic was established as a secular parliamentary democracy based on republican
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constitutional values. The nation state adopted the concept of “citizenry” instead of the Ottoman
term of ”subject”.517 The Turkish Republic shifted from religious education to secular education
methods518 in order to bolster cultural, scientific and technological developments in the country.
And lastly, it established a “peace at home, peace in the world principle”519 as a state policy in
foreign relations to strengthen regional security and thereby stability.
Turkey has a great national security interest in the weakening and incapacitation of terrorist
organizations through the post-sentence detention of dangerous terrorists. First, Turkish
democracy and human rights ideals would be strengthened through the elimination of terrorist
organizations and full restoration of law and order in the region. Second, a peaceful society with a
sense of security would bolster future life expectations and thereby technological and scientific
developments. Third, eliminating the threat from terrorist organizations at home and establishing
stability in the Middle East would contribute to Turkey’s territorial integrity.
The balancing of all these interests is a tough issue in the Turkish context. Turkey wants to
make human rights improvements while at the same time it struggles to provide full security and
stability to its vulnerable territory as well as to the neighboring region. The weight of individual
liberty is heavy and thus comes very close in the scale to the public interests of safety, order, and
national security.
Turkey has an authoritarian background. Libertarian and democratic culture is not
enshrined in the very deep of Turkish society. This is because democracy was brought by the
founders of the Turkish Republic through a revolution instead of a gradual evolution in the society.
Turkey moved from a theocratic authoritarian governmental system to a secular democratic
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republic by Atatürk’s cultural and legal revolution. The principles of democracy were imposed by
Atatürk through the adoption of Western constitutional principles and statutes. For these reasons,
I conclude that Turkey lacks a complete democratic culture like in Europe, and it still has to
generate human rights awareness in the society.520 This is possible only through the preservation
of security and peaceful life conditions in the region. Therefore, in the Turkish context, security is
the very prerequisite of exercising individual liberties.
In sum, post-sentence detention of terrorists would pass the fair balancing threshold,
particularly because Turkey’s special circumstances necessitate the consideration of the protection
of the state as the highest value over individual liberty under the lessons it learned from the collapse
of the Ottoman Empire. The more the public interest, the more liberty restriction can justifiably be
imposed. Turkey’s special interests of national security, public order, and public safety therefore
justify such a high deprivation of liberty following the serving of sentence.

(2) Arguments Against Post-Sentence Detention
i.

The Prohibition of Double Jeopardy (Non bis in idem)

Non bis in idem, the right not to be tried or punished twice (double jeopardy) for the same
offense, is an essential principle in European and United States laws. The principle, however, is
not explicitly stated either in the Turkish Constitution or in its Criminal Procedure Code.521
Nevertheless, the non bis in idem principle is integrated into the Turkish system through Turkish
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Constitution Article 90/5. Article 90/5 attributes to international agreements the force of law and
recognizes the prevailing effect of international human rights principles over statutory
provisions.522 The Turkish system thereby applies the non bis in idem principle by incorporating
the European Convention on Human Rights Protocol 7-Article 4/1 into its system.
Some may argue that post-sentence detention on dangerousness grounds violates the nonbis in idem principle for two reasons: First, terrorists will be deprived of their liberty for the
offenses that they have committed before. Second, due to the high infringement that detention
imposes on personal liberty, it would function as a criminal penalty instead of a civil protective
measure, and thus would serve as a punishment in reality. This sub-chapter is intended to address
these concerns. It will first discuss the European and American non bis in idem principles, and
then will provide the reasons why post-sentence detention does not violate the double jeopardy
principle.

The European Court of Human Rights
The European Convention on Human Rights Protocol 7-Article 4/1 refers to the non bis in
idem principle as follows:
Right not to be tried or punished twice
1. No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings under the
jurisdiction of the same State for an offence for which he has already been finally acquitted or
convicted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of that State…

522

International agreements duly put into effect have the force of law. No appeal to the Constitutional Court shall
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The European Court of Human Rights conducts a three step analysis when determining whether
Article 4 is violated: First, whether the proceedings are “criminal” in nature; second, whether the
offense a person is prosecuted for is “the same”(idem); and third, whether there is a duplication of
proceedings (bis).523
The Court assesses the “criminal” nature of the proceedings considering the criteria that
were first established in Engel and Others v. the Netherlands case.524 The Engel criteria require
the examination of three elements when deciding on the criminal nature of the proceedings:
a) “the legal classification of the offense under national law”,525 taking into account whether “the
measure is imposed by a general legal provision applying to all citizens rather than towards a group
possessing a special status”526
b) “the very nature of the offense”,527 taking into account whether it entails the characteristics of
criminal penalties such as punishment and deterrence purposes or only compensation528
c) “the degree of severity of the penalty that the person concerned risks incurring”,529 mainly
considering the nature, duration, and manner of execution of the measure, and whether it cannot
be regarded as “appreciably detrimental” under these features of execution.530 In cases where the
measure involves loss of liberty, the Court presumes that the proceedings are “criminal” and this
presumption can be rebuttable only in exceptional cases.
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The second and third criteria are deemed “alternative and not necessarily cumulative” by
the Court.531 The Court nevertheless warned that “where separate analysis of each criterion does
not make it possible to reach a clear conclusion as to the existence of a criminal charge”, the
cumulative approach may be applicable.532 Therefore, when assessing the criminal nature of the
proceedings, the Court assesses the three criteria independently. If one of these criteria strongly
suggests that the proceedings are criminal in nature, non bis in idem rule would take effect. If there
is no such strong and determinative conclusion, the Court would consider the three criteria together
to determine whether double jeopardy principles are at stake.

The United States Supreme Court
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution demonstrates its commitment to the non bis
in idem principle: “…nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb”. This is regarded as “the Double Jeopardy Clause” in U.S. law. Jeopardy
attaches when a defendant’s trial begins: when the jury is “impaneled and sworn” in a jury trial or
“when the judge begins to hear evidence” in a bench trial.533 In double jeopardy analysis, the U.S.
Supreme Court first examines whether there is a criminal offense, and then whether offenses are
the same.
In Hudson v. United States,534 the Court set forth two elements to determine whether there
is a criminal offense. First, the legislative intent, and second, “whether the statutory scheme was
so punitive either in purpose or effect…as to “transfor[m] what was clearly intended as a civil
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remedy into a criminal penalty”.535 The Court then declared the factors discussed in Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez536 as useful guidelines for such determination:
(1) "[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint";
(2) "whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment";
(3) "whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter";
(4) "whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment—
retribution and deterrence";
(5) "whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime";
(6) "whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is
assignable for it"; and
(7) "whether it appears …excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned."537

The Post-Sentence Detention of Terrorists under the Double
Jeopardy Analysis
Considering European and U.S. approaches, we may conclude that both jurisdictions focus
on the same question when a person is detained after serving a sentence --- whether the continued
detention is “punishment” for the crime previously committed. In determining whether the
detention is “punishment”, the courts generally look for;
•

legislative intent or the legal classification of the offense

•

whether the offense is designed for punishment (retribution) and deterrence purposes
or another civil purpose
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537
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•

whether criminal intent is required

•

the severity of the measure: the nature, duration, and manner of execution of the
measure

•

the measure is applicable to all citizens or just a group possessing a special status

For the purposes of this paper, we will discuss whether the post-sentence detention of
terrorists violates the non bis in idem principle.
The first question is whether the proceedings that would authorize continued detention are
criminal in nature. The main feature of criminal proceedings is that the purpose of the measure
should be punishment (retribution) and deterrence. In the post-sentence detention case, however,
the purpose of post-sentence detention is neither punitive nor deterrent. It is for the prevention of
further terror attacks as well as the incapacitation and rehabilitation of the dangerous, to protect
innocents. Moreover, there is no determination of any criminal intent, which would indicate the
retributive purpose that distinguishes criminal from civil proceedings. Instead of criminal intent,
factors such as mental abnormality or personality disorder, personal and criminal background,
prison radicalization, and prison intelligence will be considered. These factors show a preventive
purpose rather than retribution against or the deterrence of a criminally culpable intent.
Since the proposed measure will deprive a terrorist of his liberty, such a severe limitation
may indicate a punitive intent. Yet, the nature, duration, and the manner of execution of the
proposed preventive detainment suggest otherwise. In terms of the nature and manner of execution,
the detainee, under my proposal, will be kept in rehabilitation centers segregated from prisons.
Rehabilitation centers have less restrictive rules than prisons, and they are supervised by
departments other than the Corrections Department. Different methods of treatment and education
than prisons will be provided to re-integrate a terrorist into society.
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In terms of duration, the confinement is only “potentially” indefinite.538 The detainee will
be released immediately after a determination that he no longer poses a threat to others. This would
not be the case if there was any punitive intent. Another indication showing non-punitive intent is
that the measure will not be applicable for all citizens, but just for terrorists who served their
sentence and yet remain dangerous to society.
The second question is whether the detainee is receiving a second punishment for the
original crime. The answer is no, because under my proposal a new finding will have to be made
that the detainee poses a risk of future dangerousness. Thus he is not being detained for what he
did in the past, but for what he might do in the future. It is true that judges will consider many
factors in evaluating future dangerousness, one of which is prior criminal background. The
offenses a terrorist has committed before, thereby, will be used as supporting reasons for his
continued detention upon determination that the prison did not rehabilitate the terrorist. But prior
conduct will be used only for evidentiary purposes to substantiate the fact that he still poses a
danger to the society. It is not designed to re-punish his past misdeeds. The fact that a statutory
determination is tied to a criminal activity does not deem the statute punitive as well.539 For these
reasons, the post-sentence detention of terrorists does not trigger the non bis in idem principle.
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A similar argument was raised for detention of mentally disordered and dangerous persons by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 363-364.
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Same argument held by the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 292 (1996).
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ii.

Human Dignity

Human dignity is the ideal that everybody is valuable and entitled to a certain level of
respect because of the sole reason that she is a human being. Today, we regard human dignity as
the very essence of human rights.
Human dignity is regarded either as a constitutional value or as a constitutional right
depending on the constitution of each state.540 Yet, what is common in each system is that human
dignity lies behind the existence and protection of basic individual rights such as life, liberty,
privacy, freedom of expression, or even due process rights such as the presumption of innocence
or privilege against self-incrimination.541 Any infringement on these rights thereby harms human
dignity to some extent. Human dignity in this sense is not an absolute right or value, but a relative
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The United States, Turkey and France see human dignity as a constitutional value instead of a constitutional right,
as there is no explicit right to human dignity in constitutional texts of these states. See Carter Snead, Human Dignity
in U.S. Law, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF HUMAN DIGNITY 386-393 (Marcus Düwell et al. eds., 2014);
Stéphanie Hennette-Vauchez, Human Dignity in French Law, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF HUMAN DIGNITY
368-373 (Marcus Düwell et al. eds., 2014); 1982 CONST. Preamble (Turk.) (mentioning human dignity).
The ECHR also does not contain a right to dignity in its text, although the ECtHR refers to human dignity in many
cases especially regarding Article 2 (Right to life), Article 3 (Prohibition of Torture), Article 4 (Prohibition of Slavery
and Forced Labor), and Article 7 (No punishment without law), and Article 8 (Right to respect for private and family
life). Jean-Paul Costa, Human Dignity in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, in
UNDERSTANDING HUMAN DIGNITY 393-399 (Christopher McCrudden ed., 2014). Human dignity in privilege against
self-incrimination (Article 6) is stated only in a dissenting opinion in John Murray v. U.K. (8 February 1996) case.
(Case currently unavailable either print or online) Id. at 398.
Differently, human dignity is a constitutional right under Article 2 &4 of Israeli Basic Law. AHARON BARAK, HUMAN
DIGNITY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALUE AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 280 (2015).
German Basic Law Art. 1 states that human dignity is inviolable and to be respected and protected by the state.
GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], translation at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/ (Ger.). Yet,
German scholars still discuss whether it is a constitutional right or value, as well as if it is absolute or relative. BARAK,
supra, at 227-28, 232-34. Horst Dreier, Human Dignity in German Law, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF HUMAN
DIGNITY 375-385 (Marcus Düwell et al. eds., 2014).
See Aharon Barak, Human Dignity: The Constitutional Value and the Constitutional Right, in UNDERSTANDING
HUMAN DIGNITY 361-380 (Christopher McCrudden ed., 2014), for more general information on the constitutional
right and constitutional value discussion.
541
See generally BARAK, supra note 540, at 156-162, 288-300; Jean-Paul Costa, Human Dignity in the Jurisprudence
of the European Court of Human Rights, in UNDERSTANDING HUMAN DIGNITY 396-402 (Christopher McCrudden ed.,
2014).
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one. Its justifiable limitation depends on the circumstances and the fair weighing of public interests
against individual rights.
For the purposes of this paper, we must address whether post-sentence detention
unjustifiably infringes on human dignity in two respects: First, whether a presumption that a
convict will commit further terror offenses disregards their humane ability to make rational and
autonomous decisions, and thereby treats them as mere objects. Second, whether the right to liberty
is infringed by post-sentence detention to such a deep extent that it would deny individual dignity.
With regard to the first argument of denial of autonomy, the limits of a person’s freedom
of choice should be considered. A person’s autonomy and the freedom of choice are protected so
long as he does not harm the autonomy of others.542 A prospective terrorist thus can lawfully be
refrained from acting under his free will if a state has sufficiently concrete information on his
dangerousness to others, which is supported by his prison intelligence on his continuing
relationship with the terrorist organization, prison radicalization, mental disorder, and personal and
criminal background.
With regard to the second argument that whether the deprivation of liberty of dangerous
terrorists would harm the very essence of individual liberty and thereby human dignity, the state
must assure that the measures of detention will ameliorate these concerns. The detainee should be
kept in humane conditions as well as such conditions proportional to his non-prisoner status. A
disproportionate manner of execution would harm the dignity of the person, and the very core of
the right to liberty. Because a detainee has served the sentence for his initial crime, he cannot be
kept in prison, especially in solitary confinement, and if kept, that would violate his dignity. He
should be kept in places providing more freedom to a detainee but eliminating his dangerousness
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and incapacitating him at the same time. For these reasons, the post-sentence detention of
dangerous terrorists does not unduly offend human dignity, provided that detainees are kept in
dignified conditions recognizing their non-prisoner status.

(3) Safeguards Against Arbitrariness
In order to prevent state arbitrariness against dissenting and minority groups, and to ensure
firm justification of the post-sentence detention of terrorists, some protective legal safeguards must
be established. This chapter presumes that the principle of ‘clear and precise’ laws543 itself is
already a safeguard that states must comply with in the first instance, and offers three more
safeguards for enactment. These safeguards are an articulation of specific dangerousness factors,
a judicial finding of a certain level of cause, and a particular period of detention.
First, the proposed dangerousness factors are prison radicalization, mental disorder, prison
intelligence establishing a relationship with a terrorist organization, and personal and criminal
background. Each sub-chapter explains these concepts and provides information on how to
evaluate these factors. Second, the reasonable level of cause suggested for the post-sentence
detention of terrorists is the preponderance of evidence, followed by a clear and convincing
evidence standard as the duration of detention extends. The level of cause was set up as such
because of two reasons: a) There is a heightened state interest in preventing terrorist attacks, and
b) the liberty interest of convicted terrorists is diminished since they will be kept in less restrictive
rehabilitation center conditions instead of high security prisons.
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i.

The Statutory Factors of Dangerousness
Prison Radicalization

Of course it is so that many terrorist offenders radicalize before they get to prison, but this
may not be the case in all occasions. A terrorist offender may engage in terrorist acts for reasons
other than firm devotion to the terrorist cause. He might instead need financial support or might
be coerced by a terrorist organization. These type of terrorist offenders may nevertheless develop
radicalization in prisons. This sub-chapter therefore focuses on first-time and further radicalization
in prisons.

The Determination of Radicalization
The radicalization of prisoners is a common problem encountered in counterterrorism.
Prison radicalization means the adoption of extremist views and beliefs by prisoners during the
incarceration period.544 These beliefs legitimize the use of violent or non-violent measures to
realize particular social, political or religious objectives.545 Radicalization thus can be either
violent or non-violent, depending on whether a particular ideology and a prison group encourage
violence.546
Radicalization occurs as a consequence of various personal, social, and institutional
factors.547 Personal factors are experiences of discrimination or humiliation,548 quest for self-
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Joshua Sinai, Developing a Model of Prison Radicalization, in PRISONS, TERRORISM, AND EXTREMISM: CRITICAL
ISSUES IN MANAGEMENT, RADICALIZATION AND REFORM 36 (Andrew Silke ed., 2014).
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546
VELDHUIS, supra note 545.
547
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significance549 coupled with low self-esteem,550 and personal uncertainty.551 Social factors are the
unsatisfied need to belong, the need for status and affection,552 the desire for fame and
recognition,553 the identification of oneself with charismatic leadership,554 and gang dynamics in
which prison gangs influence and protect vulnerable prisoners.555 Institutional factors are the
overcrowding556 and understaffing of prisons,557 high staff and inmate change,558 and harsh
confinement conditions.559 The risk of prisoner radicalization does not necessarily exist in all
cases, but the combination of these factors may trigger its emergence.
According to Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, human motivation is grounded upon five stages
of basic needs: physiological needs, safety needs, love needs, esteem needs, and need for selfactualization.560 These needs are in sequence as if in a pyramid, which means that the satisfaction
of the most basic need would generate a desire for the latter. In this sense, prisoners who satisfy
their physiological needs are more prone to radicalization, as they would have the motivation to
meet the second and third level needs of safety and belongingness in Maslow’s hierarchy of
needs.561
Since prison conditions generate an environment with limited autonomy and security along
with violence and conflict between inmates,562 group membership is often seen as the source of
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satisfying the deprived needs of safety and belonging. Further, membership in groups may affect
a prisoner’s self-esteem and personal uncertainty regarding approved and disapproved
behaviors,563 which is a way to meet the fourth need of esteem. Prisoners generate a sense of worth
in prison groups with which they share common ideological or religious values. After the
satisfaction of the esteem needs in a particular group, prisoners search for a meaning and goal for
their life in order to meet their last basic need of self-actualization. They identify the prison group’s
ideology as theirs, and the realization of the group’s purpose becomes their life goal. This is
basically how the radicalization process develops.
Prisoners who are susceptible to violent extremist ideologies and those subjected to
humiliation are more prone to get radicalized in prisons, especially if a charismatic extremist leader
exists. If an accepted ideology and a group encourage violence, there is an increased probability
of violent prison radicalization.564 Conversely, if the group and its leader do not support violence
for political objectives, it is likely that any prison radicalization would be non-violent.565
Prisoner re-integration programs developed by prison managements could be helpful to
loosen the commitment to the radical group and its ideological appeal for a prisoner. Prisons
thereby could in some cases de-radicalize terrorists and re-integrate them into society. Yet, the risk
assessment, which is a pre-emptive security measure,566 should still be employed to make sure that
terror prisoners do not pose any threat to the society when they are released from prisons.
A risk assessment of radicalization is required to determine the dangerousness of an
individual prisoner. The analysis must be based upon; a) a prisoner’s ideology, b) capability
(experience and training), c) political and social environment, d) affiliations, e) emotional factors
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such as grievance, injustice and anger, f) a prisoner’s behavior in custody, g) disengagement
factors such as aging, experiencing a turning point event, delayed deterrence, the expression of
changed priorities, among others.567
The sources of information when determining on these risk analysis factors would be; a)
prisoner interviews, b) specialized testing methods designed for terrorist prisoners,568 and c) third
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Andrew Silke, Risk Assessment of Terrorist and Extremist Prisoners, in PRISONS, TERRORISM, AND EXTREMISM:
CRITICAL ISSUES IN MANAGEMENT, RADICALIZATION AND REFORM 113-115 (Andrew Silke ed., 2014).
568
For example, the Violent Risk Assessment Protocol (Version 2) is being used in high security prison facilities in
several countries for convicted terrorists in sentencing, correctional classification, placements, program interventions
and release determinations. The protocol measures the risk of radicalization of each terrorist prisoner considering
various indicative factors. The basic structure of this protocol is as follows:
a)

BELIEFS AND ATTITUDES
• Commitment to ideology justifying violence
• Perceived victim of injustice and grievances
• Dehumanization/demonization of identified targets of injustice
• Rejection of democratic society and values
• Feelings of hate, frustration, persecution, alienation
• Hostility to national collective identity
• Lack of empathy, understanding outside own group

Low

Moderate

High

b) CONTEXT AND INTENT
• Seeker, consumer, developer of violent extremist
materials
• Identification of target (person, place, group) for attack
• Personal contact with violent extremists
• Anger and the expressed intent to act violently
• Willingness to die for cause
• Expressed intent to plan, prepare violent action
• Susceptible to influence, authority, indoctrination
c)

HISTORY AND CAPABILITY
• Early exposure to pro-violence militant ideology
• Network (family, friends) involved in violent action
• Prior criminal history of violence
• Tactical, paramilitary, explosives training
• Extremist ideological training
• Access to funds, resources, organizational skills

d) COMMITMENT AND MOTIVATION
• Glorification of violent action
• Driven by criminal opportunism
• Commitment to group, group ideology
• Driven by moral imperative, moral superiority
• Driven by excitement, adventure
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party information such as “court reports, prison reports, and other prison documentation, police
reports, assessments by prison and probation staff”.569 When determining whether a prisoner is
radicalized in prison, an all or nothing approach must not be adopted. Instead, an individualistic
analysis should be made considering various indicative factors under the totality of circumstances.

Prison Radicalization in Turkey
The existence of radicalization in Turkish prisons must be determined under an
individualistic analysis for each terrorist prisoner considering various personal, social and
institutional factors. Risk assessments must be conducted for each individual. Although there is no
statistical information on radicalization currently held by the Turkish government, it is possible to
consider whether Turkish prisons are likely to generate radicalized terrorists.
According to Turkish law, convicts are required to be classified on many factors: the types
of crimes, dangerousness levels, the duration of incarceration, recidivism, age, mental and physical
conditions, and hierarchical status in an organization.570 Terrorists are isolated from ordinary
criminals or other organized crime members. Terror convicts are classified in four categories: the

e)

PROTECTIVE ITEMS
• Re-interpretation of ideology less rigid, absolute
• Rejection of violence to obtain goals
• Change of vision of enemy
• Involvement with non-violent, de-radicalization, offence related programs
• Community support for non-violence
• Family support for non-violence

D. Elaine Pressman & John Flockton, Violent Extremist Risk Assessment: Issues and Applications of The VERA-2 In
A High-Security Correctional Setting, in PRISONS, TERRORISM, AND EXTREMISM: CRITICAL ISSUES IN MANAGEMENT,
RADICALIZATION AND REFORM 122, 128 (Andrew Silke ed., 2014).
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leaders of a terrorist organization, active members in a terrorist organization, those who have left
from a terrorist organization, and non-partisan or neutral convicts.571
Prisoner radicalization is a matter of fact in Turkish prisons, according to a security official
in the Counterterrorism Department as well as a corrections judge in Ankara. The security official
complained that:
We detain terrorists at the stage of membership in a terrorist organization at a young age. Yet, they
get out of jail in their mid-ages as professional terrorists ready for new attacks when the head of the
organization demands. They get more radicalized in jail through interaction with more experienced
terrorists.

The corrections judge’s experience suggests the following as contributing factors to
radicalization in prisons:
1- Crowded prison conditions: The prison population was profoundly increased in the last
10 years, from 90,837 in 2007 to 230,519 in 2017.572 According to 2017’s latest governmental
statistics,573 62,924 out of 230,519 prisoners have been jailed for terror crimes. The number of
detainees includes both convicted offenders and pre-trial detainees.574 Among the 62,924 inmates,
49,455 of them have been detained for FETO, 10,193 for PKK, 1234 for ISIS, 1545 for leftist
extremists, and 497 for rightist extremists. Thus, Turkey’s prisons are overcrowded. The overcrowdedness eases the interaction of prisoners from different levels in the organizational hierarchy
and the emergence of a charismatic leader who would direct a group into an extremist ideology.
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2- The understaffing of prisons: There are 53,552 personnel in the Corrections Department
for 230,519 inmates.575 It shows that each corrections officer is responsible for taking care of four
prisoners. In U.K.,576 Spain,577 Germany,578 Italy,579 Holland580 and France,581 in comparison, one
corrections officer is responsible for one to two inmates.582
3- The placement of terrorists in 10 to 20 capacity rooms instead of the legally required 1 to
3 capacity rooms.583
4- Occasional ill-treatment of terrorists by security officials in the 1980s, and terrorists’
abuse of these memories to radicalize others
5- Firm organizational discipline and hierarchy, which makes it difficult to loosen terrorist
bonds and to prevent radicalization.
6- Age: Younger prisoners are more likely to get radicalized than 30-35 years old prisoners
are.
7- The authoritarian and submissive Middle Eastern culture prevailing especially in the
Southeast. This culture generates a human profile who is willing to hand his free-will and
autonomy to another person or a group, and ready to fulfill the orders or wishes of an authoritarian
leader. The main reason for terrorist violence in Turkey is thus not self-actualization but
submission to a leader.
8- The attitudes of the corrections staff towards prisoners, and the effectiveness and
expeditiousness of judicial remedies in case of an ill-treatment.
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The interviewed corrections judge reveals that the Turkish corrections department uses risk
assessment factors only to measure the likelihood of recidivism if released on parole.584 Risk
assessment is used to determine whether an offender is in ‘good condition’ and thus should be
released on parole.585 Risk assessment factors are the same for convicts of ordinary crimes and
terror crimes. There are no risk assessment factors specifically designed to measure violent
extremist radicalization. There is also no statistical data on whether terror convicts get radicalized
in prisons. In his opinion, it is hard -if not impossible- to measure prison radicalization certainly
in mathematical numbers.
The judge might be right that it is hard to measure the likelihood of radicalism precisely in
numbers. Yet, on the other hand, he accepts that radicalization is very likely to occur in Turkish
prisons. Therefore, in my opinion, Turkey must determine particular personal, social and
institutional indicators of radicalization for post-sentence detention purposes, and make a risk
assessment accordingly. The radicalization analysis must be made individualistically and be based
upon interviews with terrorists, court reports, the reports of corrections officers and prison
psychologists, prison intelligence, and the specific radicalization tests designed solely for
terrorists. In conclusion, Turkey must assure, through the enactment of post-sentence detention,
that radicalized terrorists must not be released after their serving of sentences.
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Mental Disorder
A mental disorder is a “clinically significant disturbance in an individual’s cognition,
emotion regulation, or behavior that reflects a dysfunction in the psychological, biological, or
developmental processes underlying mental functioning”.586 Some researchers assert that there
may be a relationship between terrorist involvement and mental disorder. These studies suggest
that terrorist involvement was either the cause or the result of a particular mental disorder if
coupled with recent stressors, and that there was ample evidence of mental disorder among
terrorists.587
To begin with, terrorist engagement can be either the “driving force”,588 or the “byproduct”
of a mental disorder if coupled with recent stressors.589 That is, exposure to violent and traumatic
situations in terrorist organizations may lead to psychological problems such as posttraumatic
stress disorder (PTSD). Additionally, the experience of mental health problems may act as a
background risk factor towards terrorist radicalization if combined with proximal stressors.590
According to research, among 153 lone actor terrorists, 8.5% suffered from schizophrenia,
7.2% depression, 6.5% unspecified personality disorder, 3.9% bipolar disorder, 3.3% PTSD, 3.3%
autism spectrum disorder, 2.0% delusional disorder 1.3% traumatic brain injury, 1.3% unspecified
anxiety disorder, 1.3% obsessive-compulsive disorder, 0.7% drug dependence, 0.7%
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schizoaffective disorder, 0.7% psychotic disorder, 0.7 % dissociative disorder, and 0.7%
unspecified sleep disorder.591
Various studies have been conducted to determine which type of terrorists are more likely
to have a mental disorder. For instance, one study conducted on 119 lone-actor terrorists and 428
group-based actors shows that lone wolf actor terrorists are 13.5 times more likely to have mental
illness than group-based terrorists.592 In the Islamic State context -for instance- mental health
problems are more prevailing among individual terrorists inspired by ISIS than those directed by
it.593
Another study demonstrates the rates of mental disorders within various terrorist types as
follows: 50% for mass casualty offenders, slightly more than 40% for lone actor terrorists, 20%
for solo-actor terrorists (who conducted an act of terrorism by themselves but were directed and
controlled by a larger terrorist organization), over 5% for lone dyads (a group of two terrorists),
and less than 3% for terrorist group members.594 Another study comparing suicide bombers against
other terrorists and non-political criminals shows that; suicide bombers are 43% more likely to
have avoidant-dependent personality disorder, 45% more likely to have depressive symptoms, and
40% more likely to have suicidal tendencies.595
In conclusion, researchers suggest that there is a nexus between terrorist engagement and
mental disorder even though more research needs to be done for more clear and determinative
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analysis.596 What we know for now is that mental disorder can be the cause (if coupled with a
recent stressor) or the result of terrorist engagement, depending on the situation. For these reasons,
in the determination of post-sentence detention, judges should consider expert opinions on whether
a particular terrorist detainee has a mental disorder and whether this mental disorder would make
him attracted to mass violence via terrorist involvement.

Prison Intelligence
Prison intelligence is a useful tool to ensure prison security and to detect potential
organized criminals or terrorist groups existing in the prison system.597 It can also be used as a
means to determine whether a terrorist continues to be dangerous in prisons and would likely
commit further terror crimes when released. Prison intelligence is comprised of various sources of
information:
§

Covert surveillance such as “recording of telephone calls”, “interception of post/mail”, “the
use of listening devices”, “tracking devices”, “dedicated surveillance teams”,
“photographic surveillance”, “video surveillance”, “covert search of letters, packages and
parcels”, the “use of tracking and positioning devices”598

§

Prisoner informants,599

§

Information obtained from prison staff: correction officers, prison psychologists, teachers,
health and rehabilitation officials, prison reports600
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§

Visitor data: “visits from family, friends and associates”601

§

Communications data: the monitoring of “internal communications between prisoners”,
and “external communications between prisoners and their contacts outside of the
prison”602 (monitoring of letters and telephone conversations by the prison administration).

Judges must utilize these prison intelligence sources in post-sentence detention
determinations, particularly to determine whether a terrorist convict continues to be in a committed
relationship with a terrorist organization and to determine whether he is still dangerous to society.

Personal and Criminal Background
Every person bears the traces of his past. Our past is what makes us who we are today. It
is a sign of our tendencies, capabilities, motivations, and future conducts. It is mainly comprised
of our personal and criminal history. For this reason, personal and criminal history can be used for
counterterrorism purposes to anticipate future propensity to violence.
Personal background factors include character, age, health, psychological profile, physical
and mental condition, family, social environment, employment history, education level, financial
resources, the length of residence in a community, community ties, past conduct, and drug or
alcohol abuse history.603 Intelligence reports may be used to support these personal background
factors.
Criminal background factors include past criminal history, court reports in prior
proceedings, the nature and circumstances of prior offenses.604 In assessing the nature and
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circumstances of previous offenses, courts may utilize general sentencing factors. These factors
are the means used to commit prior crimes, their location and time, the significance and value of a
subject matter, the seriousness of the harm or the danger posed by those crimes, the motivation
for those crimes, and the culpability of the intent. 605
Additional personal and criminal background factors specific to terror crimes should be
taken into account when determining the likelihood of future terrorist acts upon release. I propose
the following factors be taken into account:
•

A terrorist’s hierarchical level in the organization,

•

The patterns of behavior of a particular terrorist organization, and a terrorist’s
commitment to those patterns,

•

His prior target selections,

•

The number of terror attacks that he participated in,

•

His level of commitment to the terrorist cause,

•

His contributions to the growth of an organization,

•

Any detachment factors such as a turning point event or changing priorities,

•

His behavior in prison, and

•

Whether he retained capability (experience and training) after discharge from
prison.

605
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ii.

The Level of Cause for Dangerousness

The determination of appropriate levels of cause is an issue of balancing, which is
conducted under the reasonableness standard606 in the United States and the proportionality
standard in Europe. The balancing test used in each standard demands that public interest is
weighed against individual interests, and the suitable level of cause is determined as a result of this
balance. The greater an individual right intrusion is, the higher the level of cause should be.
The rationale in setting levels of cause in European practice and the United States law rests
on the balancing test. Yet, states other than the United States (including the ECtHR jurisdiction)
have not created a clear hierarchy among different levels of cause in their statutes or case law.607
No jurisdiction other than the U.S. uses precise and consistent terms when assessing whether a
restrictive measure satisfied the required cause threshold. Since the only jurisdiction that generated
an accurate hierarchy among levels of cause is the United States, this chapter will be based upon
the standards set by the U.S.
There are five levels of cause used in the United States:
1) Reasonable suspicion: Reasonable suspicion means “a particularized and objective
basis, supported by specific and articulable facts, for suspecting a person of criminal
activity.”608 It is used in stop and frisk cases.609 The scope of reasonable suspicion in
U.S. law and Turkish law are similar. According to U.S. law, reasonable suspicion
requires the police to rely on “their own experience and specialized training to make
inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that
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‘might well elude an untrained person.’ ”610 Under Turkish law, reasonable suspicion
is based on professional experience of a police officer and his interpretations of
particular behaviors of a suspect signaling that a crime is or has been afoot.611
2) Probable cause: Probable cause demands a “fair probability” or a “substantial chance”
of criminal activity. 612 It is used for search and seizure cases.613 According to U.S. law,
probable cause is more than a bare suspicion, and exists “where the facts and
circumstances within knowledge of the officers and of which they had reasonably
trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed”.614 According to
Turkish law, probable cause stems from general life experience. In deciding on
probable cause, the place and time of search, the condition and manners of the person
who will be searched, the features of effects that the suspect carries must be taken into
consideration. There must be corroborating indications supporting tips. The suspicion
must be based upon specific facts. There must be particular facts showing that evidence
or person being searched may be found in the place under search.615
3) The preponderance of evidence (more likely than not): It refers to “superior evidentiary
weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is
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still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than
the other.”616 The standard is used in civil trials as a burden of proof.617
4) Clear and convincing evidence (substantially more likely than not): It refers to the
“evidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably
certain”.618 The concept is used for pre-trial detention.619 Clear and convincing
evidence standard is the middle burden of proof between the preponderance of evidence
and proof beyond a reasonable doubt standards.620
5) Proof beyond a reasonable doubt: It refers to “proof that precludes every reasonable
hypothesis except that which it tends to support”.621 This standard is used to decide on
conviction in criminal cases.622

The issue before us is which level of cause is more proportional or reasonable for postsentence detention of terrorists. In Addington v. Texas,623 the United States Supreme Court
determined that the suitable level of suspicion for involuntary civil confinement of the mentally ill
was clear and convincing evidence. The Court found that the preponderance of evidence would
fall short of satisfying the due process clause, while ‘proof beyond a reasonable doubt’ would be
too burdensome for a civil proceeding.624 The Court reasoned that the preponderance of evidence
required for civil cases would not be protective enough in involuntary civil commitment case of
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the mentally ill especially considering the high intrusion on the right to liberty.625 On the other
hand, the Court concluded that the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard applied in criminal
cases was a poor fit for civil confinement especially because the uncertainties of psychiatric
diagnosis makes it harder to prove that medical treatment is needed.626
In Addington, the Court gave a hint on how to set the right standard of cause. The Court
stated that “when the possible injury to the individual is significantly greater than any possible
harm to the state”, “the individual should not be asked to share equally with society the risk of
error”.627 The Court thereby decided that the equal share of risk of error through adoption of the
preponderance of evidence standard was acceptable only when there was a possibility of greater
harm to the state. The Court implied that the preponderance of evidence standard could be deemed
reasonable in a case where there was a greater state interest prevailing over the right to liberty.
In deciding on whether the preponderance of evidence or the clear and convincing evidence
standard is more reasonable for the post-sentence detention of convicted terrorists, the same logic
will be used. The state interest in protecting society from terror attacks is greater than a convicted
terrorist’s liberty interests. This is so for two reasons: the greater state interest in counterterrorism
in Turkey, and the diminished liberty intrusion in rehabilitation centers. First, the state interest is
greater in terror crimes than in regular violent crimes (or in involuntary confinement of the
mentally ill), for the lives of the mass are at stake in terror cases. Further, the preservation of
national security, public safety and order is the most fundamental social norm prevailing over
individual liberty in Turkey. The Turkish history showed that the state –instead of individuals- was
the sole protector of the democratic culture and individual rights. Without a state that is governed
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by the rule of law and that ensures security and public order, democracy would be undermined and
chaos would emerge.
Second, the manner of liberty intrusion is not as intrusive as in regular detainment since
post-sentence detainees will be held --- under my proposal --- in rehabilitation centers instead of
high security prisons. Rehabilitation centers provide more dignified conditions of confinement
than crowded high security prisons. For one thing, rehabilitation centers will be governed by the
Ministry of Health instead of the Ministry of Justice. These centers would lack the authoritarian
environment of prisons. They will be administered by medical and educational personnel who are
trained to nurse, instead of the corrections officers who are trained to ensure security and use
coercion when necessary. Second, rehabilitation centers would provide more intense educational
courses, employment skills, and psychological treatment than prisons. Third, rehabilitation centers
will provide more freedom of movement than prisons in which prison cells are separated with
dungeons. Rehabilitation centers in this sense are more akin to hospitals than prisons. Their
primary purpose is not retribution or deterrence, but to restore innate humane abilities in a former
terrorist and to reintegrate him into society. Fourth, treatment in rehabilitation centers would be
more individualized and goal-oriented than in prisons that pursue general re-integration policies.
Since the public interest in national security, public safety and public order in Turkey
outweighs the diminished liberty interest in rehabilitation centers, the suitable level of cause in
post-sentence detention is the preponderance of evidence standard. If the detention period extends,
however, the level of cause must be raised to the clear and convincing evidence standard.628 This
is because the liberty intrusion would be greater as time passes, and the preponderance of evidence
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standard would not sufficiently justify a greater liberty intrusion. Thus, a higher standard is needed
for a lengthier intrusion on liberty. The burden of proof rests upon the government.

iii.

The Length of Detention

The threshold period necessary for further detention under the clear and convincing
evidence standard could be determined in two ways. First, we may calculate the average
rehabilitation period in Turkish prisons, and set the permissible detention period under the
preponderance standard accordingly. The average rehabilitation period has not yet been calculated
by Turkish authorities.629 It should be approximately determined, and the standard of proof should
be raised to clear and convincing evidence after the passing of that duration. This suggestion is
worth trying but is hard to implement due to difficulties in the assessment of highly individualized
rehabilitation results.
Second, we may determine a bright line rule and set a certain period of time as a limit. I
suggest that after three years of detention under the preponderance standard, judges review the
case file under the clear and convincing evidence standard. If the latter standard is not satisfied,
the detainee should be released.
Post-sentence detention decision must be automatically reviewed by courts every six
months at a hearing. Any decision extending the detention should be corroborated with expert
opinions.
There is a fair concern that terrorist offenders who refuse to receive rehabilitation
treatments will permanently stay in prisons. It is unfortunately the case, as there is a potential that
somebody will always present a risk.630 It would not be wise to release persons who have the
629
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propensity to commit terror crimes, and give them the opportunity to harm innocents. Otherwise,
the state would be responsible for any attacks as it recklessly opened the way for terrorists.

c) Conclusion

Interviews with officials in counterterrorism practice suggest that there is a need for
prevention-oriented detention laws in Turkey. In order to address this issue, this chapter has made
two proposals: pre-trial detention on dangerousness grounds and the post-sentence detention of
dangerous terrorists.
Turkish law should add dangerousness or propensity to commit a new crime as another
reason for pre-trial detention. This enactment would prevent judges from pre-textually using other
reasons for pretrial detention (destruction of evidence, witness tampering and flight risk) just to
protect society from further attacks. Such an amendment would contribute to the preservation of
judicial integrity and the restoration of public trust in the Turkish judicial system.
The post-sentence detention of terrorists complies with the European standards, especially
because it satisfies the principle of proportionality in Turkey’s circumstances and there can be
adequate safeguards against arbitrariness. The post-sentence detention of terrorists meets the
proportionality standard as it is implemented for the proper purposes of protecting Turkish
national security, public safety, and public order, and it is necessary to protect the public from
terrorism. Post-sentence confinement in rehabilitation centers is also the least restrictive suitable
option compared to other measures. Rehabilitation conditions must of course be designed to
infringe on individual dignity and liberty as little as reasonably possible.
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Post-sentence detention can also satisfy the balancing test, which is the core of the
proportionality analysis. The public interest overrides the individual interest for two reasons: First,
Turkey’s special circumstances require national security to be the foremost social norm. Second,
individual liberty interest is diminished in this case because the detention would be conducted in
rehabilitation centers instead of prisons.
Safeguards against arbitrariness must be imposed --- specifically a required showing of
future dangerousness and a precise level of cause. The dangerousness analysis required that judges
consider various scientific reports on: 1) whether a prisoner is radicalized in a prison by the
influence of more experienced and professional detainees, 2) whether a prisoner had a mental
disorder generating a propensity for violence, 3) whether a prisoner continued to be in contact with
his terrorist organization, and 4) whether his personal and criminal background suggested any
inclination towards violence. Judges would decide on post-sentence detention only if there was
preponderance of evidence. If the detention period is prolonged to three years, judges would look
for clear and convincing evidence regarding dangerousness.
Post-sentence detention of the dangerous might not be acceptable by the ECtHR, although
there are jurisdictions like Germany applying it. The ECtHR would perhaps need to renovate its
case law to allow post-sentence detention in member states where there was a continuous high risk
of terror like in Turkey. If post-sentence detention is enacted in Turkey and the measure goes
before the Court, I suggest that the Court considers Turkey’s enduring national security, public
safety and order concerns in determining its validity.
Post-sentence detention in rehabilitation centers may raise concerns such as potential
mistreatments in these facilities, biased and politically influenced judgments, or attempts to silence
dissidents through continued detention. These are fair arguments, but they are also valid for the
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application of any legal rule affecting individual liberties. If a state does not have effective
oversight mechanisms to oversee the implementation of its rules, these concerns may come true in
the application of any rule. For this reason, what matters at the end is the honesty of government
officials as well as their commitment to the rule of law.

B. LIMITED PROCEDURAL RIGHTS DURING POLICE INTERROGATION
This section explains the procedural rights of suspects during police interrogation in the
U.S. and ECtHR jurisdictions, their legal groundings, the situation in Turkish law, and its gaps. It
makes two proposals to Turkish law, which are based on the comparison of U.S. and ECtHR
jurisdictions as well as on interviews with Turkish counterterrorism officials. The first proposal is
that Turkish judges consider relevant ECtHR decisions on the compelling reasons exception to the
right to counsel and the right to be informed of procedural rights. The second proposal is that
Turkey enacts a law that allows the exclusion of a defense lawyer from a police interrogation when
there is reasonable suspicion (under the professional experience of the police and public
prosecutor) that the lawyer; 1) participates in the same criminal activity or is engaged in the same
terrorist organization with his client, or 2) abuses his communication with his client to commit
crimes or to protect the terrorist organization and its structure, or to jeopardize the security of a
prison.

1. Procedural Rights in Police Interrogation in the U.S. and ECtHR Jurisdictions
In democratic countries, individuals are granted with certain procedural rights that are
designed to ensure fairness and to prevent arbitrary government action in police interrogation.
These rights are the right to counsel, the right to silence, and the right to be informed of these
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procedural rights (including that anything said can and will be used against the individual in court
and that a lawyer will be appointed to him if he is indigent).631 This sub-chapter will explain the
U.S. and European understandings of these common rights, and will discuss whether developments
in the U.S. law affected the European perspective.
According to the U.S. law, the right to counsel, the right to silence, and the right to be
notified of defense rights in police interrogation derive from the Fifth Amendment’s privilege
against self-incrimination.632 The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states that no one
“shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself”.633 The landmark case of
Miranda v. Arizona634 held that the privilege was applicable to the “inherently compelling” incustody police questioning.635 The privilege against self-incrimination is a measure to determine
the proper scope of government power over its citizens.636 The privilege thereby demands respect
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for dignity and integrity of citizens as well as for their free will.637 The right to counsel and the
right to be informed of these rights do not explicitly exist in the U.S. Constitution. They instead
were created by the U.S. Supreme Court as necessary safeguards for the operation of the privilege
against self-incrimination.638
The European Convention on Human Rights, somewhat differently, does not explicitly
contain the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to silence, or the right to be informed of
procedural rights. It only provides the right to counsel in the text of its Article 6-3-c. Yet, although
they are not explicitly written in the Convention, the case law of the ECtHR suggests that the
privilege against self-incrimination and the right to silence as well as the right to be informed of
procedural rights all derive from the right to a fair trial of Article 6.
The ECHR Article 6-3 states that:
Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:
(a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him;
(b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence;
(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if
he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests
of justice so require;
(d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance
and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against
him;
(e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the
language used in court.

According to the ECtHR, a suspect is entitled to these rights at the very beginning of the
charging of a criminal offense. Under the Court’s most recent case law, “a ‘criminal charge’ exists
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from the moment that an individual is officially notified by the competent authority of an allegation
that he has committed a criminal offence, or from the point at which his situation has been
substantially affected by actions taken by the authorities as a result of a suspicion against him.”639
The right to a fair trial thus is effective not only in trial but also in pre-trial proceedings such as
during the police interrogation of a charged suspect.
The privilege against self-incrimination, the right to silence, and the right to be informed
of the right to counsel and silence are regarded as the byproducts of as well as the means of
effectively fulfilling the right to a fair trial.640 In more detail, the ECtHR interpreted the right not
to incriminate oneself and the right to silence as internationally recognized standards that “lie at
the heart of a fair procedure under Article 6”.641 In Saunders v. United Kingdom,642 the Court
determined that the right to silence and the right not to incriminate oneself “lies, inter alia, in the
protection of the accused against improper compulsion by the authorities thereby contributing to
the avoidance of miscarriages of justice and to the fulfilment of the aims of Article 6 (art. 6).” 643
In terms of the right to be notified of procedural rights, the Court ruled that in order for the right
to silence and the right to a lawyer be practical and effective rather than theoretical and illusory,644
a suspect must be made aware of his rights. Further, the right to be notified of procedural rights
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was inherent in the existence of the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to silence and the
right to counsel.645
Since Europe and the U.S. accord similar procedural rights to suspects in police
interrogation, one might wonder whether the American Miranda rule has been exported to the
ECtHR jurisprudence. There is no clear-cut answer to this question. This is because there is no
explicit reference to the Miranda case in ECtHR’s rulings.646 Yet, when ECtHR’s relevant
decisions are compared with that of the U.S. Supreme Court, there is evidence that European
judges have been influenced by the U.S. law.647 That is not to say that ECtHR judges reached the
same conclusion as the U.S. Supreme Court in every single case. Their opinions sometimes differ
in the same issues arising from these procedural rights.648 But the European Court does refer to
American law as a relevant comparison. In Ibrahim and Others v. the United Kingdom,649 for
example, ECtHR compared the European approach with other countries such as the United States
and Canada. Ibrahim is the only case the Court explicitly touched upon the Miranda decision.
Further, we can also assume that ECtHR judges are familiar with the U.S. law especially because
of their distinguished legal background with knowledge of foreign legal developments, including
the U.S.650 All these factors demonstrate that although defense rights in a police interrogation are
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not exported from the U.S. to Europe, there is evidence that U.S. Supreme Court decisions
influenced the European approach at a certain level.

2. Turkish Law, Its Gaps, and Suggestions Based On Comparative Law and Interviews
Turkish law requires mandatory counsel in cases when the minimum statutory punishment
is 5 years of imprisonment.651 Since terror crimes (except terrorist propaganda) require at least 5
years of incarceration, the presence of counsel during interrogation and trial stages is mandatory
in most of the terror cases.652 The law also requires that, regardless of the minimum incarceration
period, a statement obtained in police interrogation without the presence of counsel may not be
used as primary evidence in court if the defendant objects.653 This rule generates an incentive in
the police to provide counsel no matter how serious a crime is just to make sure that a statement
be considered as evidence at trial. Thus, we may conclude that there is an implied mandatory
counsel for all criminal cases.654
A terror suspect thus cannot be deprived of his mandatory right to counsel during
investigation and trial stages, with one exception: the right to counsel can be restricted for 24 hours
by a judicial order issued upon request of a public prosecutor. Yet, even in that case, the police
cannot interrogate the suspect.655 Any police interrogation without the presence of counsel is
strictly prohibited in Turkish law. The number of counsels is limited to three in all cases during
police interrogation, and in terror cases during trial.656
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Under Turkish law, the police are required to warn suspects of the right to counsel, the
right to silence, the right to inform relatives about detention, and of the right to demonstrate the
evidence in favor of him to clear any suspicion against him.657 These rights are required to be
reminded at the beginning of the police’s and prosecutor’s interrogation as well as at trial stages.658
Both the U.S. Supreme Court and the ECtHR have developed a public safety exception that allows
unwarned custodial interrogation when necessary to address an urgent public safety interest.659 But
no such exception exists in Turkey. Thus, unwarned statements, even in cases of imminent danger,
are inadmissible in Turkish courts.660
This chapter proposes two types of amendments to Turkish law: 1) A public safety
exception to the right to counsel and the right to be informed of procedural rights, and 2) The
exclusion of defense lawyers in certain limited circumstances. While the former suggestion fills a
legal hole in the Turkish system when compared to ECHR and U.S. jurisdictions, the latter is
developed as a legal solution to a problem stated by the interviewed counterterrorism officials.
First, the public safety exception should be adopted that would allow unwarned custodial
interrogation, outside the presence of counsel, in cases when there is an urgent need to protect the
657
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life and bodily integrity of third persons. That is, in exceptional cases when there is “an urgent
need to avert serious adverse consequences for the life, liberty or physical integrity of a person”,661
there is a sufficient and compelling reason to dispense with warnings and counsel.
Second, the exclusion of defense lawyers is proposed to counter the issue of unscrupulous
counsel, whose aim is to obstruct the administration of justice by either coercing terror suspects to
remain silent or facilitating an exchange of information between a terrorist organization and a
terror suspect or between suspects. The sub-chapters below examine the two proposals of the
public safety exception and the exclusion of defense lawyers, and provide some relevant
information on foreign laws when necessary.

a) The Limitation of Procedural Rights in the Investigative Stage in Cases of a Public Safety
Threat

This sub-chapter will first explain the U.S. and European laws regarding procedural rights
in emergency conditions, which allow the temporary restrictions on the right to counsel and the
right to be informed of procedural rights in these situations. Emergency conditions refer to cases
when there is an urgent public safety need to protect the life, liberty and physical integrity of the
public. Then, it will explain the relevant Turkish law and make suggestions to it.
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(1) The United States
The U.S. Supreme Court established a public safety exception to Miranda rights in New
York v. Quarles.662 Under the public safety exception, Miranda rights need not be provided to a
suspect when information must be obtained to protect against an imminent threat to the safety of
others. The evidence obtained therefrom thus would not be regarded as illegally obtained and
would be admissible.663
In Quarles, a police officer did not caution an arrestee when he detained him and
immediately asked the whereabouts of a gun after seeing the empty holster on the suspect. The
suspect pointed him to the gun. The U.S. Supreme Court determined that un-Mirandized
statements obtained to prevent a danger to public were admissible at trial. The Court ruled that the
police “were confronted with immediate necessity of ascertaining the whereabouts of a gun which
they had every reason to believe the suspect had just removed from his empty holster and discarded
in the supermarket”. More strikingly, the Court emphasized that the primary reason for added
Miranda protections in the expense of fewer convictions was to effectuate the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. The Miranda Court bore the burden of fewer convictions to
protect the privilege against self-incrimination. In this case, however, the cost would be more than
a simple failure to obtain evidence useful to build a case against Quarles for his conviction. The
cost would be substantial danger to the public,664 thus changing the balance between individual
and public interests that the Miranda Court had struck.
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(2) The European Court of Human Rights
The ECtHR permits temporary restrictions on the exercise of the right to counsel and the
right to be informed of the right to silence in cases when there are compelling reasons such as a
threat against public safety.665 Compelling reasons thus would justify any failure to inform the
suspect of his rights during interrogation. Similar to the U.S. Supreme Court’s Quarles decision
establishing a public safety exception to Miranda warnings, ECtHR also established a “compelling
reasons” exception to the exercise of the right to counsel via the Salduz and Ibrahim cases, and the
right to be informed of the right to silence via the Ibrahim case. Turkey also should establish an
exception to Miranda rights in exceptional cases of urgent public interest, when it would be lawful
for the police to question a person without warnings and without a lawyer present.
In Salduz v. Turkey,666 a minor was arrested on suspicion of participating in an illegal
demonstration supporting the imprisoned leader of the PKK and accused of hanging an illegal
banner from a bridge. He was later convicted of aiding and abetting the PKK. The minor was not
provided with a lawyer during police interrogation. The Court held that there had been a violation
of Article 6 § 3 (c) (the right to legal assistance of one’s own choosing) in conjunction with Article
6 § 1 (right to a fair hearing) of the Convention, given the applicant’s lack of legal assistance as a
minor during police custody.667 The Court further stated that the right to access to a lawyer could
be denied only when there were compelling reasons for a restriction. Such denial nevertheless
could not unduly prejudice the right to a fair trial under Article 6. The important part of the decision
is as follows:
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in order for the right to a fair trial to remain sufficiently “practical and effective”, … access
to a lawyer should be provided as from the first interrogation of a suspect by the police,
unless it is demonstrated in the light of the particular circumstances of each case that there
are compelling reasons to restrict this right. Even where compelling reasons may
exceptionally justify denial of access to a lawyer, such restriction – whatever its
justification – must not unduly prejudice the rights of the accused under Article 6. The
rights of the defense will in principle be irretrievably prejudiced when incriminating
statements made during police interrogation without access to a lawyer are used for a
conviction.668
Ibrahim and Others v. the United Kingdom669 is a leading and relatively new decision
holding that in cases of danger to public safety or if urgencies of the situation require, it is lawful
to temporarily restrict the exercise of the right to counsel and the right to be informed of the right
to silence. Compelling reasons exist when there is “an urgent need to avert serious adverse
consequences for life, liberty or physical integrity of the public.”670
In Ibrahim, the Court specifically evaluated whether safety interviews with a terror suspect
can be conducted without counsel present in the interrogation room for the purposes of obtaining
information that would preserve and secure public safety. The purpose of a safety interview is to
determine the whereabouts of other known accomplices, identities and unknown accomplices
involved in the commission, preparation and instigation of acts of terrorism, and the presence of
other explosive devices or materials likely to cause danger.671 Safety interviews are conducted in
cases when delaying an interview would involve “immediate risk of harm to persons or serious
loss of, or damage to, property”, or “the alerting of other persons suspected of committing a
terrorist offence but not yet arrested”.672
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The Ibrahim case involved four applicants who were suspected of detonating four bombs
which failed to explode on the London transportation system on 21 July 2005. Three of them were
immediate suspects of a terror investigation involving a detonation of a bomb which failed to
explode. The fourth applicant was initially a witness but subsequently became a suspect for
sheltering one of the main perpetrators. The first three applicants received warnings and were then
interviewed by the police (safety interviews) without a counsel present. The fourth applicant was
questioned first as a witness, and then as a suspect after he made self-incriminating statements.
Yet, he was not reminded of his rights and was not provided with a counsel when he began
incriminating himself during questioning as a witness.
The ECtHR discussed whether compelling reasons would justify the lack of a counsel in
the first three applicants’ case, and the lack of a counsel and of any notification of his procedural
rights (regarding privilege against self-incrimination)673 in the fourth applicant’s case. Regarding
the first three applicants’ questioning, the Court ruled that there was an urgent need to avert serious
adverse consequences to the life, liberty or physical integrity of the public. Since a similar type of
an attack in the transportation facilities of London killed more than 50 people two weeks earlier,
the police had every reason to think that London was subjected to a wave of terror attacks, and that
there were other accomplices to the current attempt or that other explosive devices were planted
somewhere else. The Court thus ruled that compelling reasons to protect the public from further
suicide attacks justified the temporary deprivation of the right to counsel. Regarding the fourth
applicant, who was initially questioned as a witness but then as a suspect, the Court was not
satisfied under the circumstances of the case that there were compelling reasons to deprive him his
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right to counsel as well as procedural warnings.674 In sum, the gist of the Ibrahim case is the
determination that the temporary restriction of the right to counsel and the right to be notified of
procedural rights would be lawful if compelling, safety-based reasons exist.675

(3) A Suggestion to the Turkish System
Examining the U.S. and ECtHR jurisdictions, I realized that a public safety exception to
the right the counsel and the right to be informed of procedural rights was absent in the Turkish
system. Although the Turkish system is party to the European Convention and ECtHR decisions
are binding for Turkish authorities, Turkish administrative and judicial officials are unaware of the
existence of such an exception in the ECtHR law. They would know of the exception only if a
similar type of issue came before the Turkish Constitutional Court, and the Constitutional Court
applied the ECtHR precedents of Salduz and Ibrahim. The other way to raise awareness could be
a statutory amendment to the Turkish Criminal Procedure Code, which would recognize unMirandized statements and statements obtained without the presence of a counsel as admissible if
obtained under emergency conditions.
The balancing test between the privilege against self-incrimination and the heightened state
interest in protecting the lives, liberty and physical integrity of third persons weighs in favor of the
latter social interest. This outcome is the reason to establish a public safety exception to the
privilege against self-incrimination which demonstrates itself through the right to counsel, the right
to silence, and the right to be notified of these rights. The right to counsel and the right to be
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notified of procedural rights thus should be limited in exceptional emergency conditions when the
protection of the life, liberty and physical integrity of the innocents justifies the practice.

b) The Exclusion of Defense Counsel

An interviewed security official, a public prosecutor and a judge all claimed that the
presence of counsel was necessary during police interrogation for three reasons: First, his presence
clears the doubts of coercion or inhuman treatment by the police. Second, the police make sure
with a lawyer’s presence that warnings are given about procedural rights. Third, it ensures the
voluntariness of a statement. Having said that, these counterterrorism officials stated that it is fairly
common for a defense counsel to have a relationship with terrorist organizations that goes beyond
client defense. According to the interviewees, there are occasions when defense lawyers act to
obstruct justice and hinder effective counterterrorism efforts. Examples include coercing their
clients to remain silent, or facilitating the exchange of information between a terrorist organization
and a suspect or between suspects. These attempts not only impede the administration of justice
but also preserve and promote a terrorist organization.676
The solution to counter these problems in the Turkish system is not to deprive a terror
suspect from legal advice. It is to ensure that the lawyer is not engaged in the criminal activity of
the accused, does not threaten the suspect, and does not facilitate information exchange. For this

676

For instance, according to the interviewees, in PKK cases, young militants admit to talk to the police regarding
terrorist activities. Yet, the lawyer sent by the PKK to defend him threatens a militant with his life and coerces him to
not to give any statement to security officials. Moreover, in some cases, the lawyer is a member of the terrorist
organization and defends many terror suspects at the same time. This creates the risk that a suspect’s statement will
be transferred to other suspects to ensure consistent statements, which might lead to fabricated but uniform stories
obstructing justice.

159

reason, defense lawyers who are suspected of; 1) engaging in the same criminal activity with the
accused, or 2) coercing the suspect, or 3) facilitating information exchange between the
organization and the suspect or between suspects, or 4) aiming to obstruct justice or hinder
counterterrorism efforts in other ways, should be excluded from the proceedings in the Turkish
system. Turkish law needs an enactment allowing the exclusion of defense lawyers in these four
circumstances. The exclusion should be made via a magistrate court order, after a hearing, on a
showing of reasonable suspicion.
This chapter will first analyze German law, which authorizes the exclusion of defense
counsel in cases of attempts to obstruct justice. It will then consider possible amendments to the
Turkish law that would follow the German model.

(1) The Exclusion of Defense Counsel under German Law
The German Criminal Procedure Code Article 138a permits the exclusion of defense
counsel from proceedings in cases when counsel aims to obstruct justice. The article states that:
(1) Defense counsel shall be excluded from participation in proceedings if he is
strongly suspected, or suspected to a degree justifying the opening of the main proceedings,
1. of being involved in the offence which constitutes the subject of investigation,
2. of abusing communication with an accused who is not at liberty for the
purpose of committing criminal offences or substantially endangering the security of a
penal institution, or
3. of having committed an offence which in the event of the conviction of the
accused would constitute accessoryship after the fact, obstruction of justice or handling
stolen goods.
(2) Defense counsel shall also be excluded from participation in proceedings the
subject of which is a criminal offence pursuant to section 129a, also in conjunction with
section 129b subsection (1) of the Criminal Code, if certain facts substantiate the
suspicion that he has committed or is committing one of the acts designated in subsection
(1), numbers 1 and 2.
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The exclusion of defense counsel is allowed in every stage of proceedings both in regular
crimes (138a-1) and terror crimes (138a-2, 129a that refers to terror offenses under German
Criminal Code). While strong suspicion or suspicion to a degree justifying the opening of the main
proceedings is required for regular crimes, a simple level of suspicion is enough for the exclusion
of lawyers in terror cases. Indeed, in terror cases, the Code only requires that certain facts
substantiate the suspicion that a lawyer 1) is involved in the criminal activity of the accused, or 2)
abuses his communication with the accused in order to commit criminal offences or endanger the
security of a penal institution.677

(2) A Suggestion to the Turkish System
According to the Turkish Criminal Procedure Code Article 151-3&4, defense counsel can
be prohibited via a judicial order from defending a terror suspect, defendant or a convict, if there
is an ongoing investigation or prosecution against him for any terror crimes.678 The ban on defense
counsel can be imposed in every stage of criminal proceedings. The judicial order can be issued
upon request of a public prosecutor, and will only be issued for the terror crime that is the subject
of the accusation. The initial ban is for a year, but it can be extended for six months, two times,
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depending on the circumstances of a terror offense. The ban may be contested by the banned
lawyer. It automatically gets lifted, if; 1) the lawyer’s objection is found reasonable by the court,
or 2) the prosecutor decides not to prosecute after the investigation, or 3) the lawyer is not
convicted at the trial stage.
Turkish law allows the exclusion of a defense lawyer only in a case when the lawyer
himself is under an investigation or prosecution for a terror crime. The current statutory rule does
not focus on the fact that a defense lawyer may be furthering the criminal activity of the accused
without an ongoing investigation or prosecution of the lawyer, or the fact that a defense lawyer
might be facilitating the exchange of information between the accused and his terrorist
organization or between suspects. The rationale of the current statute is to prevent lawyers who
are accused of terror crimes from defending terror suspects. The existence of an investigation or
prosecution is thus the condition of such an exclusion. But that limitation fails to address the other
dangers that defense counsel might create.679
Turkish law needs an amendment similar to German law, in order to assure that any attempt
to block the administration of justice or to further terrorism, at the hands of defense counsel, are
thwarted. A defense lawyer who aims to obstruct justice through abusing his communication with
a terror suspect or to secretly assist a terrorist organization under the name of defending his client,
should be immediately prevented from frustrating trial fairness and counterterrorism efforts. The
state should not wait for an investigation or a prosecution to be formed, as the police would need
to act swiftly to counter any efforts that dishonor proper investigation and effective
679
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interrogation in practice. The current version of the statute is not being applied by prosecutors to exclude defense
lawyers as it requires an investigation and in most of the cases there is no ongoing investigation against these lawyers.
What prosecutors literally do in these cases is to postpone the organization’s lawyer’s meeting with the terror suspect
as much as possible. He also added that Turkish law needed such an amendment allowing the instant exclusion of a
lawyer when there was some reasonable basis that the lawyer was also a member of a terrorist organization or misused
his relationship with the accused.

162

counterterrorism. When a lawyer is excluded, another lawyer should be appointed in his place, and
the police interrogation must cease until the newly appointed lawyer arrives at the interrogation
room.
The magistrate judge on duty at the time of police interrogation can be authorized to issue
the orders of exclusion. The conditions of a hearing should be determined by the legislature, but I
suggest that it be an ex-parte and in camera hearing. This is particularly because of potential
confidential intelligence information indicating the abuse of relationship as well as membership.
Access to this intelligence information by the lawyer would disclose intelligence gathering
activities as well as intelligence sources. The exclusion order should be revoked when its preconditions no longer exist or when no investigation or prosecution have been opened for the lawyer
within one year after exclusion.
The suitable level of cause in enactment should be determined under a balancing test.
Under the balancing test, the appropriate level of cause is to be set by comparing conflicting
individual rights and state interests. The individual interest in this particular case is the right to
counsel of one’s choice. While choice is important, the right to a fair trial would not be
substantially infringed by the appointment of another lawyer, as the suspect would be represented
by and be given the assistance of a lawyer during interrogation. So long as the appointed lawyer
is not prejudiced against the suspect and protects the suspect’s interests, there would not be a
significant individual rights infringement --- that is to say, the right to counsel of choice must give
way to the state interest in protecting against terrorism. Since there is a lesser intrusion on
individual rights, as opposed to the considerable state interest in this case, the use of a simple level
of suspicion should suffice. Reasonable suspicion (in the U.S. sense) that derives from the
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professional experience of the police and prosecutors should be enough for excluding lawyers from
interrogation.
The concrete evidence necessary for the establishment of the probable cause standard could
be a hard burden on authorities. This is because it might be difficult to obtain concrete evidence
right away at the very instance of interrogation. Thus, I suggest that when the police and public
prosecutor suspect under their experience and knowledge that the lawyer aims to obstruct justice
and hinder counterterrorism efforts, he should be replaced with another lawyer via a magistrate
court order.680
More specifically, a prospective enactment may rule that a defense lawyer might be
excluded from police interrogation if there is a basic level of suspicion (reasonable suspicion)
under the professional experience of the police and public prosecutor that the lawyer;
1) participates in the same criminal activity or is engaged with the terrorist organization of
an accused, or
2) abuses his communication with his client to commit crimes or to protect the terrorist
organization and its structure, or to jeopardize the security of a prison.
This amendment has many advantages: First, it would contribute to the realization of
justice by preventing the fabrication of false but consistent statements by terror suspects. Second,
it would prevent a terrorist organization’s lawyer from protecting the leader cadre as well as the
structure of the organization in the guise of defending a suspect. Third, it would help authorities
to better spot the hierarchy, organizational structure and future plans of an organization thanks to
more effective police interrogation. And fourth, it might also hamper any efforts to kidnap a terror
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suspect from a prison facility like a stationhouse, by limiting the physical interaction between an
organization’s lawyer and a terror suspect.

(3) The Proposal’s Compatibility with Relevant ECtHR Decisions
The European Convention on Human Rights requires in Article 6-The Right to a Fair
Trial/3-c that everyone charged with a criminal offense has the right “to defend himself in person
or through legal assistance of his own choosing”. The relevant issue in this proposal is whether the
exclusion of a selected counsel and the appointment of a new counsel by a magistrate court violates
Article 6.
The ECtHR has ruled in many cases that the right of an accused to be defended by a counsel
of “his own choosing” is not absolute. The defendant’s wishes can be overridden “when there are
relevant and sufficient grounds for holding that this is necessary in the interests of justice.”681 Thus,
the right to counsel of one’s own choosing can be limited if the interests of justice demand that the
accused is defended by a court-appointed counsel.682
With regard to the current proposal, the issue before us is whether any efforts of obstruction
of justice by a selected counsel would amount to “sufficient grounds” to conclude that it is
“necessary in the interests of justice” to disregard the right to counsel of one’s choice. In order to
address that issue, we must first consider the precedents of the Court. The Court ruled that there
were sufficient grounds to disregard an accused’s wishes in cases when;
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a) a lawyer did not have the qualifications of a licensed advocate, ruling that such
qualifications were required to ensure “the efficient defense of a person” and “the smooth operation
of the justice system”,683
b) the defendant requested to be defended by his mother and sister, and the court ruled that
they were not qualified as professional advocates and would not have been able to “ensure efficient
defense in compliance with the procedure”,684
c) the defendant requested his uncle to be his representative even though he was already
represented by an advocate of his choosing,685
d) there was a conflict of interest between suspects/defendants represented by the same
counsel,686
e) the adequate representation of a suspect required the appointment of different counsel,
considering the length, size and the complexity of a case, and the possession of certain
qualifications needed for a case.687

In sum, the Court finds that there are sufficient grounds in the interests of justice to appoint
a lawyer against a suspect’s (or defendant’s) wish in cases when; 1) a suspect’s interests in trial
fairness and an effective defense required so, or 2) the representation by a selected lawyer would
contradict with professional responsibility and ethical rules.688
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My proposal requires a court-appointed counsel in cases when there is reasonable suspicion
that a lawyer representing a terror suspect is associated with the same terrorist organization, or
facilitates information exchange between the suspect and the terrorist organization or between
terror suspects. The proposal serves many functions. First, it ensures that a suspect is defended by
a lawyer who puts his client’s interests first rather than the interests of a terrorist organization or
another suspect. Second, it furthers counterterrorism and security efforts of the state by hampering
information exchange between arrested members and the leader cadre of a terrorist organization.
Third, it assures that a lawyer who violates advocacy principles does not take part in the criminal
proceedings, and thereby protects the integrity of the criminal justice system. The proposal for
these reasons is in compliance with the rationale developed by the Court, and would meet the
relevant and sufficient grounds in the interests of justice standard.

3. Conclusion
Turkey’s counterterrorism efforts will be promoted, if Turkish law a) recognizes a public
safety exception to procedural warnings in police interrogation, and b) excludes the defense
counsel that aim to obstruct justice at the very instance of interrogation.
The former proposal implies that Turkish courts should abandon their shallow
understanding of the warning requirement, and should instead make a profound balancing analysis
between individual and social interests at stake. They must acknowledge that the warning

attorney, d) the attorney declines to represent the client for other reasons. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159,
160 (1988). The right to counsel of one’s choice is thus not absolute, and is subject to a balancing test between
competing interests.
It is likely that the U.S. Supreme Court deems it constitutional to exclude the defense counsel who are engaged in
terrorism, if a similar counterterrorism need as in Turkey emerges in the U.S. Therefore, the right to counsel of one’s
choice would be succeeded by counterterrorism needs under the U.S. balancing test as well.
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requirement is not absolute, and emergency circumstances may justify abandoning the rule for a
short period of time.
The latter proposal implies that in cases when a state needs to take a swift action to protect
the administration of justice, its determination could be honored via a grounded judicial decision.
This is the case with dishonest and unethical lawyers who aim to coerce a suspect and hamper
counterterrorism efforts. This suggestion implies that corruptness is unacceptable in any legal
profession with no exception to lawyers. It reflects the society’s expectation of virtue and
professional responsibility from lawyers.

C. COUNTERTERRORISM COURTS
This Section explains the benefits of having counterterrorism courts, along the lines of the
French system of centralized and specialized counterterrorism courts, while taking a lesson from
Turkey’s previous counterterrorism court attempts. It also compares American and Turkish judges’
views on whether counterterrorism courts are necessary. It finally proposes that a counterterrorism
court system, which is comprised of judges and prosecutors with special knowledge and expertise
on Turkey’s national security priorities and the characteristics of terrorist organizations, is
necessary to ensure more effective counterterrorism and to better protect individual rights. The
section also acknowledges with great regret that the Turkish judiciary would not meet the ECtHR’s
independence standard after the 2017 Constitutional Referendum changes,689 and urges the
Constitutional Court to declare the referendum null under Article 2 of the Turkish Constitution.
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The latest constitutional referendum in 2017 made fundamental changes to the Turkish Constitution. It substantially
amended the Article 159 of the Constitution, which is about the formation of the Council of Judges and Prosecutors
that appoints prosecutors and judges in the whole country. See infra for further information.
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1. Why are Counterterrorism Courts Needed?
Successful counterterrorism is a demanding task that requires the coordinated work of two
state departments: security and judiciary. A strong security department is crucial to break the
structure of a terrorist organization, to anticipate and prevent future terrorist attacks, and to provide
peaceful living conditions. An objective and efficient judiciary is essential to complement the
security department in ensuring peace in a society. The judiciary in this sense has three main
functions. First, it is the oversight authority over potential unwarranted and arbitrary human rights
intrusions by security officials. Second, it is the legitimizing authority over preventive and
investigative police activities as well as over the incarceration of convicted terrorists. Third, it is
the adjudicating authority over terror suspects, and serves as a means to protect the public from
the dangerous and to meaningfully realize the retribution, rehabilitation and incapacitation
purposes of criminal law.
The judiciary takes part in counterterrorism in three main stages: the prevention,
investigation, and adjudication of terror crimes. In the prevention stage, magistrate judges work
with intelligence agencies, and issue electronic surveillance orders to obtain information that might
prevent terror attacks. In the investigation stage, magistrate judges issue investigative electronic
surveillance orders, search and seizure warrants and pre-trial detention orders, upon request of
public prosecutors or the police, depending on the legal system. In the adjudication stage, trial
judges determine whether a terror crime is committed pursuant to proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
and decide on a just sentence that would fulfill the purposes of criminal law.690 Trial judges play
an important role in rehabilitating and incapacitating terrorists and in deterring future terror
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suspects. A sentence suitable to the circumstances of each terror case and proportional to the
culpable intent would prevent recidivism and contribute to counterterrorism efforts.
Specialization on counterterrorism requires deep knowledge of: the priorities of national
security, the essential dynamics of national security, the constitutional foundations of a state,
theoretical and historical background on terrorism, the networks and structures of terrorist
organizations, their logistics, the particular patterns of conducting attacks, extensive knowledge
on terror crimes and how they are committed, and the preparatory acts of terrorism.
Some level of expertise in counterterrorism has many benefits in the preventive,
investigative and adjudicatory stages of counterterrorism. For one thing, magistrate judges who
have such information would issue preventive and investigative orders more accurately, error-free
and quick. This is because they would know precisely what to look for in a warrant application as
well as potential deceitful factors that may be used by the police. Thus, they would also be more
alert to counter unnecessary human rights intrusions. For another thing, trial judges’ expertise
would ensure consistency between different terror sentences and prevent sentencing disparities.
This is because terror judges would be more accurate in comparing a terrorist’s position within the
hierarchy of a terrorist organization, their level of culpability, the seriousness of their crimes, and
their level of objective contribution to the realization of an attack.
The possible disadvantages of having expert judges are potential biases against suspects,
subjective determinations, security oriented thinking, and rubber stamping. Yet, these concerns
may not by themselves be the direct results of specialization in the counterterrorism field. They
may well stem from the lack of competency and particular character of a judge, instead of the
enactment of specialized courts. The problem thus derives from the practice and the improper
application of rules, not from the rules themselves. An experienced and responsible judge most
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likely be very alert to unnecessary human rights intrusions and would be far from being a rubber
stamp. For these reasons, the benefits of having specialized courts outweigh its disadvantages, and
specialized expert courts are necessary for successful counterterrorism.

2. The French Example
In France, the investigation, prosecution and trial proceedings are centralized in Paris by a
1986 Law,691 which was legislated upon request of four magistrate judges that investigated the
Islamist terrorist attacks by Georges Ibrahim Abdallah.692 The Paris public prosecutor, the
investigating (magistrate) judge and the Assize Court exercise their authority over the whole
French territory.693 Counterterrorism trials are conducted by the Assize Court in Paris, which is
comprised of seven professional judges.694 Lay persons were replaced with professional judges in
terror cases. This is because the experience showed that lay persons were frequently threatened by
terrorist groups which led to requests to be excused from jury service, obstructing the timely
judicial process.695
The centralization of the investigation and prosecution of terror cases in Paris received
praise from French scholars and criticisms from human rights advocates. Scholars supported the
1986 amendment on the grounds that magistrate judges became as competent as intelligence
agencies and thereby became crucial in preventing terror attacks.696 They even tended to specialize
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An investigating magistrate’s duty is to conduct an impartial investigation to determine whether a crime worthy of
a prosecution has been committed. After such a determination, the investigative magistrate hands the case over to a
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in a particular type of a terrorist organization such as separatist or Islamic.697 The French
experience showed that the handling of terror cases by the same magistrates ensured that they had
holistic and cultural understanding of the Islamic movement. Such knowledge turned out to be
critical “to reduce the time of the investigations, to more quickly arrest the members of a network,
and thus to better prevent attacks”.698 Two magistrate judges from Paris also pointed out the
advantages of specialization as follows: “the specific accumulated knowledge, the more global
overview on the subject, and the fact that the small number of competent judges facilitated
international collaboration.”699
On the other hand, human rights activists criticized the centralization on the grounds that
the small group of prosecutors and magistrate judges can act autocratically. The activists
recommended that pre-trial detention decisions be issued by an independent investigating court
instead of a single judge.700 There were also allegations that some defense counsel experienced
unjustified arrests with lack of substance. 701
In practice, the 1986 Law profoundly increased France’s judicial capacity to prevent terror
attacks and to fight against terrorism.702 While French authorities could not even correctly identify
the perpetrators of a terror attack in Paris in October 1980, they showed a marked improvement
in the ability to anticipate and prevent terror attacks in the late 1990s.703 The Law solved a problem

prosecutor and a defense attorney. Investigating magistrates are authorized to issue search and seizure warrants,
wiretaps and subpoenas. Shapiro & Suzan, supra note 230, at 78.
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Id. at 68. In 1980, French authorities misidentified the perpetrators of a terror attack on a Jewish target as a neoNazi movement, which turned out to be a Middle Eastern terrorist movement. The enactment of the 1986 Law
increased the collaboration between magistrate judges and the domestic intelligence agency. French authorities were
later able to prevent various terrorist attacks such as the World Cup attack in 1998, the Strasburg Cathedral attack in
2000 and the American Embassy attack in Paris. Id.
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previously encountered in the French counterterrorism practice: the lack of coordination and
centralization of anti-terrorist policies, and the politicization of the struggle against terrorism.704
The Law, which both centralized counterterrorism in Paris and generated specialized
prosecutors and magistrates within the Paris Court, had many positive outcomes. First, it
minimized the danger of reprisals against local officials, posed especially by separatists terror
groups in Corsica.705 Second, it generated competency within magistrate judges that almost
amounted to an intelligence agency. Magistrates even tended to specialize in specific types of
terrorist organizations such as separatist or Islamic.706 Third, specialized and experienced judges
have been able to connect the dots by processing all relevant data including intelligence
information. They more easily recognized the existence and identity of a terrorist network.707
Fourth, the specialized investigating magistrates ensured statutory independence from political
authorities, and de-politicized anti-terrorism.708 Fifth, specific knowledge on terrorist
organizations allowed quicker and more effective investigations against terrorist networks as well
as success in destroying terrorist networks and preventing attacks.709 Sixth, a continuing
relationship and confidence between magistrate judges and the French domestic intelligence
agency (DST) were established. The confidence especially stemmed from the fact that the judges
came to understand the concerns of the DST: the protection of intelligence sources, and the threat
that judicial procedures pose to intelligence operations. Magistrates had the power to convert an
intelligence investigation into a judicial investigation, provided that the intelligence obtained
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indicates a criminal act.710 For these reasons, the French experience showed that successful
counterterrorism requires cooperation between the judiciary and intelligence agencies.711

3. Turkey’s Counterterrorism Court Attempts
Turkey has long endeavored to adjudicate terror crimes under a special regime for more
effective counterterrorism. It respectively established state security courts and special courts.
These courts were later abolished for concerns over independence and impartiality as well as for
abuse of power. This sub-chapter will shed some light on these efforts in order to draw conclusions
from previous experiences and to help shape the proposed counterterrorism court system.

a) The Abolished State Security Courts and Relevant ECtHR Decisions

Turkey had national security courts for terrorism and other crimes against state security
and constitutional order until they were abolished in 2004 for E.U. integration purposes.712 The
State Security Court was comprised of three judges, one of whom was a military judge.713 The
European Court of Human Rights ruled in several cases that the existence of a military judge did
not comply with the independence and impartiality requirements of the ECHR Article 6, violating
the right to a fair trial.
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ECHR Article 6714 states that everybody has the right to a fair trial held by an independent
and impartial tribunal. The elements of independence and impartiality principles were determined
by ECtHR decisions. Independence must be from both the executive and the parties.715 In its
independence determination, the Court took into consideration various criteria on judges: “the
manner of appointment of its members”, “the duration of their term of office”, “the existence of
guarantees against outside pressures” and “the question whether the body presents an appearance
of independence”.716 Safeguards of the independence of judges are based on many factors such as
whether the appointment is made for a fixed period of time or on a purely ad hoc basis, the manner
of promotion or advancement of judges, the security of a judge's tenure, their irremovability, and
freedom from outside instructions or pressure.717
With regard to impartiality, the Court established subjective and objective impartiality
standards. First, subjective or personal impartiality referred to the personal conviction or bias of a
judge, and a judge was presumed to be impartial unless proven otherwise.718 Second, objective
impartiality meant that a judge must appear impartial from an objective viewpoint, and “offer
sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt in this respect”.719 Objective impartiality
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demands that courts assure confidence in the public and the accused.720 The main criteria when
deciding on objective impartiality were “whether the judge offered guarantees sufficient to exclude
any legitimate doubt” on impartiality, whether there are ascertainable facts that may raise doubts
as to impartiality, and whether the accused’s fear of impartiality was objectively justified.721
The ECtHR ruled that the existence of military judges in Turkish National Security Courts
violated the independent and impartial tribunal requirements of the right to a fair trial of Article 6.
In Incal v. Turkey,722 the Court reasoned that although the military judges received same
professional training and enjoyed similar constitutional safeguards with their civilian counterparts,
they were subject to military discipline and their assessment reports were prepared by the army.
Secondly, their appointment decisions were made by the army and other administrative authorities.
Thirdly, their term of office was only four years and could be renewed. 723 For these reasons, the
independence requirement was not met. The Court also noted that there were justifiable doubts on
impartiality which left the objective impartiality requirement unsatisfied.724 The Court thus
concluded that the applicant had legitimate reasons to fear that a military judge would be
influenced by causes other than the nature of the case, which would objectively prejudice the
independence and impartial appearance of a tribunal.725 The Court in Ciraklar v. Turkey,726
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Baskaya and Okcuoglu v. Turkey,727 Surek v. Turkey,728 Karatas v. Turkey,729 Sener v. Turkey,730
Sadak and Others v. Turkey,731 and Satik v. Turkey732 ruled with the same reasons that the presence
of a military judge violated the independence and impartiality requirements of the Article 6- the
right to a fair trial.
Following these decisions of ECtHR, and in order to satisfy Copenhagen criteria for E.U.
membership, Turkey abolished the National Security Courts in 2004.733

b) Special Courts for Organized Crimes and Crimes Against State Security

The new Criminal Procedure Code enacted in 2005 assigned the investigation and
prosecution of particular crimes to specific courts established in various cities in Turkey.734 These
crimes are: a) organized crimes involving narcotics production and drugs trafficking, b) crimes
committed within the scope of an organization and involves coercion or threat, and c) crimes
against state security. Terror crimes were prosecuted by these special courts from 2005 until they
were abolished in 2012.735
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The special courts received high criticism from the public since Gulenist prosecutors and
judges prosecuted secular military officials with coup charges and convicted them with fake
evidence.736 The breaking point leading to the abolition was the call of the head of the National
Intelligence Agency to testify about secret talks with the PKK.737 The main reason why the special
courts were abolished was first, the Gulenist officials’ plot against secular military officials, and
second, their efforts to arrest the head of the National Intelligence Agency.

c) Regular Courts Adjudicating Terror Crimes

With the end of special courts, regular assize courts responsible for serious crimes
automatically assumed jurisdiction. Yet, there is a wide concern among lawyers about the
independence of regular assize courts. This is because the Council of Judges and Prosecutors,738
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which unfortunately has become more vulnerable to influence from the executive branch after the
2017 constitutional referendum, has the authority to distribute terror cases to particular assize
courts in each city.739 The Referendum has made many fundamental constitutional amendments,740
including the Article 159 that sets the structure of the Council.741
According to the new law, the head of the Council is the Minister of Justice. The Council
is comprised of thirteen members, who are selected for a four year term that may be renewed one
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appointed by the General Assembly of the High Court of Appeals from among members of the High Court of
Appeals; two regular and two substitute members shall be appointed by the General Assembly of the Council
of State from among members of the Council of State; one regular and one substitute member shall be appointed
by the General Assembly of the Justice Academy of Turkey from among its members; seven regular and four
substitute members shall be elected by civil judges and public prosecutors from among those who are first
category judges and who have not lost the qualifications required for being a first category judge; three regular
and two substitute members shall be elected by administrative judges and public prosecutors from among those
who are first category judges and who have not lost the qualifications required for being a first category judge.
They may be re-elected at the end of their term of office.
(4) Election of members to the Council shall be held within sixty days before the expiry of the term of office
of the members. In case of vacancies for members appointed to the Council by the President of the Republic
prior to the expiry of the term of office, new members shall be appointed within sixty days following the
vacancy. In case of vacancy for other members, the remaining term of office shall be completed by the
substitute.
(5) In the elections in which every member shall vote for the members to be elected to the High Council by
general assemblies of the High Court of Appeals, the Council of State and the Justice Academy of Turkey and
in which every judge and prosecutor shall vote for the members to be elected to the High Council from among
first category judges and public prosecutors of civil and administrative courts; the candidates receiving the
greatest number of votes shall be elected as regular and substitute members respectively. These elections shall
be held once for each term and by secret ballot. [TBMM], supra note 299, for the Turkish Constitution before
the 2017 amendment.
740
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more time.742 Four of the members are selected by the President (from among first category
administrative and civil judges and public prosecutors), while seven of them are selected by the
Parliament (from among members to the High Court of Appeals and to the Council of State, and
professors and lawyers).743 The two other members of the Council are the Minister of Justice and
the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Justice. Since the majority of the Parliament is highly likely
to be from the President’s party under the so-called Presidential system (established by another
amendment to the Constitution through the 2017 referendum), it is likely that the President himself
will select all the members of the Council.744 This way of composition raises concerns over the
independence of the Council as well as the whole judicial body appointed by it. Critics argue that
political influence in appointment and career advancement of judges would be unavoidable in the
Turkish practice under such a system.745
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1982 CONST. art. 159-4 (Turk.).
The ECtHR took a different approach in Galstyan v. Armenia case, and ruled under the circumstances of the case
that:
[A]ccording to the Constitution at the material time, the authority responsible for the appointment of judges,
namely the Council of Justice, was presided over by the President of Armenia. However, the fact that members
of a tribunal are appointed by the executive does not in itself call into question its independence. The Court
notes that judges were appointed to their posts on the basis of a special proficiency test. Furthermore,
safeguards of the independence of judges, such as security of judge's tenure, their irremovability and freedom
from outside instructions or pressure, were guaranteed by the Constitution and the implementing legislation.
In the Court's opinion, these safeguards were sufficient to exclude the applicant's misgivings about the
independence of the tribunal in his case.
Galstyan v. Armenia, App. No. 26986/03, at para. 62 (2007), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-83297.
The Court basically ruled that the appointment of judges by the executive did not by itself show a lack of independence.
Independence must be evaluated in consideration of other factors such as proficiency tests, the security of a judge’s
tenure, freedom from outside pressures, and their irremovability.
744
Gülşen Solaker &Daler Butler, Turkish MPs elect judicial board under new Erdogan constitution, REUTERS (May
17, 2017 4:31 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-politics/turkish-mps-elect-judicial-board-under-newerdogan-constitution-idUSKCN18D0T9;
Human Rights Watch, Q & A: Turkey’s Elections (June 7, 2018 8:AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/07/qturkeys-elections.
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Birce Bora, Turkey's constitutional reform: All you need to know, AL JAZEERA (Jan. 17, 2017),
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/01/turkey-constitutional-reform-170114085009105.html.
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The Council of Judges and Prosecutors assigns terror cases to specific enumerated Assize
Courts in every city.746 Chief-prosecutors of each city (which are appointed by the Council) assigns
prosecutors to terror cases.747 This information suggests that the distribution of terror cases to
enumerated Assize Courts and the assignment of prosecutors are done either on a random or a
political basis, instead of considering any expertise or experience in counterterrorism.
The Turkish special courts experience and developments after their abolishment suggest
that what matters is not how we name the courts but how these courts are composed and how they
function. Whether judges are impartial and independent, and to what extent the appointment of
judges is free from executive pressure, should be the main concerns. The fact that the name tag of
“special” is removed (as done in 2012) does not mean that judges become more protective of
human rights instantly. Regular judges can also be harsh on individual rights and protect the
personal interests of the head of the government in the name of national security, especially
considering the high political influence fueled by the latest Turkish referendum. And this is a sign
of autocracy. Therefore, the independence and impartiality of judges matter more than how we
name the court. Sensitivity towards human rights and devotion to the concept of the rule of law
are all that matters.
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Hakimler ve Savcılar Kurulu [HSKK] [The Council of Prosecutors and Judges], Ağır Ceza Mahkemelerinin Görev
Alanına Giren Bir Kısım Suçlarda İhtisaslaşmaya Gidilmesine İlişkin Hâkimler ve Savcılar Yüksek Kurulu Birinci
Dairesinin 12/02/2015 Tarihli ve 224 Sayılı Kararı [The HSKK Decision Regarding Specialization on Certain Crimes
within the Jurisdiction of Assize Courts], http://www.hsk.gov.tr/DuyuruOku/627_-agir-ceza-mahkemelerinin-gorevalanina-giren-bir-kisim-suclarda-ihtisaslasmaya-gidilmesine-iliskin-.aspx.
747
ADLI YARGI İLK DERECE MAHKEMELERI İLE BÖLGE ADLIYE MAHKEMELERININ KURULUŞ, GÖREV VE YETKILERI
HAKKINDA KANUN [THE CODE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT, DUTIES, AND AUTHORITIES OF TRIAL COURTS AND DISTRICT
APPELLATE COURTS (FOR CIVIL AND CRIMINAL JURISDICTION)] arts. 18-1-2, 20-1-2, available at
http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.5235.pdf (Turk.).
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4. Interviews
Turkish and American judges’ view differ on whether counterterrorism courts are needed.
Turkish judges, in interviews conducted for this thesis, state that specialization is necessary for
effective counterterrorism, while U.S. judges assert that it is unnecessary because regular judges
have no difficulty in understanding terror crimes and terrorist structures. This chapter will provide
information about the interviews conducted with Turkish and American judges and analyze the
reasons for differing opinions between the two countries’ officials.
Turkish judges support the proposal of counterterrorism courts for three main reasons:
security concerns, the different nature of counterterrorism investigations and prosecutions, and
location concerns due to public safety reasons. First, effective judicial mechanism demands that
the security concerns of judicial officials are met by the government. An interviewed judge
adjudicating terror cases stated that judges like him worked under high threat against their life, and
not every judge received the benefit of protective measures such as a bodyguard. If special
counterterrorism courts were established, all judicial officials including prosecutors would receive
protection, and state resources might be more efficiently and accurately directed to terror judges.
Second, the nature of counterterrorism demands that judges and prosecutors know; a) the
ideological backgrounds, goals, hierarchy, network, logistics, financial sources, and the equipment
of terrorist organizations, b) messages directed to the public through attacks, c) the ways of militant
acquisition, d) the indications of a prospective terrorist act, e) the means of propaganda, f) target
population, and g) each terrorist organization’s patterns of attacks.748 According to the judge, these
features of assessment differ for each terrorist organization. Without specific knowledge about
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For the different characteristics of terrorist organizations, see Table 1.
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organizations, it would be hard to recognize the signs of upcoming terrorist attacks, to predict
future attacks and to disclose the terrorist network chain.
Further, an interviewed public prosecutor stated that the interrogation of terror suspects
must be conducted differently from that of regular criminals. A public prosecutor and a judge must
be trained on how to communicate with terrorists. This issue gets more complicated for different
terrorist organizations, with Islamist, separatist, or communist ideological radical views. It requires
different qualities such as expressive self-confidence, technical information on terrorist structures,
some level of vision and incorporation of intuitions, and more direct and strict interrogation
methods.
Moreover, the interviewees argued that expert courts will provide many benefits in the
preventive, investigative and adjudicatory stages. In the preventive stage, regular magistrate judges
are too protective of human rights and too slow on some occasions when reflexive decision-making
is crucial to protect innocent lives. Regarding the investigative stage’s benefits, the expertise of
magistrate courts would lead to quality investigations by more accurate search warrants and
scrupulously prepared evidence packaged in a case file. It would also decrease false positive
warrants. This is because expert judges would know what to look for when authorizing search or
electronic surveillance, depending on the characteristics of a terrorist organization. The police
discretion and arbitrariness in search and surveillance would also be limited in this way.
In the adjudicatory stage, a sentence should fit the actus reus and mens rea of a terror act
under the specific conditions of a case. An interviewed prosecutor added that the determination of
a sentence was a tricky and delicate task that required mastership. For example, a terror suspect
who was coerced under the hierarchy of a terrorist organization to plant a bomb somewhere or to
facilitate the commission of a terror attack by other means is not as culpable as another one who
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internalized the ideology of the organization and would fulfill his task no matter what happens.
Another terror suspect who was coerced by one of the organizations to conduct an attack, but tried
to limit the casualties as much as possible, should be considered differently as well. For these
reasons, experience and competency very much matters in an effective fight against terrorism.
Third, the interviewees argued that the location of counterterrorism courts must be different
than regular courts due to public safety reasons. The large amount of terror suspects that are
currently being tried in regular courts in cities generates security concerns for the public, since
these suspects might try to escape and endanger the general public while they are in transit to the
courthouse. Further, the outside manipulation of the adjudication of terrorists through violent
protests, propaganda in front of courthouses, manipulation attempts through terror attacks on the
way to courthouses would all put the public in danger. That is why establishing permanent
counterterrorism courts that operate from one particular location would contribute to the security
interests of a society.
In contrast to Turkish judges, some interviewed American judges are opposed to the idea
of counterterrorism courts for many reasons. First, they believe that there is nothing special about
terror crimes that would test the competence of regular judges. Second, specialized judges could
end up becoming biased against suspects and over-restrictive of individual rights. Third, repeat
players might become rubber stamp judges, automatically authorizing search, seizure and
electronic surveillance.
American judges could be right in making these arguments in the U.S. system, which is
occasionally under threat by ISIS at its homeland. Turkey, however, deals with more than six
terrorist organizations at the same time at his homeland:749 PKK, ISIS, FETO, DHKPC, TKPML,
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Let alone its international military operations against terrorists in Iraq and Syria.
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Hezbollah, besides their sub-branches in different names. And according to what Turkish judges
say, judging in this environment requires specialized knowledge of the various dimensions of state
security and the terrorist framework. Further, Turkey’s and U.S.’s terrorism problems have
different structures. While U.S. has more international-oriented terrorism for which its solutions
are mostly military, Turkey’s terrorism is both domestic and international oriented. Turkey thus
needs to fight terrorism through both military and judicial means.750 And lastly, the U.S. follows
the Anglo-Saxon tradition while Turkey is among the Continental European legal family.
Traditionally, the Anglo-Saxon legal system does not institutionally separate civil cases from
criminal cases, which might explain the lack of a specialized court culture in the U.S. I conclude
that Turkish and American judges’ views are understandable and supportable considering their
legal backgrounds and the system that they are coming from.

5. Suggestions for Turkey: A Counterterrorism Court System with Civilian Judges and
Prosecutors with Specific Knowledge and Experience on Counterterrorism

a) The Proposed Counterterrorism Court System

The counterterrorism court system should be established in seven districts of Turkey. It
should include prosecutors, magistrate court judges, and trial (and appellate) court judges.
Prosecutors and judges should receive specific information and training for a year or two before
being appointed to the specialized court system. This training should basically be on the national
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France, for example, has domestic terrorism, and uses judiciary more than military as a means for counterterrorism.
We may conclude that while states with domestic terrorism (like France) uses judiciary to counter terrorism, states
with international terrorism (like the U.S.) uses its military for that purpose. Shapiro & Suzan, supra note 230, at 8892.
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security priorities of Turkey, delicate constitutional values with effects on national security,
theoretical and historical background on terrorism, the structures and characteristics of each
terrorist organization, the particular patterns of attacks, extensive knowledge on terror crimes and
how they are committed, and the preparatory acts of terrorism.
The benefits of a counterterrorism court system are briefly as follows: First, prosecutors
specialized in counterterrorism would be more alert to spot any terrorist involvement and the signs
of future attacks. Second, magistrate judges who have some expertise in counterterrorism would
more quickly respond to the pressing moments that require reflexive decision-making through
preventive and investigative measures. And third, trial (and appellate courts) would better
determine a fitting incarceration period to each terror suspect under many factors. These factors
are a terrorist’s level of hierarchy in a terrorist organization, his level of commitment to the terrorist
cause compared to other terrorists, and his particular mens rea and actus reus in the commission
of a terror act. In this way, sentencing disparities between different terror suspects would also be
prevented as much as possible.

b) Counterterrorism Courts under the ECtHR’s Independence and Impartiality Standards

According to the ECHR Article 6 (The right to a fair trial), everyone is entitled to a fair
and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal. Since the current Turkish judiciary
does not satisfy the independence requirement, this study will propose a new way of appointment
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for the proposed counterterrorism court system.751 It will later assess whether the counterterrorism
court system would comply with the objective impartiality standard.
When determining a suitable procedure of appointment, the goal should be to have an
independent process that could lead to an efficient and highly specialized court system.
Accordingly, this paper recommends that a panel of experts on counterterrorism should appoint
judges and prosecutors in the counterterrorism court system. This panel should be determined by
the state bureaucracy instead of politicians. This might help prevent the politicization of terrorism
prosecutions.
The panel should be comprised of representatives of state institutions that take part in
counterterrorism and the protection of individual rights. The panel should heavily be made up of
seniors from the legal profession, but must also include members appointed by security
departments. The High Court of Appeals (Yargıtay), The Council of State (Danıştay), the Office
of the Chief Prosecutor (Yargıtay Cumhuriyet Başsavcılığı), trial court judges and prosecutors, the
Turkish Bar Association, and the Board of Higher Education (Yükseköğretim Kurulu) should each
appoint one representative from among individuals with 20 years of professional experience. These
representatives should be knowledgeable on the constitutional priorities of Turkey, its national
security interests, the essentials of counterterrorism, the structure of terrorist organizations, and
the importance of protection of individual rights in preventing terrorism. The police, gendarmerie,
and military should also send their representatives. The incorporation of security officials in this
process will ensure that practitioners’ experience and concerns are taken into consideration in
judicial appointments. This panel of nine people should have the same duties as those of the current
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This paper focuses on the appointment of judicial officials in counterterrorism court system only. Proposals for
the appointment of the whole judicial body will be made in another article.
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Council of Prosecutors and Judges regarding appointment, promotion, and disciplinary
punishment.
Objective impartiality means that a judge must appear impartial from an objective
viewpoint, and must provide sufficient protections to eliminate any legitimate doubts regarding
impartiality.752 The issue before us is whether judicial officials specialized in counterterrorism
would appear to be impartial from an objective standpoint. This issue has no abstract or theoretical
answer that can be given right away. Objective impartiality should be determined on a case by case
basis. If any legitimate doubts or ascertainable facts that raise doubts on the impartiality of
counterterrorism judges appear in individual cases, then objective impartiality standard would not
be met.
The concern that may arise in terror cases is that judges might feel like they are appointed
to protect state interest over individual interest all the time. Thus, they might be overly restrictive
of individual rights. This result may or may not occur, depending on how competent and
professional a judge is. Some factors to be considered in this determination are his law school
background, the extent to which he is fitting to the requirements of the job, and the extent to which
he gets affected by any biased public view.
Judges should be trained before getting appointed to counterterrorism courts. They should
be taught that the protection of individual rights is also part of effective counterterrorism. State
interest is not necessarily in conflict with the individual interest at all times. This is because states
have an interest in promoting individual rights, for too much restriction on human rights can prove
to be counterproductive. Therefore, counterterrorism judges must internalize the notion that
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Findlay v. the United Kingdom, 1997-I Eur. H. R. Rep. at. para. 73, available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58016.; Morris v. the United Kingdom, 2002-I Eur. Ct. H. R. 387, 410, para. 58,
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-60170.
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effective counterterrorism requires a proportional balance between individual rights and state
interests, and that too much restriction would raise additional terror problems in the future. Only
then will courts dispel doubts about impartiality and assure public confidence in the judicial
system.

c) Conclusion

The ECtHR would not interfere with the necessity of a special court system in a country so
long as the trial is fair enough to satisfy Article 6.753 Special counterterrorism courts with civilian
judges would thus satisfy Article 6 so long as they are formed in a way meeting the independence
and impartiality requirements in practice. As for the current composition of courts, it is impossible
to conclude that Turkish judiciary is independent from the executive branch. The Counterterrorism
Court system could be legalized in Turkey only if the 2017 Referendum is declared null by the
Constitutional Court on the grounds of unconstitutionality for violating the principle of “the state
of law” protected under the Article 2 of its Constitution. If it is not annulled, a new way of
appointment should be enacted specifically for the proposed counterterrorism court system in order
to lessen the effect of politics on the counterterrorism judiciary. This paper asserted that a nineperson panel comprised of senior bureaucrats with expertise on counterterrorism could be
established to ensure the independence of at least the counterterrorism judiciary.
Objective impartiality cannot be presumed to be absent, just because these courts would be
specialized in counterterrorism cases. Specialization, knowledge and experience in one field does
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Incal, at. para. 70, available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58197 , emphasizing that the Court’s “task is
not to determine in abstracto whether it was necessary to set up such courts in a Contracting State or to review the
relevant practice, but to ascertain whether the manner in which one of them functioned infringed the applicant’s right
to a fair trial.”
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not per se mean that state interests will be protected over individual interests in every single case
and that judges would be biased against the accused. Judges should be aware of the circumstances
in which individual interests would need to be protected over that of the state. They also should
know that there is a dangerous possibility of being a tool for protecting the head of the
government’s own personal interests in the name of protecting state interest. To raise such
awareness among judges, they should be given some knowledge on the fundamentals of national
security and counterterrorism, and the role of protecting human rights for more effective
counterterrorism. This may help judges to appear impartial from an objective viewpoint and to
assure confidence in the public, leading the way to satisfying the objective impartiality standard in
each case.

III. CONCLUSION
This study is important in the sense that it made a multidisciplinary analysis and brought
together counterterrorism laws and practitioners in one piece of work. It provided necessary
information on the national and international scope of terrorism, and the evolution of terrorism. It
also provided substantial information to the reader about the history and constitutional structure of
Turkey, and why counterterrorism and national security had paramount importance for the exercise
of individual rights in its territory.
This study concluded that Turkey need not go beyond international human rights standards
in order to more effectively fight against terrorism. This was because those standards were already
considered as national security interests and were enacted by the states that need it. The proposed
amendments did not suggest anything that did not exist in European and American laws. Some of
these proposals were designed for exceptional circumstances and had a limited use in these
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jurisdictions. But they exist. Turkey may also make these amendments. Yet, it should still need to
consider the way judicial and security officials apply these rules.
This study made five precise suggestions that already exist in some European countries and
the United States in some ways. 1) pre-trial detention on general dangerousness grounds, 2) postsentence detention on general dangerousness grounds, 3) a public safety exception to the right to
counsel and the right to be informed of procedural rights, 4) the exclusion of defense counsel from
police interrogation if they aim to obstruct the administration of justice, 5) a counterterrorism court
system that consists of judicial officials with special knowledge and training on Turkey’s national
security priorities, constitutional foundations, and the features of terrorist organizations. These
proposals would not completely solve the Turkish terror problem right away in one day. Yet, they
would surely contribute to the efforts of counterterrorism officials.
This multi-disciplinary study taught me many important lessons. First, fundamental human
rights standards are similar in democratic states. What differs is the weight of a social norm over
another internationally recognized norm in different states. The weighing of norms in balancing
scales differs according to the constitutional structure of a state, and its historical and cultural
backgrounds. Second, the opinions of practitioners are important to enact concrete laws that are
suitable to the needs of the officials in the field. Third, the truthful application of rules is as
important as the enactment of just laws. The sincere application of existing rules unfortunately has
come into question in recent years in Turkey. Fourth, the commitment to democratic international
human rights standards is necessary to ensure peace in a society. We must keep in mind that good
laws may be used inappropriately in the hands of the bad-intended and the dishonest. What is
important to protect a democracy is the honesty and reliability of state officials, and their
commitment to the principle of the rule of law.
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Turkey has made many human rights improvements since its establishment. The
incorporation of European democratic constitutional and statutory principles and the proper
application of these rules by state officials paved the way for individual and social development.
Yet, the politicization of state bureaucracy in the last decade harmed the constitutional system and
its neutral functioning. The 2017 Referendum that changed the Parliamentarian system to a
Presidential system made the condition even worse, as it boosted the influence of the ruling party
in both executive and judicial branches in many ways. Turkish democracy was profoundly harmed
as a result. There is no promising sign of a firmer commitment to the rule of law at the moment.
With an idealist state of mind, I have suggested many proposals that could be applicable if
Turkey restored its commitment to the rule of law. Once again, all that matters are individuals
applying the rules, more than the rules themselves. These proposals could be well-applicable in
Turkey, if the state and its officials were more dedicated to protecting individual rights. As an
initial step in this direction, the Turkish Constitutional Court should declare the 2017
Constitutional Referendum void, and Turkey should go back to the previous Parliamentary System
and to the pre-amendment version of the Turkish Constitution. And the next step should be to
emancipate the state authority from partisanship.
In sum, with these five legal proposals in mind, we must acknowledge that successful
counterterrorism in a state depends on the commitment to democratic principles and the rule of
law. The effectiveness of counterterrorism in Turkey can be increased not solely by legal
amendments, but also reinstating democracy and the rule of law once again.
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